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Abstract  
 
With the rapid growth of new wireless communication standards, a solution that is able to provide 
a seamless shift between existing wireless protocols and high flexibility as well as capacity is 
crucial.  Software Defined Radio (SDR) technology offers this flexibility. It gives the possibility of 
adapting the radio to users’ preferences and the operating environment and supporting multiple 
standards without requiring separate hardware for each standard. In order to avail this enabling 
technology that is applicable across a wide range of areas within the wireless infrastructure, these 
radios have to propose cryptographic services such as confidentiality, integrity and authentication. 
Therefore, integration of security services into SDR devices is essential.  
Authenticated Encryption schemes donate the class of cryptographic algorithms that are designed 
for protecting both message confidentiality and its authenticity. Traditionally, authenticated 
encryption was achieved by using two independent algorithms for encryption and authentication. 
For past few years, new modes of operation of block cipher have been developed that allow us to 
use one algorithm for encryption as well as authentication. This makes authenticated encryption 
very attractive for low-cost low-power hardware implementations, as it allows for the substantial 
decrease in the circuit area and power consumed compared to the traditional schemes.  
In this thesis, an authenticated encryption scheme is proposed with the focus of achieving high 
throughput and low overhead for SDRs. The thesis is divided into two research topics. One topic is 
the design of a 1-pass authenticated encryption scheme that can accomplish both message 
secrecy and authenticity in a single cryptographic primitive. The other topic is the implementation 
of this design on re-configurable hardware in SDRs by closely observing the trade-off between 
area/throughput performance parameters.     
For test and performance evaluation the design has been implemented in Xilinx Spartan – 3 
sxc3s700an FPGA. The resulting implementation consumes moderate number of slices on FPGA 
and achieves throughput in the range of 0.8 Gbps which can be suitably used for SDR applications. 
Comparing with traditional two pass approaches, the presented design demonstrates high 
throughput and small area to performance ratio.  
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Dansk Resume  
 
Med den hurtige vækst i nye trådløse kommunikationsstandarder, er en løsning, der er i stand til 
at levere et problemfrit skifte mellem eksisterende trådløse protokoller og høj fleksibilitet samt 
kapacitet afgørende. Software Defined Radio (SDR) teknologi tilbyder denne fleksibilitet. Det giver 
mulighed for at tilpasse radioen til brugernes præferencer og driftsmiljøet og understøtte flere 
standarder uden at kræve separat hardware for hver standard. For at kunne benytte denne 
teknologi, der kan anvendes på tværs af en lang række områder indenfor trådløse infrastruktur, er 
disse radioer nødt til at tilbyde kryptografiske tjenester såsom fortrolighed, integritet og 
autentificering. Derfor er integration af sikkerhedstjenester i SDR-enheder af afgørende betydning. 
 
Autentificeret krypteringsmetoder tilhører klassen af kryptografiske algoritmer, der er designet til 
at beskytte både besked fortrolighed og dens ægthed (autensitet). Traditionelt blev autentificeret 
kryptering opnået ved hjælp af to uafhængige algoritmer til kryptering og autentificering. De 
sidste få år er nye former for blokalgoritmer blevet udviklet, som giver os mulighed for at bruge 
samme algoritme til kryptering samt autentificering. Dette gør autentificeret kryptering meget 
attraktivt for billige energibesparende hardware implementeringer, da det giver mulighed for 
betydelig reduktion af kredsløbets omfang og strømforbruget sammenlignet med traditionelle 
metoder. 
 
I denne afhandling er foreslået en autentificeret krypteringsmetode med fokus på at opnå høj 
kapacitet og lavt overhead for SDR. Afhandlingen er opdelt i to forskningsområder. Det ene er 
udformningen af en 1-passage autentificeret krypteringsmetode, der kan benyttes til både 
hemmeligholdelse og autenticitet vha. et enkelt kryptografisk primitiv. Det andet område er 
implementering af dette design på rekonfigurérbar hardware i SDR ved nøje at observere trade-off 
mellem kredsløbets omfang  og kapacitets præstationsparametre. 
 
For test og evaluering er designet blevet implementeret i Xilinx Spartan - 3 sxc3s700an FPGA. Den 
resulterende implementering forbruger moderat antal slices på FPGA og opnår kapacitet i området 
ca. 0,8 Gbps, som kan  være passende for SDR applikationer. I sammenligning med traditionelle to 
passage metoder demonstrerer det præsenterede design høj kapacitet og lille kredsløbsomfang. 
som ydelsesforhold. 
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1 
Introduction  
 
Software-defined radio (SDR) has been recognized as one of the most important technologies for 
wireless communications. It offers a flexible mechanism to change transmitter and receiver 
characteristics such as modulation type, radiated power, and air interfaces by making software 
changes. This gives rise to the possibility of adapting the radio to users’ preferences and the 
operating environment and of supporting multiple standards without requiring separate hardware 
for each standard. However lots of security concerns are raised in terms of reconfiguring the radio 
through software (downloading new radio functionality), platform integrity, key management, 
spectrum management, and integrity and confidentiality of data.  
 
The concept of SDR appeared in 1970’s in USA and Europe and the term was coined by Joseph 
Mitola III in 1991[JMI1].  The idea was to signal the shift from digital radio to multiband multimode 
software-defined radios where 80% of the functionality is provided in software.   Mitola presented 
these radios as an intelligent agent able to track radio resources and related computer-to-
computer communications and able to detect user communications needs as a function of use 
context, and to provide radio resources and the wireless services most appropriate to those 
needs. In 1992 United States Department of Defense (DoD) began the development of SDR 
technology through the SPEAKeasy research project, where the idea was to bring all the discrete 
military radios under one umbrella using software radio technology [RJD]. In 1997, the United 
State government launched the Joint Tactical Radio Software Program (JTRS) with the mission to 
develop standardized software architecture in order to improve software component portability, 
know as Software Communication Architecture (SCA) [JTR].  
Initially SCA was mainly developed for military purposes. In 1999 SDR Forum adopted the SCA 
standard and promoted SDR technologies with applications for commercial cellular, Personal 
Communication Systems (PCS), and third generation (3G) and emerging fourth generation (4G) 
cellular services.  
 
1.1 Software Defined Radio  
 
The typical hardware radio system consists of a variety of analogue elements like filters, 
converters, modulators and demodulators. These hardware devices are expensive and offer low 
compatibility with other components. This prompted the idea of SDR, where the user could use 
 
 
2 
 
SDR technology to realize many applications without a lot of efforts in integration of different 
components by moving from analogue to digital technology. Different software modules can be 
implemented to support different modulators and demodulators in the SDR platform. Also with 
the exponential increase in digital technology in terms of performance and productivity will 
continue to move closer to the antenna and replace much of the analogue front end.   
 
Figure 1.1 shows a generic SDR transceiver, where the main components are the radio front-end 
and baseband processor. The front-end part consists of analog hardware modules. As the receiver 
side, the RF front-end part is responsible for RF amplification, down conversion from radio 
frequency (RF) to intermediate frequency (IF) signal and finally convert the signal from Analog-to-
Digital (A2D). On the transmit path, the signal is converted from Digital-to-Analog (D2A) then 
analog up conversion and RF power amplification. The baseband processing unit performs the 
baseband operations, these operations are quite different based on the type of communication 
technologies. However based on their role, it can be categorized into five function blocks:  Channel 
coding/decoding, block interleaving/ de-interleaving, modulation/ demodulation, channel 
estimation, and pulse shaping [TUL].  
 
 
Radio Frequency 
ADC              DDC 
Baseband Processing
DAC              DUC 
Receiver
Tr
an
sm
itt
er
User
RF Front-End
 
 
Figure 1.1: Generic SDR transceiver  
 
 
 
The main feature of SDR is its ability to dynamically adapt according to the radio environment 
through the re-configurability of its components. More precisely, the re-configurability is the 
ability of adjusting operational parameters for the transmission on-the-fly without any 
modifications on the hardware components. This feature gives SDR systems the ability to support 
a variety of mobile radio standards. Unlike implementing radio functional blocks on inflexible 
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) in the past, the technologies such as Field 
programmable Gate Array (FPGA), Digital Signal Processor (DSP) and General-Purpose Processor 
(GPP) are used to build software radio blocks. These components have reconfigurable capability 
and deliver flexibility of programmable architectures with power efficiency and performance. In  
3 
 
 
[TUL] one identifies four different opportunities for reconfiguration in software-defined radio:  
 
• Pre-deployment – Late changes are made in the design process based on the target 
architecture just before the device is deployed. 
  
• In-field upgrade – Device software / firmware is updated to support a new standard or 
feature that was not included at deployment.  
 
• Reconfiguration per call or session – Device is reconfigured at the start of the session i.e., a 
voice or data transmission. This could be to select the most efficient or cheapest service 
available at the point of time.  
 
• Reconfiguration during a call or session – Device is reconfigured during voice or data 
transmission e.g. to hand over from one service to another.   
 
1.1.1 Cognitive Radio  
 
 
The idea of cognitive radio (CR) was first described by Mitola [JMI2], as the natural evolution of 
the SDR. The CR by Mitola was presented as an intelligent fully reconfigurable wireless transceiver 
that is able to detect user communication needs and automatically adapts its communication 
parameters most appropriate to those needs.  Later the focus of the research was shifted towards 
the intelligent and opportunistic use of the radio resources, a technique known as Dynamic 
Spectrum Access (DSA).  
 
Based on this, the concept of CR was more emphasized towards DSA, which led to a new CR 
definition[SHY]: an intelligent wireless communication system, aware of its surrounding 
environment that uses the methodology of understanding-by-building to learn from the 
environment and to adapt its internal states to statistical variations in the incoming RF stimuli by 
making corresponding changes in certain operating parameters (e.g., transmit-power, carrier-
frequency, and modulation strategy) in real-time, with two primary objectives in mind: highly 
reliable communications whenever and wherever needed and efficient use of the radio spectrum. 
 
One of the main capabilities of the CR is its ability to reconfigure, which is enabled by the SDR 
platform, upon which the CR is built. The key enabling technologies of CR are the functions that 
provide the capabilities to share the spectrum in an opportunistic manner. Most of the spectrum is 
already assigned but not used all the time. Here the challenge is the optimal sharing of the 
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spectrum with other existing networks without interfering with their transmission. In order to do 
so the CRs makes uses of temporarily unused spectrum known as Spectrum Holes or white spaces. 
By definition in [SHY] a spectrum hole is a band of frequencies assigned to a primary user, but at a 
particular time and specific geographic location, the band is not being used by that user. However 
if CR is using a particular spectrum hole and another user also starts using this space then the CR 
either move to another spectrum hole or continue using it by altering its transmission power level 
or modulation scheme to minimize interference. Therefore CR is a perfect example for using the 
available spectrum in an efficient and opportunistic manner and through it, it is possible to: 
 
- Sense the available spectrum; 
- Decide the best available channel;  
- Coordinate with other users; 
- Vacate the channel either due to primary user or when the channel conditions worsen.  
 
Cognitive Radio Functions - The main goal of CR is to enable networks to use the available 
spectrum band according to network users Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. However CR 
networks impose unique challenges due to the presence of primary network. Thus new spectrum 
management functions for CR networks are taken into consideration in order to avoid critical 
design challenges like – Interface avoidance, QoS awareness and Seamless communication. These 
functions are as follows: 
 
- Spectrum sensing (SS): The purpose of SS is to allocate only the unused portions of the 
spectrum. The radio monitors the available spectrum bands and look for spectrum holes. 
 
- Spectrum decision (SD): Based on the available spectrum bands and associated potential 
channel estimated channel capacity, the CR user can allocate the channel. The decision is 
not only based on the availability of the channel but also QoS requirements such as data 
rate, error rate, mode of transmission, bandwidth etc.  
 
 
- Spectrum mobility (SM): SM is an important function which allows a network to use the 
spectrum in a dynamic manner. If the specific portion of the spectrum in use is required by 
the primary user, the communication must be continued in another vacant portion of the 
spectrum.  
 
- Spectrum Sharing (SSH): Due to the shared nature of the wireless channel there may be 
multiple CR users trying to access the spectrum, access to the network should be 
coordinated in order to prevent multiple users colliding in overlapping portions of the 
spectrum.    
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1.1.2 Field Programmable Gate Arrays/ System on Chip  
 
For past few years FPGAs have become an increasingly important resource for SDR. A successful 
SDR design is build by designing powerful processing blocks and connecting these blocks to form a 
flowgraph. These blocks are either implemented in software or in soft hardware with an FPGA. 
However with the development in the field of programmable logic, FPGA has ushered in an era of 
rapid prototyping for digital systems. The FPGAs are cost efficient and supplies abundant 
resources too for the system designers. FPGAs are programmed using Hardware Description 
Language (HDL) commonly known as VHDL. Same VHDL code could run on any FPGA that has 
enough logic cells, this characteristic give further flexibility and dynamic upgradeability to SDR 
device.  FPGAs reprogrammable nature makes it ideal for SDRs, so any upgrades or changes in the 
operational parameters can be easily uploaded to the device without any hardware 
reconfigurations.  
 
Partial Reconfiguration – A shared resources model is referred as more efficient architecture for 
SDRs. As compared to dedicated resource model, shared resources are capable of supporting ex., 
multiple waveforms across a single set of processing resources; this allows for much more efficient 
usage of the resources. The technology that facilitates this model is partial reconfiguration of the 
FGPA. Partial reconfiguration allows the replacement of one or multiple functional blocks with a 
different implementation while other portions are either being used by other applications or going 
unused. Without partial reconfiguration, it would be necessary to reconfigure entire FPGA.  
However, using partially reconfigurable platform FPGAs as an SDR system-on-chip (SoC) will 
substantially decrease the component count of the SDR device and reduce power consumption 
while still providing the necessary functionality [PKG].    
 
1.2 Need for Security    
 
Communication between two or more devices over insecure channel, flexibility of implementing 
radio functions such as modulation/demodulation, signal generation etc, on software and 
reconfiguration of radios to upgrade or adapt to user preferences, and regional regulations may 
lead to serious radio security concerns. While reconfiguring the radios have many benefits, the 
ability to reconfigure radio functionalities with software may lead to many security problems such 
as unauthorized use of application and network services, unauthorized modification of software 
and manipulation of radio sets. For example, malicious software can be uploaded into the device 
that changes its radio frequency so that the device will no longer function within the regulated 
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constraints. This could lead to the Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Additionally, transmission of 
unencrypted data over insecure channel could compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the 
data.  
The concept of transmission security is broadly divided at three different levels of security [TAJ], as 
follows: 
 
• Detection – If an unauthorized user is able to distinguish between transmission signal and 
noise, a signal is said to be detected. 
 
• Interception – After transmission signal being detected if an unauthorized user is able to 
identify the specific class of a signal and distinguish from signals belonging to other classes, 
a signal is said to be intercepted.  
 
• Exploitation – If an unauthorized user is able to recover any useful information such as the 
message contents or the origin of the message, then a signal is said to be exploited.    
 
 
Security has always being a hot topic in SDRs weather it is for military or commercial applications. 
However the subject of security for SDR systems is quite broad and covers many issues. In the past 
SDR security has followed few general directions ex., the first direction mentioned in 
[SS1][SS2][HRM]  covers the list of security requirements for the underlying hardware, integrity of 
the platform, downloading upgrades, key management issues, and content protection  and 
possible threats on SDR. The second issue explores the essential issue of secure downloading of 
new radios parameters. A framework for establishing secure download using a tamper-proof 
hardware module is proposed [RFL][LMI][ABR]. The third direction focuses on spectrum 
management and policy enforcement of SDR [PFL][KSA][ATO].  
 
1.2.1 FPGAs for Cryptographic Application   
 
FPGAs are generic semiconductor devices contain programmable logic components called “logic 
blocks” that can be programmed and reprogrammed, as per user-defined logic functions. In recent 
years, FPGAs are designed using the latest technologies to be as competitive as possible with ASICs 
in terms of performance, power and space.  FPGAs compete by being reconfigurable and combine 
the advantages of software and hardware implementation. Additionally, FPGA reconfigurable 
hardware gives advantage in cryptographic applications [ACR][TWC]. Following shows the benefits 
of implementing Crypto solutions on FPGAs:  
 
Algorithm Flexibility - The term flexibility in algorithms refers to the switching of cryptographic 
7 
 
algorithms during operation of the targeted application.  Based on the degree / level of the 
security various encryption algorithms could be programmed or reprogrammed on the fly. 
Majority of security protocols such as IPSec are algorithm independent and allow for multiple 
encryption algorithms. These algorithms are negotiated on a per-session basis and wide variety 
may be required.   
 
Algorithm Upload - It is to be recognized that the devices need to be upgraded at some point with 
newer or securer cryptosystem. The reason could be compatibility concerns with new applications. 
Algorithm upload is necessary because a current algorithm for ex., AES (Advanced Encryption 
Standard) uses only 128-bit encryption keys and to increase the level of security it needs to be 
replaced by AES 256-bit. This could be achieved under the assumption that there is some kind of 
connection to a network, where FPGA-equipped encryption devices can upload the new 
configuration code. As compared to FPGA-implemented this upgrade is practically infeasible to 
ASIC-implemented algorithms.  
 
 Architecture Modification - Most of the encryption algorithms used today are standardized. But in 
certain cases hardware architecture can be much more efficient if it is designed for specific set of 
performance parameters like implementation area, throughput and latency. Based on the type of 
cryptosystem and resources, and area available these algorithms could be implemented on 
sequential or parallel hardware architectures. For example as shown in chapter 5 section 5.3, 
hardware implementation of AES in fully parallel hardware architecture can achieve maximum 
throughput of 32 Gbits/s on Xilinx Vertix -5VLX50T and 51% of area is consumed. Whereas 
sequential architecture uses 20% of area and can achieve maximum throughput of 0.876 Gbits/s. 
 
Resource Efficiency - Today most of the security protocols used for communication between two 
or more devices are hybrid protocols. This means, that a public-key algorithm is used for secure 
key exchange and private key algorithm for encryption of data over channel. Once the keys are 
exchanged and devices are authenticated, the public-key algorithm is not used for the session. 
Since the algorithms are not used simultaneously, the same FPGA device can be utilized for both 
through run-time reconfiguration. This is an important factor in many implementations where 
resources are limited.  
 
Throughput - Comparing FPGAs to general purpose CPU and ASICs, FPGA implementations have 
the potential of running substantially faster than software implementations but slower than ASIC 
implementation. General purpose CPUs are not optimized for fast execution especially in the case 
of public-key algorithms. That happens mainly because they lack those instructions for modular 
arithmetic operations on long operands. AES block cipher for example reaches the data rate of 
112.3 Mbit/s and 718.4 Mbit/s on a DSP TI TMS320C6201 and Pentium III, respectively [ACR]. As 
compared to FPGA implementation of AES on Virtex XCV-1000BG560-6 achieved 12 Gbit/s using 
12,600 slices and ASIC, the Amphion CS5240TK can reach 25.6 Gbit/s at 200 Mhz [TWC].  
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1.2.2 Attacks on FPGA  
 
For past few years, the industrial market is more inclined towards FPGAs due to their benefits of 
re-programmability.  With FPGAs being used in a variety of military and commercial applications 
that require security features and as these designs have become more valuable, attackers look for 
possible vulnerabilities and developers for defenses.  
In case of an implementation of cryptographic algorithm, the main objective of an attacker is to 
recover a secret key that could be a symmetric key or the private key of an asymmetric encryption 
algorithm. Most of the cryptographic algorithms used in commercial applications are publicly 
known and recovering the key facilitates the attacker to decrypt all the future and past 
communication.  
Rest of the section summarizes security issues produced by attacks against given FPGA 
implementation.   
 
Cloning – Due to the generic nature of FPGAs, the image generated for one FPGA device could also 
be used in any other device for same family and size. In such case, attackers can clone image and 
use them in cheaper devices that can compete with the originals. This security vulnerability is 
usually common in volatile FPGA, where the configuration data is stored externally in a nonvolatile 
memory and is transmitted to the FPGA at power-up. An adversary could easily eavesdrop on the 
transmission and get the configuration file.  There are many different concerns with regards to 
cloning. For original system developers, the clone system can hurt the bottom line after significant 
development investments and it could affect the reputation of the original product if the clone or 
poor quality products are marketed as originals. Another threat is cloning /copying of a 
cryptographic algorithm together with its key. In few cases it is possible to run the cloned 
application in decryption mode to decrypt communication. An attacker can also lunch man-in-the-
middle attack and masquerade as the attacked communication party.  
 
Black Box Attack – Black box attack is a classical method to reverse engineer a chip. The attacker 
launches a variant of known-plaintext attack, where an attacker inputs all possible combinations, 
while saving the corresponding outputs. This attack can be used to reveal secret information such 
as secret keys and code books. However this attack is only successful if a small FPGA with specific 
inputs and outputs are attacked and a lot of processing power is available. With today’s design 
complexity and the size of state-of-the-art FPGAs this attack is not really a threat nowadays.  
 
Readback Attack – It is a feature in FPGAs, where the snapshot of the FPGAs current state could be 
retrieved while it is still in operation. It is used for read a configuration out of the FPGA for easy 
debugging. The image (snapshot) is different from original bit stream by missing the herder, footer 
and initialization commands etc. But an attacker can easily readback the design, add the missing 
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static header and footer and use it in other device.  The feature can be prevented by adding few 
security bit provided by the manufactures. Xilinx provides security bit for disabling readback, but it 
can be easily found. When these security bit are used, multiple, majority-voted, disabling registers 
are activated with the FPGA to prevent readback [SAD] [JMA]. Despite of countermeasures, an 
adversary is still able to attack FPGAs with fault injection. This kind of attack was first introduced in 
[DBR], where it was shown to break public-key algorithms by exploiting hardware faults. There has 
been many publications presenting different techniques to insert faults e.g., electromagnetic 
radiation [JJQ], infrared laser [CAJ], and flash light [SSR].  
 
Reverse engineering the image/bitstream -   Once the attacker is in possession of the image, 
assuming the case where image is unencrypted. The attacker will be able to transform bitstream 
into a functionality equivalent description of the original design. Image could be reversed fully or 
partially. Partial image can be used for the extraction of data for the image such as secret keys or 
Block Ram/LUT content without gaining the full functionality of the design. In full reverse image 
one can gain the full functionality of the design and reproduce another bitstream completely 
different from the original one such that it would be hard to prove in fingerprint.    
 
Side Channel Attacks – An attack based on the information gained due to the unwanted leak in the 
physical implementation of a cryptosystem instead of theoretical weakness in the algorithm are 
known as side-channel attacks.  Example of side channels include in particular- power 
consumption, timing behavior and electromagnetic radiation. Today while implementing an 
encryption system on FPGA, additional input / output are used which are not the plaintext or 
ciphertext. The devices produce timing information, radiations, power consumption statistics and 
lot more. Additionally these devices also have additional “unintentional” inputs such as voltage 
that can be tampered with to cause predictable outcomes.  Side channel attacks make use of all 
this information with other know techniques to retrieve keys. In terms of power analysis side 
channel side channel attacks are further classified as Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential 
Power Analysis (DPA), where the attacker studies the power consumption of an encryption device. 
SPA is based on the visual representation of the power consumption of a device will encryption is 
in process. The attacker simply observes system power consumption, as the amount of power 
consumed varies depending on the instruction performed. DPA consists not only of visual but also 
statistical analysis and error-correction statistical methods, to obtain information about keys.  
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1.3 Confidentiality and Authentication   
  
Communication between two parties over an insecure channel often concerns with two main 
security objectives: confidentiality and authenticity of the data. The objective of confidentiality is 
to keep the contents of the information secure and no one but the sender and authorized 
receivers are able to read the data. Authentication of message data verifies the origin and 
improper or unauthorized modification of data.   
In the past, confidentiality of the data was the main and probably the only issue that was 
considered. This was mainly because no other security objectives such as authentication or 
integrity prevented to have access to the information. Only message encryption can protect data 
from eavesdroppers. However encryption of messages provides some sort of authentication but as 
compared to present authentication techniques it is weak and cannot be relied upon. In addition 
to confidentiality, authentication services have been implemented but as add on feature to 
provide extra information security. Encryption algorithms are used to ensure confidentiality while 
Message Authentication Codes (MAC) can be used to provide authentication. In past few years, 
techniques have been invented which can combine encryption and authentication into a single 
algorithm. By combining these two security features and performing single pass operation might 
possibly provide following advantage for hardware implementation:  
 
• The rapid growth of portable electronic devices with limited area has opened a vast scope 
for compact circuit design opportunities. Implementation of single algorithm instead of 
two separate algorithms with definitely has less area requirements.  Reduction in area 
requirements on chip is directly proportional to the reduction in cost.  
 
• Small and compact designs tend to consume less power as compared to bulky designs. This 
is an attractive feature for low-power devices like Cellular phone, PDAs and smartcards. 
 
• Even though separate keys are used for encryption and authentication for better security 
of the system. But both the keys are usually derived from the same master key. This will 
have a slight advantage with regards to the key storage issues over separate algorithms.  
 
• Most of the new designs target performance goals like throughput and throughput-area 
trade-off. In many cases, combined schemes are based on block ciphers, and designers 
have tried to be efficient with the number of block cipher calls required for getting both 
confidentiality and authentication from the algorithm. Based on the mode of the 
operations some of these combined schemes can run in parallel and achieve much higher 
speed than older techniques.  
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From above, the cryptographic schemes that provide both confidentiality and authentication are 
called authenticated encryption schemes. The scheme is designed in such a way that the sender 
produces the ciphertext as well as an authentication tag which is verified by the receiver.  
 
 
1.4 Motivation  
 
The main focus of the thesis is to propose a single pass authenticated encryption scheme to 
achieve faster encryption and message authentication for reconfigurable chips such as FPGAs in 
Software Defined radios. The motivation to focus only on this issue comes from the fact that the 
information security is one of the key relevant aspects of SDR, whether it is for data transmission 
or downloading of radio parameters or upgrades.  Additionally, proposing a crypto solution for 
reconfigurable chips instead of ASICs gives us the possibility to improve and correct hardware 
components. This will reduce the vulnerabilities in the device and improves radio interoperability 
and upgradeability.  
The future of communication systems is expected to be based on SDR principals. SDR provides an 
efficient and comparatively inexpensive solution to the problem of building multi-mode, multi-
band, multi-functional wireless devices that can be enhanced using software upgrades. As such 
SDR can be considered an enabling technology that is applicable across a wide range of areas 
within the wireless infrastructure, both military and commercial. The main issue in these 
communication systems is security, whereby an adversary can take control of a radio system to 
their advantage. Additionally, if a third party modifies a stream at lower layers then higher layers 
can be caused damage upon i.e. application level of a mobile phone. As a result, documents and 
traditional applications of a device can be changed. Thus, various security functions such as 
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality need to be supported in SDR transceivers.  
 
The goal of this research is to find an encryption scheme that can accomplish both message 
secrecy and authenticity in a single cryptographic primitive with the focus to achieve high 
throughput and minimal overhead for these radios. As, it is expected that the speed of the 
network will increase beyond Giga-bit so the need for fast cryptographic solution will be increased 
in the nearest future to take advantage of the future fast speed network.  
 
So the above gives the motivation for the design and careful implementation of an Authenticated 
Encryption Stream Cipher for optimal results in terms of security and speed. Different hardware 
architectures are also taken into consideration to explore trade-off between area utilization and 
throughput in the implementation.   
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1.5 Problem Definition  
  
The problem tackled in this thesis is on how to develop a cryptosystem that could cover security 
features like confidentiality and authentication in single pass as opposed to traditional two pass 
approach. Additionally, keeping the security of the design at par with traditional systems, another 
problem was how to downsize the system and increase the efficiency so the design is ideal for 
implementation of low-cost, low-power SDR device. With this in mind this research gives answers 
to the following questions:  
 
• What important parameters need to be kept under consideration while designing a single 
pass authenticated encryption scheme?  
 
o Parameters like – two separate keys for encryption and authentication, Initialization 
vector, underlying block cipher. For hash functions, security parameters like – pre-
image resistance, second pre-image resistance and collision resistance.  
 
• What is the right trade-off between the security and the performance of the cipher? 
 
o Design of block ciphers are mostly built from a round function in an iterative way. 
Using signal round function for encryption and its repeated use leaves patterns. 
This could be used to break the cipher. To add additional security extra rounds can 
be added but it also increases the complexity of the cipher. Thus, there should be 
right trade-off between the number of rounds and performance of the cipher.  
 
• What are the optimum choices of hardware architecture for cryptosystem?  
 
o In this thesis we explore different hardware architectures for implementation. 
Hardware architectures for cryptosystem are based on feedback and non-feedback 
modes of operation. Such as basic iterative architecture, partial /full loop unrolling 
architecture and pipelined architecture.  
 
• What is the trade-off between minimum area, minimum power consumption, maximum 
throughput, maximum throughput to area ratio, etc? 
 
o Hardware architectures mentioned above have their own pros and cons, ex: in a 
basic iterative architecture only single block cipher is implemented as a 
combinational logic where as in partial loop N rounds are implemented as a 
combinational logic.   
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In this thesis each one of these questions have been analyzed and solved.  
 
1.6 Limitations  
 
Many issues need to be covered in order to make SDR systems secure. The security of SDRs has 
followed many general directions such as: 
 
• Security Threats on the devices; 
• Secure download of new radio parameters;  
• Security concerned with spectrum management and policies; 
 
In this thesis we have limited our research on the authenticity and privacy of the data 
transmission. This could also be applied for the secure upgrade and download of new radio 
parameters.  
 
Another limitation is based on our proposed Authenticated Encryption (AE) cipher. ASC-1 operates 
in a cipher feedback mode (CFB) in order to compute an authentication tag, which means the 
encryption core of the scheme is limited to run in feedback modes hardware architectures, i.e., 
basic iterative or partial loop unrolling. This will certainly limit the throughput of the design as 
compared to the designs in non-feedback mode hardware architectures. However in such kind of 
encryption modes, the encryption and decryption operations are similar so there is no need for 
inverse block ciphers. From implementation point of view this is considered as an advantage.   
 
As mentioned this research is mainly focused on two fundamental information security goals: 
confidentiality and message authentication. Issues like key exchange between communicating 
parties are not considered. We assume that the recipient has knowledge of the secret key that is 
used to derive the Initialization vector and keys for encryption and authentication.  Additionally 
we also assume that the secret / master key is securely placed in a crypto module inside the FPGA.  
 
1.7 Contribution  
 
The contributions given throughout this thesis are the following:  
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• An Authenticated encryption scheme ASC-1 (Authentication Stream Cipher One) that is 
designed using a stream cipher approach instead of a block cipher mode approach; 
 
• Proving the security of ASC-1, by showing that it is secure if one cannot distinguish the case 
when the round keys are uniformly random from the case when the round keys are derived 
by the key scheduling algorithm of ASC-1; 
 
 
• Design and implementation of ASC-1 and Introducing a new crypto unit for reconfigurable 
chips;  
 
• Analysis of performance parameters such as Area utilization, throughput and latency by 
releasing different hardware architectures.   
 
The Publications performed during the Ph.D work:   
 
• Samant Khajuria and Henrik Tange, Implementation of Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange on 
Wireless Sensor Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography : Wireless Communication Society, 
Vehicular Technology, Information Theory and Aerospace and Electronic Systems 
Technology, Wireless VITAE 2011 
• Goce Jakimoski and Samant Khajuria, ASC-1 : An Authenticated Encryption Stream Cipher :  
Selected Areas of Cryptography (SAC), LNCS 7118, Springer, pp. 356-372, 2012.  
• Samant Khajuria and Birger Andersen, Authenticated Encryption for Low-Power 
Reconfigurable Wireless Devices:  Accepted for Journal of Cyber Security and Mobility, 
2012. 
• Samant Khajuria, Comparative Analysis of the Hardware Implementation of ASC-1 : In 
Pipeline.  
 
 
1.8 Organization    
 
Figure 1.2 shows the outline of this thesis, as shown below the thesis is divided into two parts. 
Part I covers the cryptography part of the thesis and Part II is based on the design and 
implementation for the cryptographic schemes.  
 
Chapter 1 provides the overview on Software Defined Radios and the benefits of re-configurable 
architecture, together with the need of security for these architectures and the motivation for the 
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work developed and described in the thesis. 
  
Chapter 2 gives the general introduction of two prime security requirements – Confidentiality and 
Authentication of data. We introduce the cryptographic concept such as symmetric-key encryption 
and cryptographic primitives known as block and stream ciphers with some examples. Under 
Authentication we also give some background information on cryptographic hash functions, where 
both un-keyed and keyed hash functions are covered. 
 
 
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
Chapter 2 : 
Cryptography
Chapter 3 : 
Authenticated EncryptionPA
RT
 I
Chapter 4 : Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)
Chapter 5 : 
Hardware Implemetation
Results
PA
RT
 II
Chapter 6 : Conclusion 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Thesis Outline 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 3 is based on Authenticated Encryption (AE) schemes, where we initially discuss the 
solution to the problem of privacy and authentication in a traditional manner known as “generic 
composition”. Then we look into the advantages and disadvantages of 2-pass and 1-pass 
combined approach with few well known AE schemes. Based on this finally we present “ASC-1 : An 
Authentication Encryption Stream Cipher “ and proof of security of ASC-1 by discussing The 
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information-theoretic case and computational security analysis. 
  
Chapter 4 presents the design and implementation of ASC-1 for FPGAs. At the start of the chapter 
we discuss the architecture and Implementation flow of the FPGAs followed by the role of FPGA in 
SDR with an example of Gnu radio framework and USRP hardware. This chapter also discusses the 
generic SDR structure and System-on-chip (SOC).  Finally we present an implementation of ASC-1 
for Xilinx Spartan-3 xc3s700an FPGA. For better performance and efficient resource allocation the 
design is divided into two parts – Initial phase generation and encryption process.  
 
Chapter 5 summarizes the results for hardware implementation of ASC-1. Performance 
parameters like area utilization, throughput and latency are also discussed and analyzed for 
different hardware architectures for feedback and non-feedback cipher modes. The results also 
show the optimal payload lengths of maximum throughput corresponding to the Bit Error Rate 
(BER) for different data rates. In the end we discuss OFDM modulation in LTE and WiMAX.  
  
Chapter 6 gives the final conclusion and outlook for the future work.  
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2 
Cryptography 
 
 
The name Cryptography comes from the Greek words “kryptos” which means “hidden secret” and 
“graph” which means “writing” and is the art of hiding information. This definition may be 
historically accurate where the focus was only on the problem of secret communication and until 
20th century, cryptography was an art. By late 20 century, a rich theory emerged enabling the 
rigorous study of cryptography as a science and today Cryptography is much more than secret 
information and art. For example, in addition to confidentiality it deals with the problems of data 
integrity, entity authentication, data origin authentication and much more.  
 
As classical Cryptography is basically the process of encrypting and decrypting message, 
encryption is the process of converting normal message or communication (plaintext) into 
unintelligible text (ciphertext). Decryption is the reverse, moving from unintelligible ciphertext to 
plaintext. A cipher is a pair of algorithms which perform this encryption and decryption. This 
operation of a cipher is controlled both by the algorithms and the keys. In communication, 
cryptography is necessary when communicating over any unsecure medium, which includes 
particularly wireless communication. Within the context of any application-to-application 
communication, there are some specific security requirements including [MOV]:   
 
Confidentiality - Ensuring that no one except the intended receiver should be able to read the 
message when transmitting a message over insure channel. An unauthorized eavesdropper should 
not get any information about the contents of the message. Also stored data should be protected 
against unauthorized access.  
 
Authentication - The process of proving one’s identity. This function applies to both entities and 
information itself. Two users trying to communicate should identify each other and/or information 
delivered over a communication channel should be authenticated. For the above mentioned 
reasons, this aspect of cryptography is usually subdivided into two major cases: entity 
authentication and data origin authentication. Entity authentication assures the identity of the 
entity involved and data origin authentication ensures the integrity of the data, if the is message is 
modified and the source had changed. 
 
Data integrity - Assuring the receiver that the received message (neither accidently nor on 
purpose) has not been altered in any way from the original.  To assure this, one must be able to 
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detect manipulation by unauthorized parties.  
 
Non-Repudiation – A mechanism to prove that the sender really sent the message. This prevents 
an entity from denying previous actions.   
 
A fundamental goal of cryptography is to adequately address these four areas in both theory and 
practice. For secure communication there are two types of cryptographic schemes typically used, 
Symmetric Encryption (Secret-key cryptography) and Asymmetric Encryption (Public-key 
cryptography). In this thesis we focus on symmetric encryption schemes and Hash functions which 
are supposed to provide confidentiality and message authentication.  
 
2.1 Symmetric Encryption  
 
Two parties want to communicate over an insecure channel without allowing an eavesdropper to 
obtain or modify any information about their conversation. Another problem is the key 
management issue, where we assume that both the parties have somehow exchanged a secret 
key over a secure channel. The main purpose of these encryption algorithms is to protect the 
secrecy of the message transmitted over an insecure channel. 
 
Generally an encryption scheme consists of two mathematical transformations: an encryption 
function E and a decryption function 𝐷 = 𝐸−1. An encryption function takes the plaintext (𝑃) as 
input and transforms into the corresponding ciphertext 𝐶 = 𝐸(𝑃), and a decryption function 
inverts the encryption function 𝐷(𝐶)  =  𝑃. In order for this encryption scheme to work, 𝐸 should 
be designed in such a way that an eavesdropper cannot extract any information about the 
plaintext after intercepting ciphertext and the decryption function should be kept secret. By 
looking into the practical issues, keeping the whole algorithm secret is never a good idea because 
it means that several algorithms are needed for different partners [CAB]. The idea to overcome 
this problem is to construct a parameterized encryption algorithm. In this scheme both encryption 
and decryption function uses an additional parameter also called as secret key (𝑘),𝐷𝑘′ (𝐸𝑘 (𝑃)) 
for 𝑘′ ≠ 𝑘 does not reveal any information about the plaintext 𝑃. This secret key is usually a bit 
string and depending on encryption scheme the length of this key could vary from few bits to 
couple of hundred bits. A single key is used from both encryption and decryption functions. The 
sender uses the key 𝑘 to encrypt the plaintext p and sends the ciphertext 𝐶 =  𝐸𝑘(𝑃) to the 
receiver. The receiver applies the same key 𝑘 to decrypt the message and recover the 
plaintext 𝑃 =  𝐷𝑘(𝐶). 
 
 
Definition 2.1 [STN]: A symmetric cryptosystem, also called a symmetric encryption scheme, is a 
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five-tuple (𝑃,𝐶,𝐾,𝐸,𝐷) where 𝑃 is the finite field set of plaintexts ,𝐶 is the finite set of ciphertexts 
and 𝐾 is the key space. For each key 𝑘 ∈  𝐾 there is an encryption function 𝐸𝑘 ∈  𝐸 with respect 
to 𝑘,  
 
𝐸𝑘   : 𝑃 -> 𝐶 
and a corresponding decryption function 𝐷𝑘   ∈  𝐷, 
 
𝐷𝑘  : 𝐶 -> 𝑃 
 
Such that 𝐷𝑘 (𝐸𝑘 (𝑝)) = 𝑝 for all plaintexts  𝑝  ∈  𝑃.  
 
From the above, it is clear that the key must be known to both the sender and the receiver. The 
biggest difficulty with this approach is the distribution of the key; exchange of secret key over a 
secure channel beforehand. In 1970s, Diffie and Hellman proposed trapdoor one-way functions 
where the secrecy of the encryption function was not necessary. These are functions which are 
easy to evaluate, but cannot be efficiently inverted, unless some extra information (the trapdoor) 
is given. This insight gave birth to Public-Key Cryptography (PKC). Two keys are used in public-key 
cryptosystem; a public and a private key, where the public defines the encryption function and the 
private key is the trapdoor information needed to invert the encryption function. When user 𝐴 
wants to send a message to user 𝐵, user 𝐴 then encrypts the message using 𝐵’s public key. Public 
is usually obtained by a direct exchange over insecure channel or from a trusted source, often 
referred to as Certificate Authority (CA). Afterwards, user 𝐵 is able to decrypt the message using it 
own private key. Public-key cryptography has huge advantage as both the parties do not have to 
exchange any information over secure channel before they start exchanging messages. However, 
symmetric cryptography still plays a vital role in practical systems because symmetric encryption is 
an order of magnitude more efficient than public key encryption. In the remainder of this thesis 
we only consider symmetric encryption schemes. 
 
Symmetric encryption algorithm are traditionally divided into two categories: stream ciphers and 
block ciphers; A stream cipher operate on a single bit, byte, and word at a time and implement 
some form of feedback mechanism so that the key is constantly changing. As the name say in a 
block cipher, the scheme encrypts one block of data at a time using the same key on each block. In 
general, the same plaintext block will always encrypt to the same ciphertext when using the same 
key in a block cipher whereas the same plaintext will encrypt to different ciphertext in a stream 
cipher. 
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2.2 Block Cipher  
 
Block ciphers can be either symmetric-key or asymmetric-key. In this thesis our main focus is 
symmetric-key block ciphers. Symmetric-key block ciphers play an important role in many 
cryptographic systems. Their flexibility allows construction of pseudorandom number generators, 
stream ciphers, Messages Authentication codes and hash function.  
 
As the name suggest block ciphers operate on fixed lengths of plaintext blocks, cipher function 
maps 𝑛-bit plaintext to 𝑛-bit ciphertext blocks where 𝑛 is called the blocklength of the cipher. The 
mapping is controlled by the second input – the secret key. It is generally assumed that the key is 
chosen at random. For 𝑛-bit plaintext and ciphertext blocks and a fixed key, the encryption 
function is a bijection, defining a permutation and substitution on 𝑛 -bit vectors.  Each key 
potentially defines a different bijection. As mentioned two important parameters of a block cipher 
are the block size which are normally 64 or 128 bits and key size generally ranges from 56 to 256 
bits.  
 
Most Block ciphers follow the same general approach. It simply consists of sequence of operations 
called round functions repeatedly applied 𝑟 times on the input. Round function takes the output of 
the previous round and output the input of the next round. Addition to the intermediate output 
from the previous round, round function also uses a subkey (round key) which is usually derived 
from the secret key by a key schedule algorithm and are called key schedule. The receiver should 
be able to uniquely decrypt the ciphertext, so for the fixed key the round function is by definition 
bijective.  
Majority of block ciphers are either realized as Feistel ciphers or Substitution-Permutation (SP) 
networks. In Feistel cipher, the round function operates only on one half of the block while the 
other half remains unchanged where as in SP networks, the round function combines layers of 
invertible functions such as substitutions and permutations. The substitution functions, also called 
as S-boxes (Substitution boxes) are usually implemented as look-up tables. The S-boxes are non-
linear and introduce local confusion. The permutation layer is an affine transformation that 
operates on the complete block and introduces diffusion.  
 
Definition 2.2 [MOV] - An 𝑛 -bit block cipher is a function 𝐸 ∶  𝑉𝑛  ×  𝐾 → 𝑉𝑛, such that for each 
key 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾, 𝐸(𝑃,𝑘) is an invertible mapping (the encryption function for 𝑘) from 𝑉𝑛  to 𝑉𝑛  , 
written 𝐸𝑘(𝑃). The inverse mapping is the decryption function, denoted 𝐷𝑘(𝐶).  𝐶 =  𝐸𝑘(𝑃) 
denotes that ciphertext 𝐶 results from encrypting plaintext 𝑃 under 𝑘.  
 
Block ciphers generally process plaintext in relatively large block. For plaintext messages exceeding 
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one block in length, various modes of operations for block ciphers are used.  
 
Electronic CodeBook (ECB) [MOV] [BCM] mode, as shown in figure 2.1, it is the simplest and most 
obvious application: the secret key, together with the encryption (forward cipher) function is 
applied directly and independently to each block of the plaintext resulting in the sequence of 
ciphertext blocks. Similarly on the decryption side, decryption (inverse cipher) function is applied 
to the ciphertext resulting in the sequence of plaintext blocks. The drawback of this method is that 
two identical plaintext blocks (under the same key) will always generate the same ciphertext 
block. Thus it does not hide patterns well and is prone to a variety of brute-force attacks.  
 
Block Cipher
Plaintext
Ciphertext
  
Figure 2.1: Electronic Codebook 
 
 
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)[MOV,BCM] mode adds a feedback mechanism to the encryption 
scheme. As shown in figure 2.2, an initialization vector is exclusively – ORed (XOR-ed) with the first 
plaintext block. An encryption function is applied to the first input block resulting in the output 
ciphertext block. The output block is XOR-ed with the second plaintext block to form next input 
block. Each plaintext block is XOR-ed with the previous output block to produce a new input block. 
Similarly in CBC decryption, the decryption function is applied to the first ciphertext block and the 
resulting output is XOR-ed with the initialization vector to recover the first plaintext block. For 
second block, ciphertext from previous block is applied instead of IV to recover plaintext blocks. In 
CBC decryption all the ciphertext blocks are immediately available, so multiple decryption 
operations can be performed in parallel.  Identical plaintext result in identical ciphers under same 
key and Initialization vector, by changing the IV to the counter mode will result in different 
Ciphertext. Another drawback in CBC mode is error propagation; a single bit error in the 𝑛𝑡ℎ cipher 
block 𝑐𝑛 will effect decryption of  𝑐𝑛 and adjacent block 𝑐𝑛+1. Block 𝑝𝑛+1′  recovered after 
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decryption of 𝑐𝑛+1 will have bit errors precisely where 𝑐𝑛  did. Thus an attacker can get an 
opportunity to cause predictable bit changes in 𝑝𝑛+1  by altering corresponding bits to 𝑐𝑛.  
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Figure 2.2: Cipher Block Chaining 
 
 
 
Cipher Feedback (CFB) [MOV,BCM]  mode is a block cipher implementation as a self synchronizing 
stream cipher. In CFB mode, encryption function is applied to the Initialization vector to produce 
the first output block as shown in figure 2.3. First ciphertext block is produced by XOR-ing plaintext 
block with 𝑆 most significant bits of the output block; where 𝑆 is an  integer parameter and 
sometimes incorporated into the name of the mode, e.g., 1-bit CFB mode , 8-bit CFB mode, 64-bit 
CFB mode etc. For second input block, bits of the first input block circularly shift S positions to the 
left, and then the ciphertext block replaces the 𝑆 least significant bits of the result. Where as in 
CFB decryption, similar encryption function is applied to the input block, the IV is the first input 
block and plaintext in recovered by XOR-ing ciphertext with the 𝑆 most significant bits of the 
output block. Operations in CFB decryption can be performed in parallel if the input blocks are first 
constructed from the IV and the ciphertext. One flip of bit in a 𝑆-bit ciphertext block, will affect the 
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decryption of that block and the next ⌈𝑛/𝑆⌉ ciphertext blocks i.e., until entire block has shifted 
entirely out of the shift register. The decrypted message 𝑝𝑛′  will differ from 𝑝𝑛 precisely in the bit 
positions where 𝑐𝑛 was in error. Thus an attacker gets an opportunity to cause predictable bit 
changes in 𝑝𝑛  by altering corresponding bits to  𝑐𝑛. 
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Figure 2.3: Cipher Feedback 
 
 
Output Feedback (OFB) [MOV,BCM]  mode is a block cipher implementation, conceptually similar 
to a synchronous stream cipher. In OFB mode, initialization vector is transformed by the 
encryption function to generate first block output. As shown in figure 2.4, the output is then XOR-
ed with the plaintext block to produce the first ciphertext block. Encryption function is then 
invoked to the first output block to produce the second output block; the block is then XOR-ed 
with next plaintext block to produce ciphertext. Similarly at the decryption side, same encryption 
function is used for producing output blocks. These output blocks are then XOR-ed with the 
ciphertext blocks to produce plaintext blocks. In both the cases (encryption and decryption), 
output of the encryption function depends on the results of the previous encryption functions; 
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therefore, multiple encryption functions cannot be performed in parallel. However if IV is known 
then output blocks can be generated in advance. Bit errors in the ciphertext will affect the 
decryption of only those specific bits where error occurred. However OFB mode recovers from the 
error bit, but cannot self-synchronize after loss of ciphertext bits. In this case, explicit re-
synchronization is required.  
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Figure 2.4: Output Feedback 
 
 
2.2.1 Advanced Encryption Standard  
 
In September 1997, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) issued a public call 
for proposals for a new block cipher to succeed the Data Encryption Standard (DES). Out of 15 
submitted algorithms the Rijndael cipher by Daeman and Rijmen was chosen to become the new 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)[DRA] in 2001. Some of the requirements in the context held 
by NIST were that AES should have a block length of 128 bits and have a support for key lengths of 
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128, 192 and 256 bits. Security, efficient computation and straight forward implementation in 
software and hardware were the main focus point in the choice of Advanced Encryption standard. 
Implementation of AES included several steps shown below.  
 
The Advanced Encryption standard is a block cipher with a fixed block length of 128 bits. It 
supports three different key lengths 128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits. For encryption, data is divided 
into 128 bit blocks transforming it in 𝑛 rounds into a 128-bit output block. Another crucial 
parameter is the key 𝑘 used in each round 𝑟 in 𝑛 round. These key are derived from the AES key in 
so called key expansion. The number of 𝑛 rounds depends on the length of the key: 𝑛 = 10 for 128 
bit keys, 𝑛 = 12 for 192 bit keys, and 𝑛 = 14 for 256 bit keys.  
 
 
Key Expansion – The AES algorithm takes the Cipher key, 𝐾, and performs a key Expansion Routine 
to generate a key schedule. The key Expansion generates a total of  𝐵(Block size) words: the 
algorithm requires an initial set of 𝐵 words, and each of the 𝑅 (number of rounds) rounds requires 
𝐵 words of key data. The resulting key schedule consists of a liner array of 4-byte words.  
 
AES encryption Specification - As shown in figure 2.5 and described in algorithm 2.1, AES 
encryption of a 128-bit input block uses four basic operations, SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns 
and AddRoundKey described in detail in the following.  
 
AddRoundKey – The AddRoundKey operation inputs each byte of the state with the round key 
derived from the cipher key using key schedule and returns the bitwise XOR of the AES state.  
 
SubBytes – The SubBytes operation substitutes each byte of the state to another byte, it’s a non-
linear substitution step where each byte is replaced with another according to a lookup table. The 
input to the SubBytes can be a 16 byte AES state type for encryption or 4 bytes from key 
expansion.  
 
ShiftRows – The ShiftRows operation is a transposition step where each row of the state is shifted 
cyclically a certain number of steps.  
 
 
�
𝑏00   𝑏01   𝑏02   𝑏03
𝑏10   𝑏11   𝑏12   𝑏13
𝑏20   𝑏21  𝑏22   𝑏23
𝑏30   𝑏31  𝑏32   𝑏33
�    →  �
𝑏00   𝑏01   𝑏02   𝑏03
𝑏11   𝑏12   𝑏13   𝑏10
𝑏22   𝑏23  𝑏20   𝑏21
𝑏33   𝑏30  𝑏31   𝑏32
� 
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MixColumns – Unlike ShiftRows operation, MixColumns operate on the columns of the state, 
combining four bytes in each column. This operation considers the bytes of the AES state as 
elements of 𝐹28  =  𝐹2[𝑋]/(𝑋8 + 𝑋4 + 𝑋3 +  𝑋 + 1). It multiplies the matrix 𝐵 with the fixed 
circulant matrix.  
  
 𝐵 → �
𝑋 + 1  𝑋 + 1  1 + 1    1 + 1
1 + 1  𝑋 + 1  𝑋 + 1    1 + 1
1 + 1  1 + 1  𝑋 + 1    𝑋 + 1
𝑋 + 1  1 + 1  1 + 1    𝑋 + 1
� ∙ 𝐵 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Algorithm 2.1 AES-128 encryption 
Input: 128- bit input block 𝐵, 128-bit round keys 𝐾0., … … … … .𝐾10. 
Output: 128-bit block of encrypted output  
  𝐴 ← AddRoundKey (𝐴, 𝐾0) -- [Initial state]  
For 𝑖 from 1 to 9 do  
        𝐴 ← SubBytes (𝐴) 
        𝐴  ← ShiftRows (𝐴) 
        𝐴 ← MixColumns (𝐴) 
        𝐴 ← AddRoundKey (𝐴, 𝐾𝑖) 
End for 
  𝐴 ← SubBytes (𝐴) 
  𝐴 ← ShiftRows (𝐴) 
  𝐴 ← AddRoundKey (𝐴, 𝐾10)  
Return 𝐴 
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Figure 2.5: 128 bits Advanced Encryption Standard  
 
 
2.3 Stream Ciphers  
 
Stream ciphers are another major class of symmetric-key encryption schemes. Unlike block ciphers 
where blocks of plaintext data is transformed into ciphertext blocks, stream ciphers encrypt one 
bit (or a small chunk of bits) of a plaintext message one at a time using an encryption 
transformation which varies with time. Stream ciphers are in general faster than block cipher and 
less complex in hardware implementations [MOV]. When buffering is limited or if there is a need 
for bit to be individually processed as they are received for example in telecommunications, 
Stream ciphers are more appropriate. Another important advantage of stream cipher is that they 
have a very limited or no error propagation.   
 
Even though various design principles for stream ciphers have been proposed and broadly 
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analyzed [CAB], block ciphers have been systematically replacing stream ciphers for example, 
Stream cipher A5/1 used in GSM standard has been replaced by Kasumi block cipher [EBD, AAD, 
EAG] and in wireless standard 802.11, RC4 stream cipher was replaced by newer standards based 
on AES block cipher. Another major disadvantage with the popularity of the stream cipher is most 
of ciphers used in practice tend to be patented; block ciphers on the other hand have been 
proposed, published and standardized. In most of the cases block ciphers are defined as 
memoryless; as same function is used to encrypt all the blocks. In contrast, stream ciphers are said 
to have some memory as the encryption function may vary as the plaintext is processed. The 
encryption function may vary not only because of the key and plaintext but also on the current 
state, these are known as state ciphers. By adding small amount of memory to the block cipher for 
example, as in the CBC mode results in a stream cipher with large blocks [MOV].   
  
Much of the popularity of stream ciphers can undoubtedly be attributed to the work of Shannon in 
the analysis of the one-time pad, originally known as the Vernam cipher [VER]. Shannon proved 
that one-time pad provides perfect secrecy if the key is of same length as the message and chosen 
uniformly at random. The one-time pad uses a long string consists of bits that are chosen 
completely at random called key-stream. This key-stream is then combined with the plaintext on a 
bit by bit basis. The downside of this design is that the key and message length should be of same 
size and can only be used once. Let  𝑚 (𝑚0𝑚1 … .𝑚𝑛−1 ) be the plaintext message and key-stream 
(𝑘0𝑘1 … 𝑘𝑛−1) , which is the same length as the message 𝑚. Then the ciphertext 𝑐 =  𝑐0𝑐1 … 𝑐𝑛−1 
is defined by 𝑐𝑖 =  𝑚𝑖 ⊕  𝑘𝑖  for 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 − 1 where ⊕  denotes bitwise exclusive-or. 
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Figure 2.6: Stream Cipher 
 
 
This is an obvious drawback in one-time pad as it increases the difficulty of key distribution and 
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key management. The idea behind the stream cipher design is to use a short secret key to 
generate a long sequence of bits (key-stream), which appears to be random and this stream is 
combined with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext as shown in figure 2.6.   
Most stream ciphers can either be classified as synchronous or self-synchronizing stream ciphers.  
 
 
2.3.1 Synchronous Stream Cipher  
 
In Synchronous Stream ciphers the next state of the cryptosystem is defined independently of 
plaintext or ciphertext data and the key-stream is generated independently of the plaintext or 
ciphertext as shown in figure 2.7. All messages are encrypted independently of each other and the 
corruption of a bit of the ciphertext during transmission will not affect the decryption of other 
ciphertext bits. This means there is no error propagation for corrupted bits. However to allow 
proper decryption, both the sides need to be properly synchronized otherwise deleting or 
inserting a ciphertext bit will cause an error in the decryption of all consecutive ciphertext bits. 
This could only be rectified by using additional techniques for re-synchronization ex., placing 
special “marker positions” in the transmission; resulting that a bit of ciphertext missed during 
transmission results in incorrect decryption until one of the markers positions is received.     
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Figure 2.7: Synchronous Stream Cipher. Where 𝜎𝑖 is the state and 𝑘 is the key, next state is calculated using 
the next state function 𝑓 i.e. 𝑓 (𝜎𝑖,𝑘). Key-stream 𝑧𝑖  is generated by using key-stream generator function 𝑔 
i.e., 𝑔 (𝜎𝑖,𝑘) and h is the output function which combines plaintext 𝑚𝑖 and key stream 𝑧𝑖  to produce 
ciphertext 𝑐𝑖.  
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2.3.2 Self-Synchronizing Stream Cipher  
 
By definition, A self-synchronizing or asynchronous stream cipher is one in which the key-stream is 
generated as a function of the key and a fixed number of previous ciphertext digits [MOV]. This 
stream cipher solves the problem of synchronization and resumes correct decryption if the key-
stream generated by the decrypting unit falls out of synchronization after a ciphertext bit was 
inserted or deleted. This is because the key-stream depends only on the fixed number of the 
preceding ciphertext bits. Also the error propagation is limited. Such ciphers are capable of re-
establishing proper decryption automatically after loss of synchronization, with only a fixed 
number of plaintext characters unrecoverable. This makes such ciphers suitable for applications 
where synchronization is difficult to maintain.  
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Figure 2.8: Self-Synchronizing Stream Cipher where 𝜎𝑖  is the state and 𝑘 is the key. Key-stream 𝑧𝑖  is 
generated by using key-stream generator function 𝑔 i.e., 𝑔 (𝜎𝑖,𝑘) and h is the output function which 
combines plaintext 𝑚𝑖 and key stream 𝑧𝑖  to produce ciphertext 𝑐𝑖.  
 
 
2.4 Authentication  
 
Generally the term authentication is widely used in very broad sense. By itself, authentication is 
the process of determining whether someone or something is, in fact, who or what it is declared 
to be. Authentication is specific to different security objectives like access control, entity 
authentication, message authentication, data integrity, non-repudiation and key authentication. In 
this thesis we will be focusing on the authenticity and integrity of the messages.  
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Message Authentication also called as data-origin authentication plays a very important role in 
information security. It allows parties to send messages to each other over a channel in such a way 
that if the message is modified, then the receiving party should be able to detect this. Message 
authentication protects the integrity of messages and ensures that the each message arriving to 
the receiving party is in the same condition that it was sent out with no inserted, missing or 
modified bits. This property also validates in the case of communication between parties over a 
noisy channel. Data-origin authentication and integrity goes hand-in-hand, if the data is altered 
and source cannot be determined then the question of alteration cannot be settled.  
 
2.4.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions   
 
Hash functions were introduced in the domain of cryptography in the late seventies to protect the 
authenticity of information. Even conventional hash functions used in non-crypto computer 
application help mapping larger domains into smaller ranges. In this section we will only be 
focusing on cryptographic hash functions and their use in authenticity and integrity of the 
messages.  
  
Hash functions take a message as input and produce an output referred to as a hash-code, hash-
result, hash-value or just hash. In other words, hash function is a function h which takes input 𝑝 of 
arbitrary finite length and converts it into an output ℎ(𝑝) of fixed length 𝑛.The basic idea of 
cryptographic hash functions is that a hash-value serves as a compact representative image 
(sometimes called an imprint, digital fingerprint, or message digest) of an input string, and can be 
used as if it was uniquely identifiable with that string. 
Hash functions are used for data integrity in conjunction with digital signature schemes, where for 
several reasons a message is typically hashed first, and then the hash-value, as a representative of 
the message, is signed in place of the original message.  
 
 Hash functions are generally classified into two classes unkeyed and keyed hash functions. In 
unkeyed hash functions, the input parameter is only a message whereas in keyed hash functions 
two distinct parameters are used, a message and a secret key. Hash functions are further sub- 
classified as Message Authentication codes (MACs) and Modification Detection Codes (MDCs) or 
manipulation detection codes, provides an image or hash of a message [MOV]. MDCs are a 
subclass of unkeyed hash functions, and further divided into One-Way Hash Functions (OWHF) and 
Collision Resistant Hash Functions(CRHF). The term collision resistant hash function is preferable 
over strong one-way hash function, as it explains more clearly the actual property that is satisfied. 
This term proposed by I.Damgård [DAM,DA1] , can be sometimes misleading because collisions do 
exist but it is hard to find them. An alternate proposed by Y.Zheng [ZHE, Z01] is collision 
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intractable hash function. The term weak one-way hash function was proposed by R.Merkle [MER] 
in order to stress the difference with a strong or collision resistant hash function.  
 
Hash Functions
Unkeyed 
keyed 
Modification detection
(MDCs)
Message Authentication
(MACs)
OWHF CRHF
 
Figure 2.9: Classification of cryptographic hash functions 
 
 
One-way hash function (OWHF) 
 
The first informal definition was given by R.Merkle [MER,M01]and M.Rabin [RAB] 
 
Definition 2.3 - A one-way hash function is a function ℎ satisfying the following conditions:  
 
1. The argument 𝑋 can be of arbitrary length and the result ℎ(𝑋) has a fixed length of 𝑛 bits 
(with 𝑛 ≥ 64). 
2. Given ℎ and 𝑋, the computation of ℎ(𝑋) must be “easy” 
3. The hash function must be one-way in the sense that given a 𝑌 in the image of ℎ, it is 
“hard” to find a message 𝑋 such that ℎ (𝑋)  =  𝑌, and given 𝑋 and ℎ(𝑋) it is “hard” to find 
a message 𝑋′ ≠ 𝑋 such that ℎ(𝑋’)  =  ℎ(𝑋).  
 
The first part of the last condition corresponds to the intuitive concept of one-wayness, namely 
that it is “hard” to find a pre-image of a given value in the range. Pre-image – for all pre-specified 
outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find any input which hashes to that output. In the case 
of permutations or injective functions only this concept is relevant. The second part of this 
condition, is about finding a 2nd –pre-image should be hard, is a stronger condition that is relevant 
for most applications. 2nd – pre-image – it is computationally infeasible to find any second input 
which has the same output as any specified input. The terms “easy” and “hard” are intentionally 
left without formal definition; it is intended they should be interpreted relative to an understood 
frame of reference.  
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Collision resistant hash functions (CRHF) 
 
The first formal definition of a CRHF was given by I.Damgård [DAM, D01]. An informal definition 
was given by R.Merkle [MER].  
 
Definition 2.4 - A collision resistant hash function is a function ℎ satisfying the following 
conditions:  
1. The argument 𝑋 can be of arbitrary length and the result ℎ(𝑋) has a fixed length of 𝑛 bits 
(with 𝑛 ≥ 128 ) 
2. Given ℎ and 𝑋 , the computation of ℎ(𝑋) must be “easy” 
3. The hash function must be one-way in the sense that given a 𝑌 in the image of ℎ, it is 
“hard” to find a message 𝑋 such that ℎ(𝑋) = 𝑌 and given 𝑋 and ℎ(𝑋) it is “hard” to find a 
message 𝑋’ ≠ 𝑋 such thatℎ(𝑋’)  =  ℎ(𝑋). 
4. The hash function much be collision resistant: this means that it is “hard” to find two 
distinct messages that hash to the same result.  
 
 
As mentioned in [DAM] the first part of one-way property follows from the collision resistant 
property. Collision resistance – it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs which 
hash same output. Formal definition of Collision resistant hash function can be obtained though 
insertion of a formal definition of terms “hard” and “easy” on combination with the introduction 
of a security parameter.  
 
 
2.4.2 Message Authentication Codes (MAC) 
 
Message Authentication codes have been used for a long time for commercial purposes ex., in 
banking. These codes are used to provide authenticity: did the message received actually 
originated from the in alleged sender? Algorithms used for message authentication allow two 
parties to send message to each other in such a way that if the message is modified in route to the 
receiving party then the receiver should be able to detect this. MAC algorithms may be viewed as 
hash functions which take two functionally distinct inputs, a message and a secret key, and 
produce a fixed-size (say 𝑛 -bit) output, with the design intent that it must be infeasible in practice 
to produce the same output without knowledge of the key. Unlike digital signatures, MACs are 
computed and verified with a same key, so that they can only be verified by the intended 
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recipient. 
 
 
Definition 2.5 - [MOV, PRE] A MAC is a function satisfying the following conditions: 
1. The argument 𝑋 can be of arbitrary length and the result ℎ(𝐾,𝑋) has a fixed length of 
𝑛 bits (with 𝑛 ≥ 32 … 64).  
2. Given ℎ,𝑋 and, the computation of ℎ(𝐾,𝑋) must be “easy”.  
3. Given ℎ and 𝑋, it is “hard” to determine ℎ(𝐾,𝑋) with a probability of success “significantly 
higher” that 1/2n. Even when a large set of pairs �𝑋𝑖,ℎ(𝐾,𝑋𝑖)� are known, where the 𝑋𝑖 
have been selected by the opponent, it is “hard” to determine the key 𝐾 or to compute 
ℎ(𝐾,𝑋’) for any 𝑋’ ≠ 𝑋𝑖. This last attack is called an adaptive chosen text attack.  
 
 
The last condition implies that the MAC should be both pre-image and collision resistant for 
someone who does not know the secret key 𝐾. But it does not dictate whether MACs need be 
one-way and collision resistant for parties knowing the key 𝐾.  
 
2.4.3 Dedicated Hash functions  
 
In this section we will discuss hash functions specially designed for hashing operations. First part 
will give an overview of MDC proposals, while in second MAC proposals will be treated.  The vast 
majority of dedicated MDC published up to date is more or less designed using ideas inspired by 
functions MD4 and MD5. Many functions like HAVAL [Z02], RIPEMD [P01] SHA-0[SHS] and SHA-
1[SHS] all exhibit similar resemblance.   
 
R. Rivest of RSA Data Security Inc. has designed a series of hash functions that were named MD for 
“message digest” followed by a number. MD1 is a proprietary algorithm. MD2 [KAL] was 
introduced in 1990, to replace BMAC [LIN]. MD3 was never published, and it seems to have been 
abandoned by its designer. MD4 was also announced in 1990 at Eurocrypt and was published in 
[RIV]. The four other algorithms MD5, SHA, RIPEMD, and HAVAL are variants on MD4 that were 
proposed in a later stage. However in 1991, weaknesses in MD4 were initially found and published 
[DEN] by Den Boer and Bosselaers and in 1995 Hans Dobbertin found the first full round collision 
attack [DOB].  
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MD5 Algorithm - After looking into the vulnerabilities in MD4 R. Rivest in 1991 proposed a 
strengthened version of MD4, namely MD5 [RIV01]. MD5 calculates a 128-bit digest for an 
arbitrary 𝑏-bit message and it consists of the following steps:  
 
- Appending Padding bits: The 𝑏-bit message is padded so that a single 1-bit is added into 
the end of message. Then, 0-bits are added until the length of the message is congruent to 
448, modulo 512.  
- Appending length: A 64-bit representation of 𝑏 is appended to the result of the padding. 
Thus, the resulted message is a multiple of 512 bits. This message is denoted here as 𝑀.  
- Buffer Initialization:   Four 32-bit registers are used in derivation of the 128-bit message 
digest. The registers are initialized to the following values: x“01234567” x”89abcdef” x”fe 
dc ba 98” x”76 54 32 10”.  
- Processing of the message: Message 𝑀 is divided into 512 bit blocks which are processed 
separately. The algorithm consists of four rounds, each of which comprises 16 steps. Hence 
64 steps are performed in the algorithm. First the initial values (𝐴,𝐵,𝐶,𝐷) mentioned 
above are stored into temporary variables 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵,𝐶𝐶,𝐷𝐷. Then, the following operations 
are performed for 𝑖 = 0 to 63:   
𝐴 =  𝐵 +  ((𝐴 +  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐(𝐵,𝐶,𝐷) +  𝑋𝑗 [𝑘] +  𝑇[𝑖])  <<< 𝑠), 
 𝐴 ←  𝐷,𝐵 ←  𝐴,𝐶 ← 𝐵,𝐷 ← 𝐶. 
 
Where 𝑋𝑗  - donate the 𝑗𝑡ℎ block of 𝑀. 𝑋𝑗 [𝑘] – denote the 𝑘𝑡ℎ 32-bit word of 𝑋𝑗  , 𝑇[𝑖] – 
table of 64 32-bit constants, <<< 𝑠  donate circular shift left by 𝑠 bits and additions are 
addition of words i.e. additions modulo – 232.  
 
Each round employs one nonlinear round function, which is given below. 
 
 𝐹(𝑋,𝑌,𝑍)  =  (𝑋 ∧ 𝑌)  ∨ (￢𝑋 ∧  𝑍),                   0 ≤  𝑖 ≤  15, 
𝐹(𝑋,𝑌,𝑍) =  (𝑋 ∧ 𝑌) ∨ (𝑋  ∧  ￢𝑍),                  16 ≤  𝑖 ≤  31, 
𝐹(𝑋,𝑌,𝑍)  =  𝑋 ⊕  𝑌 ⊕  𝑍,                               32 ≤  𝑖 ≤  47,  
𝐹(𝑋,𝑌,𝑍)  =  𝑌 ⊕ (𝑋  ∨￢𝑍),                              48 ≤  𝑖 ≤  63, 
 
Where 𝑋,𝑌,𝑍 are 32 bit words. ∨ is a bitwise or-operation, ￢ is a bitwise complement, ⊕ 
is a bitwise exclusive-or-operation (xor) and ∧ is a bitwise and operation. Finally, the values 
of the temporary variables are added to the values obtained from the algorithm.  
𝐴 =  𝐴 +  𝐴𝐴,𝐵 =  𝐵 +  𝐵𝐵,𝐶 =  𝐶 +  𝐶𝐶,𝐷 =  𝐷 +  𝐷𝐷. 
 
 
However, Den Boer and Bosselaers in 1993 showed in their initial findings a “pseudo-collision” 
[D01] of the MD5 compression function, that is, two different initialization vectors which produce 
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an identical digest. This made MD5 not suitable for applications like SSL certificate or digital 
signatures. Finally in 1996, Dobbertin announced a collision [DOB1] of the compression function of 
MD5. While this was not an attack on full MD5 hash function, but close enough for cryptographers 
to recommend switching to the replacement SHA1. 
 
 
 2.4.4 Secure Hash Algorithm  
 
The first Secure Standard (SHS) was proposed in 1992 by U.S. National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) that contained description of the secure hash Algorithm (SHA). SHA-1, FIPS 180-
3[SHS] was based on MD4, but with better strength. As compared to MD4, the hash value is 160 
bits and five instead of four 32-bit chaining variables. The number of steps per round was 
increased to 20 (16 in case of MD4) and the number of rounds to 4 same as in MD5. By increasing 
the number of steps in the rounds implied that every word of the chaining variable is transformed 
4 times per round. In the compression function, each 16-word message block was expanded to an 
80 – word block by XOR-ing of 4 words from earlier positions in the expanded block. These 80 
words are then input one-word-per-step to the 80 steps. In the core step, the only rote used is a 
constant 5-bit rotate; the fifth working variable is added into each step result. The Secure Hash 
Algorithm (SHA-1)[SHS], was one of the most popular hash functions. Unfortunately, the security 
level of this standard is limited to a level comparable to an 80-bit block cipher as compared to 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher which is specified in 128-, 192-, 256- bit keys. 
This demanded for a new SHA algorithm offering security comparable to the AES key strengths. 
Looking into the limitations of SHA-1, NIST announced the new Secure Hash Standard 2 (SHA-2), 
this introduced the specifications of three new Secure Hash Algorithms, SHA-2 (256, 384 and 512).  
 
SHA-2 – As mentioned above, Standard uses three hash functions SHA-2 (256), SHA-2 (384), SHA-
2(512), for computing condensed representation of electronic data. The produced messages digest 
ranges in length from 256- to 512-bits, depending on the selected hash function. Each hash 
function operation can be divided into two stages: 
 
Preprocessing – Before the computation begins the message is padded into the multiples of 512 or 
1024, depending on the algorithm. Then parsing the padded message into 𝑁 message 
blocks𝐵0,𝐵1,……. ,𝐵𝑛−1 , where block size is 512 or 1024 bits.  
 
Hash Computation – After preprocessing each message block 𝐵0,𝐵1,……. ,𝐵𝑛−1 is processed in 
order. For each message block 𝐵𝑖, starting from message schedule 𝑊𝑡 , following steps (1 -4) are 
repeated to compute hash values 𝐻0𝑖  to 𝐻7𝑖  for the ith block.  
 
Step1:   𝑊𝑡   is computed by identical procedure for SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512, only the logic 
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function 𝜎0 and 𝜎1 are different. Where 𝑊𝑡 ∈  {0,1}𝑛 , 𝑛 is 32 for SHA-256 and 64 for SHA-512. 
𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅𝑘(𝑥) − Right rotation of an 𝑛-bit string 𝑥 by 𝑘 bits and 𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑘(𝑥) − Right shift of an 𝑛-bit 
string 𝑥 by 𝑘 bits. 
 
 
 
 
For SHA-256:    
Message schedule 
  
𝑊𝑡 =  𝐵𝑡𝑖                     0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 15 
=  𝜎1256(𝑊𝑡−2) + 𝑊𝑡−7 +  𝜎0256(𝑊𝑡−15) + 𝑊𝑡−16       16 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 63 
Where 
𝜎1256 = 𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅17(𝑥)⨁ 𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅19(𝑥)⨁ 𝑆𝐻𝑅10(𝑥) 
𝜎0256 = 𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅7(𝑥)⨁ 𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅18(𝑥)⨁ 𝑆𝐻𝑅3(𝑥) 
 
For SHA-384 & SHA-512:  
Message schedule 
  
𝑊𝑡 =  𝐵𝑡𝑖                     0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 15  
=  𝜎1512(𝑊𝑡−2) + 𝑊𝑡−7 +  𝜎0512(𝑊𝑡−15) + 𝑊𝑡−16       16 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 79  
Where  
𝜎1512 = 𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅19(𝑥)⨁ 𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅61(𝑥)⨁ 𝑆𝐻𝑅6(𝑥) 
𝜎0512 = 𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅1(𝑥)⨁ 𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅8(𝑥)⨁ 𝑆𝐻𝑅7(𝑥) 
 
Step 2: The hash values 𝐻0𝑖  to 𝐻7𝑖  , are assigned to the variables 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑒, 𝑓,𝑔 and ℎ. The eight 
initial hash values are 32 or 64-bit words.  
 
- A sequence of 64 constant 32-bit words, 𝐾𝑡256 or 80 constant 64-bit words, 𝐾𝑡512 is used by 
the hash processing unit.  
- The processing unit uses four logical functions, 𝐶ℎ(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧),𝑀𝑎𝑗(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧),∑ (𝑥)0 ,∑ (𝑥)1 . The 
logic functions 𝐶ℎ and 𝑀𝑎𝑗 is identical for SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512.  
𝐶ℎ(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧) = (𝑥 ∧ 𝑦)⨁(￢𝑥 ∧ 𝑧) 
𝑀𝑎𝑗(𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧) = (𝑥 ∧ 𝑦)⨁(𝑥 ∧ 𝑧)⨁(𝑦 ∧ 𝑧) 
 
SHA-256: 
  
∑ (𝑥) =  𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅2(𝑥)⨁𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅13(𝑥)⨁𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅22(𝑥)0   
∑ (𝑥) =  𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅6(𝑥)⨁𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅11(𝑥)⨁𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅25(𝑥)1   
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SHA-384 & SHA-512: 
  
 ∑ (𝑥) =  𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅28(𝑥)⨁𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅34(𝑥)⨁𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅39(𝑥)0  
∑ (𝑥) =  𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅14(𝑥)⨁𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅18(𝑥)⨁𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑅41(𝑥)1   
 
Step 3: The processing unit performs this step, 64 or 80 times on a 512 or 1024 bit block.  
 
𝑇1 = ℎ + ∑ (𝑒) + 𝑐ℎ(𝑒,𝑓,𝑔) +  𝐾𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡,1   
𝑇2 =  ∑ (𝑎) + 𝑀𝑎𝑗(𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑)0   
ℎ = 𝑔,𝑔 = 𝑓,𝑓 = 𝑒, 𝑒 = 𝑑 + 𝑇1,𝑑 = 𝑐, 𝑐 = 𝑏, 𝑏 = 𝑎,𝑎 =  𝑇1 + 𝑇2 
  
Step 4: The ith intermediate hash value 𝐻0𝑖  to 𝐻7𝑖  be computed by modulo-32 or modulo-64 bit 
adders after the iterations.  
 
𝐻0𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝐻0𝑖−1    𝐻1𝑖 = 𝑏 + 𝐻1𝑖−1  𝐻2𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝐻2𝑖−1   𝐻3𝑖 = 𝑑 + 𝐻3𝑖−1 
𝐻4𝑖 = 𝑒 + 𝐻4𝑖−1  𝐻5𝑖 = 𝑓 + 𝐻5𝑖−1  𝐻6𝑖 = 𝑔 + 𝐻6𝑖−1  𝐻7𝑖 = ℎ + 𝐻7𝑖−1 
 
- The message digest is computed by P 𝐻0𝑛 ∥ 𝐻1𝑛 ∥ 𝐻2𝑛 ∥ 𝐻3𝑛 ∥ 𝐻4𝑛 ∥ 𝐻5𝑛 ∥ 𝐻6𝑛 ∥ 𝐻7𝑛 after 
processing all N blocks in the message.  
 
 
 2.4.5 Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) 
 
The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code standard specifies a mechanism for message 
authentication using cryptographic hash functions. Hash functions were not originally designed for 
message authentication. Several constructions were proposed prior to HMAC, but they lacked a 
convincing security analysis. The HMAC construction intended to fill the gap [BEL]. The 
performance and the security of the system depend on the underlying hash function and this 
replaced by other hash functions. HMACs can be proven secure if the underlying hash function has 
some reasonable cryptographic strength.  
 
As mentioned above HMAC can be used with any iterative hash function, in combination with a 
shared secret key (𝐾). For simplicity of description we may assume that the underlying hash 
function (𝐻) is SHA-1, where the input message is hashed by iterating a basic compression 
function on blocks of data. With 𝐵 = 60 is denoted the byte-length of blocks and 𝐿 = 20 be the 
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byte-length of the SHA-1 output. 𝐷 donates the data to which the MAC function is to be applied. 
The key 𝐾 should not be longer than the size of the hashing block, if shorter, zeros are appended 
to bring its length to the hashing block.  In addition two fixed constants are specified: ipad and 
opad. In order to computer the HMAC over a data block (𝐷), the following function is applied:  
 
 
𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐾,𝐷) =  𝐻{(𝐾 𝑋𝑂𝑅 𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑑)‖𝐻(𝐾 𝑋𝑂𝑅 𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑑 ‖𝐷 )  } 
 
HMAC function takes the key 𝐾 and Data block 𝐷 and produces 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝐾,𝐷). Figure 2.10 
describes the operation in simple steps.  
 
Determine K
K xor ipad
K xor ipad                          text 
H((k xor ipad) ║text)
K xor opad
K xor opad                               H((K xor ipad) ║ text) 
H((K xor opad) ║ H((K xor ipad) ║ text) 
MAC (D) = leftmost ’d’ bytes of 
H((K xor opad) ║ H((K xor ipad) ║ text) 
Step 1-3:
Step 4:
Step 5:
Step 6:
Step 7:
Step 8:
Step 9:
Step 10:
 
Figure 2.10: HMAC Construction 
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HMAC was chosen as the mandatory to implement authentication transform for the Internet 
security protocols being designed by the IPSEC working group of the IETF [BEL1]. 
 
2.4.6 CBC-MAC  
 
The CBC-MAC [FIP13, ISO97] is an authentication code (MAC) based on a block cipher. Security of 
CBC-MAC was proved by Bellare, Kilian and Rogaway under the assumption that messages are of 
one fixed length, 𝑚𝑛 bits, where 𝑛 is the block length of the underlying block cipher  𝐸[BEL2]. 
Which means when message lengths vary then CBC-MAC is not secure.  Therefore, several variants 
of CBC-MAC have been proposed for variable lengths. However , first let us look into the basic 
construction of CBC-MAC with DES (Data Encryption Standard) as shown in figure 2.11, with an 
underlying block cipher E and n = 64 and MAC key is a 56-bit DES key.  
  
 
- Padding and blocking: First pad the data if needed and divide it into n-bit blocks donated as 
𝑃1 … …𝑃𝑡 
- CBC Processing: Let  𝐸𝐾 donate encryption function using E with the key K, compute the 
hash 𝐻𝑡 as follows: 𝐻1 ← 𝐸𝑘(𝑥1); 𝐻𝑖  ← (𝐻𝑖−1  ⨁𝑥1), 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑡. Initialization vector IV = 0. 
- Output: The Mac is the n-bit block 𝐻𝑡 
 
 
E E E E
IV = 0
k
P1
k
H1
k k
P2 P3 Pt
H2 H3 Ht-1
Ht  
Figure 2.11: CBC-based MAC algorithm 
 
To increase strength of the MAC, First Encrypted MAC (EMAC) was proposed. It is obtained by 
encrypting the CBC-MAC value by E again with a new key 𝐾2.  
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𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾1,𝐾2(𝑀) =  𝐸𝐾2 �𝐶𝐵𝐶𝐾1(𝑀)�, 
 
Where 𝑀 is the message, 𝐾1 is the key of the CBC MAC and 𝐶𝐵𝐶𝐾1(𝑀) is the CBC MAC value of 𝑀. 
However EMAC was proved to be secure only if the message length is a positive multiple of 𝑛 [PET, 
VAU]. Other variants of CBC-MAC were also proposed for example XCBC by black and Rogaway 
which requires only one key scheduling of the underlying block cipher 𝐸 [BLK].  XCBC takes three 
keys: one block cipher key and two 𝑛-bit keys. Again the drawback of XCBC is that it requires three 
keys. Two-key CBC MAC (TMAC) was proposed by Kurosawa and Iwata: a block cipher key  𝐾1 and 
an 𝑛-bit key 𝐾2. TMAC [KUR] is obtained from XCBC by replacing (𝐾2,𝐾3) with (𝐾2. 𝑢,𝐾2), where 𝑢 
is a non-zero constant and “.” denotes multiplication in GF (2𝑛). Finally One-key CBC Mac (OMAC) 
was proposed by Kurosawa and Iwata [IWA]. This scheme operated in exactly the same way as 
XCBC except that it only uses a single key 𝐾. A key triple (𝐾1,𝐾2,𝐾3), as used is XCBC, is then 
derived from (𝐾,𝐾′) by setting 𝐿 =  𝑒𝑘(0𝑛),𝐾1 = 𝐾,𝐾2 = 𝑢. 𝐿 and 𝐾3 =  𝑢2. 𝐿, where 0𝑛 is the 𝑛-
bit block of all zeros, and 𝑢 is a constant.  
 
Table 2.1 summarizes the above mentioned common hash functions and MAC algorithms.    
 
Name Year of the Standard Example 
MD4 
 
MD5 
1990 
 
1992 
MD4 was used to compute NT LAN Man- ager password-
derived key digests on Microsoft Windows. MD5 was used in 
many applications like GPG (GNU Privacy Guard), Kerberos, 
TLS/SSL etc.  
SHA-0 
SHA-1 
 
SHA-224 
SHA-256 
SHA-384 
SHA-512 
1993 
 
 
1995 
2004 
2002 
2002 
SHA-1 was developed based on the security flaws of original 
SHA i.e., SHA-0. SHA-1 was used with the Digital Signature 
Algorithm (DSA) in electronic mail, bank transfers, software 
distribution, data storage and many other security applications 
and protocols, including IPsec, TLS/SSL. Soon after the 
retirement of SHA-1 because of certain weaknesses, SHA-2 
hash functions took over for these applications.    
 
HMAC 
 
1994 
A message authentication code based on above mentioned 
hash functions. HMAC was developed for the IPSec standard of 
the internet Engineering Task force (IETF). Currently HMAC is 
incorporated in SSL/TLS, SSH, Kerberos, IPSec etc.  
 
 
CBC-MAC 
 
 
1994 
CBC-MAC authentication method is widely used in practice. The 
construction is secure if the messages are of one fixed length. 
However, variants of CBC MAC with variable lengths are 
suggested in the past ex., XCBC, TMAC and OMAC. Most 
common and widely used example is Counter Cipher Mode with 
Block Chaining Authentication Code protocol (CCMP), an 
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encryption protocol used for WiFi devices. CCMP protocol is 
based on AES using the counter mode with CBC-MAC (CCM) 
mode of operation.  
 
Table 2.1: Hash Functions and MAC Algorithms  
2.5 Conclusions  
 
 
Modern Cryptography is much more than secret information and art. In addition to confidentiality 
it deals with the problem of data integrity, entity authentication, data origin authentication and 
much more. In this chapter, we have covered two prime security requirements i.e., confidentiality 
and authentication of data. It is assumed that the authentication of the source of data provides 
messages integrity also as a part of the service.   We further introduce the concept of symmetric-
key encryption and traditional classes of symmetric encryption algorithm – block ciphers and 
stream ciphers.  
Block ciphers are an important primitive in cryptography. A secret key is used to transform a 
plaintext into a ciphertext in block cipher. The security of block cipher lies within the secrecy of the 
key, without any knowledge of the secret key, it should be computationally infeasible to recover 
the original plaintext. Block ciphers are well studied and standardized, and can be used for 
building other cryptographic primitives, including hash functions, message authentication codes 
and stream ciphers.  Stream ciphers forms the second class of symmetric encryption algorithms. 
Unlike block ciphers, stream ciphers take a continuous stream of plaintext bits as an input and 
transform one bit (or a small chunk of bits) at a time. Stream ciphers are in general faster than 
block cipher and smaller in terms of hardware implementation, even though stream ciphers are 
broadly proposed and analyzed they have been systematically replaced by block ciphers ex., in 
802.11, RC4 stream cipher was replaced by AES block cipher. Another major disadvantage is most 
of the stream cipher designs are proprietary.  
 
Confidentiality deals with the secrecy of the information whereas authentication is about whether 
someone or something is, what it is declared to be. Protecting both the security requirements is 
important but encryption on its own does not provide authenticity. This leads to our second part 
of the chapter, where Authentication of data is discussed. Cryptographic hash functions are 
important tools for providing authentication of data and entities. Due to the wide range of 
applications, hash functions are considered as the “Swiss army knives” of cryptography. Defining 
the security requirements of the hash functions is not straightforward because they strongly 
depend on the application and sometimes are used in unexpected ways. For the purpose of data 
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integrity we have defined the concepts of preimage, second-preimage and collision resistance in 
section 2.4. We have further explained the classification of cryptographic hash functions as keyed 
an un-keyed hash functions. Several hash functions are analyzed in section 2.4 e.x., MAC, HMAC 
and CBC-MAC.  
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3 
Authenticated Encryption 
 
 
Symmetric key encryption plays vital role in the field of communication, it refers to the schemes 
and algorithms used to communicate data secretly over an insecure channel between parties 
sharing a secret key. Often when two parties communicate over a network, they have two main 
security goals: confidentiality and authentication. In fact, there is compelling evidence that one 
should never use encryption without also providing authentication [SBE, JBL]. Confidentiality 
addresses the issue of keeping the information secret from unauthorized users. Often, this is 
achieved by encrypting the data using a symmetric-key encryption scheme. Message 
authentication addresses the issues of source corroboration and improper or unauthorized 
modification of data. To protect the message authenticity, the sender usually appends an 
authenticated tag that is generated by the signing (tagging) algorithm of some message 
authentication scheme.  
 
Although symmetric-key encryption and message authentication have been mainly studied in the 
separate context, there are many applications where both are needed. The cryptographic schemes 
that provide both confidentiality and authenticity are called authenticated encryption schemes. 
The authenticated encryption scheme consists of three algorithms: a key generation algorithm, an 
encryption algorithm and a decryption algorithm. The encryption algorithm takes a key, a plaintext 
and an initialization vector and it returns a ciphertext. Given the ciphertext and the secret key, the 
decryption algorithm returns plaintext when the ciphertext is authentic and invalid when the 
ciphertext is not authentic. The scheme is secure if it is both un-forgeable and secure encryption 
scheme [MBE]. When an attacker is not able to successfully produce a ciphertext 𝐶, a nonce 𝑁, 
and a tag 𝜎 (three parameters which maintains the integrity of the message) even if the attacker 
convinces the receiver to will believe that the sender was the originator then the scheme is Un-
forgeable. The term secure is related towards confidentiality of the scheme, where confidentiality 
means, that an attacker cannot understand the contents of the message 𝑀, even after knowing 
the ciphertext 𝐶 and the nonce 𝑁. One way to achieve this is to make the encryption scheme 
indistinguishable from a random permutation; this is a standard definition that is used in many 
security proofs such as the security proofs of the modes of operation for block ciphers.  
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3.1 Generic Composition 
 
The generic approach provides authenticated-encryption with associated-data (AEAD) as well as 
authenticated-encryption (AE). The first generic composition where an encryption scheme and 
MAC were used jointly (but securely) under independent keys was proposed by Bellare and 
Nampermpre in 2000 [MEB].  However, this was not very efficient generic composition, the time it 
took to encrypt and authenticate made this block cipher based authenticated encryption twice as 
slow as either encryption or authentication.  In the same year, Katz and Yung presented the single-
pass RPC block cipher mode for authenticated encryption [JKA]. RPC could run almost twice as fast 
as generic authentication scheme but it depends on the size of the authentication tag. In 2001, 
two block modes of operation for authenticated encryption, IACBC for integrity aware cipher block 
chaining and the parallelizable mode called IAPM for integrity aware parallelizable mode, 
supported by a claim of provable security were proposed in [CSJ]. Other provably secure 
authenticated encryption schemes that use a block cipher as a building block were XCBC, XECB and 
OCB [VGL, VGL1, PRO]. These schemes were as fast as conventional encryption (without 
authenticity) i.e. twice as fast as the generic approach with minimal expansion i.e., the size of a 
ciphertext is same as the size of the plaintext and 𝜎 bits of authentication tag, were 𝜎 is  
independent of plaintext size and a constant. The duplex construction [GBE] iteratively applies a 
bijective transformation, and its main application is authenticated encryption. One can also 
incorporate some message authentication mechanisms in a stream cipher. The drawback of this 
approach is that one cannot reduce the security of the scheme to a well-known problem such as 
the indistinguishability of block ciphers from random permutations. However, this approach 
promises better efficiency. One such authenticated encryption scheme is Helix [NFE]. Another 
example of a heuristically designed authenticated encryption scheme is SOBER-128 [PHA]. 
 
As mentioned above, the goal of Authenticated encryption is to provide privacy and integrity.   
Two possible notations are used for the authenticity of AE, INT-PTXT (Integrity of the plaintexts) – 
𝑀 =  𝐷𝐾(𝐶) was never encrypted by the sender, it is computationally infeasible to produce a 
ciphertext decrypting to a message that is never encrypted by the sender and INT-CTXT (Integrity 
of the ciphertexts) -  𝐶 was never transmitted by the sender, it is computationally infeasible to 
produce a ciphertext not previously produced by a sender. Privacy goals for encryption schemes 
consists of indistinguishability (advantage of a reasonable adversary determining what message 
was sent, 𝑀 𝑜𝑟 𝑀ʹ)  and non-malleability(advantage of a reasonable adversary being able to 
change the message to be meaningful), each of which are considered under either chosen-
plaintext or chosen-ciphertext attack. This leads to two indistinguishability notations of security 
IND-CPA (indistinguishability under a chosen plaintext attack), IND-CCA (indistinguishability under 
a chosen ciphertext attack) and two non-malleability security notations, namely NM-CPA (non-
malleability under a chosen plaintext attacks), NM-CCA (non-malleability under chosen ciphertext 
attack).   
To analyze the security of the Authenticated Encryption Scheme three “generic composition” 
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methods are considered namely Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-Encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC. In 
each case two different keys (𝐾1,𝐾2 ) are used.  
 
3.1.1 Encrypt-and-MAC (E&M)   
 
The ciphertext (𝐶) is generated by encrypting the plaintext message (𝑀) and appending a MAC (𝜎) 
of the plaintext. At decryption side, first ciphertext is decrypted and then authentication tag is 
verified.  
An authenticated encryption scheme (𝐴𝐸) = (𝐾,𝐸,𝐷)  in E&M is defined by  
 
Encryption Algorithm:  𝐸𝐾1 ∥𝐾2(𝑀) 
 
Decryption Algorithm :  𝐷𝐾1∥𝐾2(𝐶
′ ∥ 𝜎) 
 
𝐶′  ←  𝐸𝑘1
′ (𝑀) 
𝜎 ← 𝑇𝐾2(𝑀) 
Return 𝐶′ ∥ 𝜎 
 
𝑀 ←  𝐷𝑘1
′ (𝐶′) 
If (𝜎 =  𝑇𝐾2(𝑀)) then return 𝑀 
Else return ⊥ 
 
 
Secure shell (SSH) protocol uses the Encrypt-and-Mac composition [TYL]. SSH is a cryptographically 
secure replacement for standard Telnet, rlogin, rsh and rch commands. Because of its security 
properties SSH became incredibly popular as the secure mechanism for access to remote systems 
interactively. Other programs like rlogin and telnet transmit usernames and passwords in 
cleartext, sniffing a network were easy, whereas by beginning an encrypted session in SSH before 
the username and password are transmitted, confidentiality was guaranteed. SSH consists of both 
a client and a server that use public key cryptography to provide session encryption. The protocol 
is responsible for encrypting and authenticating all messages between two parties involved an SSH 
session. To establish a secure connection, client initiates communication by requesting an SSH 
session. Once the server receives the request, both perform handshake and agree upon a set of 
shared symmetric keys. The client and the server also agree upon which encryption and message 
authentication schemes they wish to use. All the recommended encryption and message 
authentication schemes are based on CBC mode encryption and HMAC [TYL].   
Initial formal security analysis and attacks were proposed by Bellare et al. [MEB1] and Dai [WDA] 
Theses attacks were primary focused on Binary Packet Protocol (BPP) of SSH and assumed that 
keys had already been securely established. Bellare et al. focused on details such as the mode of 
operation (SSH’s use of CBC mode) and use of initialization vectors (chained IVs to random IVs). 
Plaintext-recovering attacks were exposed by Albrecht et al. [MRA] based on Bellare’s initial 
security analysis, where they neglected to consider the underlying data structure used by the SSH 
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BPP in their security proofs. The model was later improved by Paterson and Watson [KGP], to 
avoid the pitfalls exposed by Albrecht et al.  
 
3.1.2 MAC-then-Encrypt (MtE)  
 
The ciphertext (𝐶) is generated by appending a MAC (𝜎) to the plaintext and then encrypting 
everything. At the receiving side, decryption is first performed to get the plaintext and the tag, and 
then tag is verified.  
An authenticated encryption scheme (𝐴𝐸) = (𝐾,𝐸,𝐷)  in MtE is defined by  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol uses Mac-then-Encrypt composition. SSL is a public key based 
protocol that was developed by Netscape and is the standard Internet protocol for secure 
communications [PKO]. The secure hypertext transfer protocol (HTTPS) is http using SSL is a 
communication protocol designed to transfer encrypted information between computers over the 
World Wide Web. SSL provide a connection between a client and server, over which any amount 
of data can be sent securely. This layer provides confidentiality, authenticity and replay protection 
over a connection-oriented reliable transport protocol such as TCP. The SSL protocol supports 
variety of different cryptographic algorithms to support authenticity between the client and 
server, confidentiality of the data and establishing session keys. In initial version of SSL (SSL 2.0), 
most commonly used cipher suite was RSA key exchange (developed by Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman). Other algorithms like MD5[RON], SHA-1[SHS] were used for generating Mac and 
SKIPJACK, Triple-DES for generating ciphertext. 
 
SSL 2.0 suffered from much vulnerability both in cryptographic security and in functionality so the 
protocol was upgraded to SSL 3.0 with significant enhancements. Security analysis and attacks on 
SSL 3.0 was proposed by Wagner et al.[DWA]  Later in 2001, H Krawczyk [HKR] showed that the 
generic composition, Mac-then-encrypt method yields a totally insecure protocol when an 
encryption function that provides perfect secrecy but combined with any MAC function. But 
Encryption Algorithm:  𝐸𝐾1 ∥𝐾2(𝑀) 
 
 𝜎 ← 𝑇𝐾2(𝑀) 
 𝐶 ←  𝐸𝑘1
′ (𝑀 ∥ 𝜎) 
Return 𝐶 
 
Decryption Algorithm :  𝐷𝐾1∥𝐾2(𝐶) 
 
 𝑀 ∥ 𝜎 ←  𝐷𝑘1
′ (𝐶) 
If (𝜎 =  𝑇𝐾2(𝑀)) then return 𝑀 
Else return ⊥ 
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Krawczyk, also showed that MtE could provide secure protocol under two very common forms of 
encryption: CBC Mode (with an underlying secure block cipher) and stream ciphers (that XOR the 
data with random or pseudorandom pad). 
 
3.1.3 Encrypt-then-Mac (EtM) 
   
The ciphertext (𝐶) is generated by encrypting the plaintext (M) and then appending a MAC (𝜎) of 
the encrypting plaintext. At the receiving side, authentication tag of the ciphertext is first verified 
and then decryption is performed to get the plaintext.  
 
An authenticated encryption scheme (𝐴𝐸) = (𝐾,𝐸,𝐷)  in EtM is defined by  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of all three above mentioned generic compositions, Encrypt-then-MAC is provably secure 
[MBE, JBL]. It guaranties INT-CTXT and IND-CCA which gives secure Encryption and MAC functions 
(IND-CPA and strongly unforgeable). Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) uses Encrypt-then-MAC 
composition[SKE,SKE1]. IPSec was originally developed at the Naval Research Laboratory as part of 
a DARPA-sponsored research project. The protocol, as defined by IETF is “a framework of open 
standards for ensuring private, secure communications over Internet Protocol networks, through 
the use of cryptographic security services” IPSec secures communication by authenticating and 
encrypting each IP packet. IPSec is not bound to any particular authentication method of secure 
communications, which is why it is considered an “open standard” The IPsec protocols can be 
deployed in two basic modes of operation: transport mode and tunnel mode. In transport mode 
only the data (payload) is encrypted during communication, which gives the advantage of speed- 
since the IP headers are not encrypted, so the packets are smaller. The disadvantage of transport 
mode is that an adversary can sniff the network and gather information about end parties. In 
tunnel mode whole packet, payload and the header is encrypted and treated as a payload for new 
header called the outer header. The original or inner IP packet is said to be encapsulated within 
the outer IP header. The advantage is that neither the payload nor any information about end 
parties can be sniffed and the disadvantage is speed, since the size of the encrypted packet 
Encryption Algorithm:  𝐸𝐾1 ∥𝐾2(𝑀) 
 
𝐶′  ←  𝐸𝐾1(𝑀)  
 𝜎 ← 𝑇𝐾2(𝐶
′) 
 Return 𝐶′ ∥ 𝜎  
 
Decryption Algorithm :  𝐷𝐾1∥𝐾2(𝐶
′ ∥ 𝜎 ) 
 
 𝑀 ←  𝐷𝑘1
′ (𝐶′) 
If (𝜎 =  𝑇𝐾2(𝐶
′)) then return 𝑀 
Else return ⊥ 
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increases. IPSec provides authenticity, integrity and confidentiality for network layer data through 
two separate security protocols – Authentication header (AH) and Encapsulating security payload 
(ESP). AH provides the authenticity and integrity of the data. AH authenticates the packets by 
signing them, signing packets also provides integrity, since the unique signature prevents the data 
from being modified. ESP also provides authenticity and integrity, but also adds the advantage of 
data confidentiality though encryption and usually makes use of block cipher algorithm operating 
in CBC mode [SKE1, SKE2]. 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the security results of above mentioned composite authenticated 
encryption schemes.  
 
 
Generic Composition Privacy Integrity 
  
IND-CPA 
 
INT-PTXT 
 
INT-CTXT 
 
Encrypt-and-MAC 
 
 
NO 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
MAC-then-Encrypt 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
NO 
 
Encrypt-then-MAC 
 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Table 3.1: Security Results in different composite authenticated encryption schemes. 
 
 
3.2 Two pass combined mode  
 
 
In this section we will discuss two pass combined mode with one pass for encryption and another 
one for authentication. With the popularity of highly-efficient single pass Authenticated 
Encryption (discussed in next section), several patents were filed by the authors to cover such 
schemes. To avoid such patents, two-pass schemes were developed. The first such scheme was 
CCM (CBC MAC with Counter Mode) [DWH] by Whiting at el.  followed by EAX [MEB2],  CWC 
(Carter-Wegman with Counter mode encryption)[TKO].  
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3.2.1 CCM Mode  
 
Counter with Cipher Block Channing – Message Authentication Code, abbreviated as CCM is an 
authenticated-encryption mode of operation of block cipher. The underlying block cipher used in 
CCM is AES -128. CCM is invoked by providing 4 inputs: the key 𝑘 used with AES, plaintext data 𝑀, 
both authenticated and encrypted, associated data 𝐻, authenticated but not encrypted and the 
nonce 𝑁. CCM processing consists of two pairs of related processes – generation-encryption and 
decryption-verification. These processes combine encryption using counter mode and 
authentication using CBC-MAC. Only the encryption function of the block cipher algorithm is used. 
CCM encryption processes two types of input blocks - Payload block, data must be encrypted and 
authenticated and associated data block, where data block must be authenticated but not 
encrypted.  
 
CCM specification – Steps performing CCM processing:  
 
- Pre-processing of the Message: Initially the data is arranged in blocks suitable for CCM 
processing. The first block uniquely determines the nonce 𝑁 and the length of the payload. 
If associated data is present, the block after initial block will consist of associated data until 
there is no more associated data left.  
 
- Computing CBC-MAC: Blocks are encrypted using CBC mode and the output of final 
encryption is the MAC which can be used for authentication.  
 
 
- Encryption using counter mode: Data is encrypted using Counter (CTR) Mode of operation. 
The initial input value to the mode is an Initialization Vector (IV) and subsequent values are 
computed by incrementing the current counter value by one.  
 
- Processing Counter Mode Encryption: Initial block generated by counter mode encryption is 
processed differently than the following blocks.  
 
 
- Computing Authentication Tag: Authentication tag 𝜎 is generated by XORing the initial 
block with the computed CBC-MAC. The length of the tag can be set by the user.  
- Computing the ciphertext: Finally the cipher is generated by XORing the output of counter 
mode encryptions with the plaintext blocks. Final ciphertext output is concatenated with 
the authentication tag i.e.  𝐶‖𝜎 .  
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Several problems were encountered in CCM in terms of efficiency, parameterization, complexity, 
variable-tag-length etc. After examining shortcomings of CCM, Bellare et al. offered new 2-pass 
authenticated encryption called EAX mode of operation [MEB2]. EAX mode addressed several 
problems with CCM for example; CCM did not take advantage, if the associated data field was 
fixed from message to message. In CCM, message lengths must be known in advance because it is 
encoded into the first block before process begins.   
 
 
3.2.2 EAX Mode 
 
Like CCM, EAX is a combination of a type of CBC MAC and CTR mode encryption. However unlike 
CCM, EAX mode of operation supports streaming data input and does not require data to be in 
storage before applying EAX processing. EAX also does not impose any restrictions on the block 
size of the underlying block cipher and uses only encryption function of the block cipher. EAX 
processing consists of two invertible processes – Encryption plus authentication tag generation 
and Decryption plus authentication tag verification. Three input parameters are used for EAX 
mode of operation –Nonce, Header and Message. Security is related to indistinguishability from 
random bits and the inability of an attacker to produce a new but a valid triple i.e., {nonce, header, 
ciphertext}. EAX uses OMAC with an extra input called a “tweak” which allows them to essentially 
get several different MACs by using distinct values for this tweak input. As shown in figure 3.1, to 
invoke encryption and authentication tag generation in EAX, a nonce 𝑁, header 𝐻 will be 
authenticated but not encrypted and the message M will be authenticated and encrypted. Then 
OMAC is used under key 𝑘 (for the chosen block cipher) three times, each time with a different 
tweak, 𝑂𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾0, 𝑂𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾  1 and 𝑂𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐾2. First counter value is obtained by computing nonce 𝑁 for 
CTR mode encryption, 𝑐𝑡𝑟 ← 𝑂𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑘0(𝑁). Then authentication tag is obtained by computing 
Header, 𝜎𝐻 ← 𝑂𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑘1(𝐻). Then Message 𝑀 is encrypted and authenticated,  
𝐶 ← 𝑂𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑘2(𝐶𝑇𝑅𝑘𝑐𝑡𝑟(𝑀)). Finally the output is   an authentication tag 𝜎 = (𝑐𝑡𝑟 ⊕ 𝐶 ⊕  𝜎𝐻) and 
(𝑁,𝐻,𝐶). The decryption and verification process is quite similar and straightforward.  
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Figure 3.1: EAX mode  
 
 
Despite of all the problems addressed by EAX mode of operation ex., complex parameterization, 
handling online data etc still proving security in EXA is difficult since the key 𝑘 is re-used in several 
contexts which are not a safe practice.   
 
3.3 Single Pass Combined Modes 
 
 
The goal of single pass Authenticated Encryption is to achieve faster encryption and message 
authentication by performing both the encryption and message authentication in a single pass as 
opposed to the traditional encrypt-then-mac approach, which requires two passes. Several single-
pass minimal-expanding Authenticated encryption schemes have been proposed: IAPM[CJU] was 
proposed by Julta in 2000,immediately after announcement of IACBC and IAPM , Gligor proposed 
two classes of schemes : XCBC and XECB, XCBC was similar to CBC mode encryption just as IACBC 
and XECB was similar to ECB mode just as IAPM method[VGL]. Rogaway et al. also announced their 
scheme: OCB, which was similar to IAPM but with the additional optimizations [RRO].  These 
combine minimal expansion with a close-to-optimal running time: for large messages, these 
schemes are almost as fast as conventional encryption (without authenticity), i.e. twice as fast as 
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the generic approach. Unfortunately, several patents cover the usage of the fast single-pass 
schemes.  
 
3.3.1 IAPM  
 
Two modes of encryption were introduced by Jutla of IBM in 2000, which were the first correct 
single-pass Authenticated Encryption modes [CJU]. These two modes were called IACBC (Integrity 
Aware CBC) and IAPM (Integrity Aware Parallelizable Mode). The first mode was lot more similar 
to CBC mode of encryption. However more interest was shown in second mode, IAPM because of 
it advantage over IACBC. As mentioned IACBC resembles CBC mode, where one cannot begin 
computation for the 𝑛𝑡ℎ block-cipher until one have the results of previous 𝑛 − 1 block.  
 
IAPM was the first provable secure mode for authenticated encryption. It requires two 
independent keys 𝑘0,𝑘1 with the same length as an underlying block cipher, Message 𝑀 and 
nonce 𝑁, as shown in figure 3.2. The mode is divided into two main steps: offset-generation and 
encryption-tag generation. For offset-generation, a unique nonce 𝑁 is used to generate an 
“offsets”, pair wise differentially uniform vectors (a sequence of uniformly distributed 𝑛-bit 
random numbers, 𝑆1 ,𝑆2 … … . 𝑆𝑚). This generation requires a one block cipher invocation using a 
key 𝑘0, an integer additions over the Galois field using 𝑛-bit prime 𝑝(𝐺𝐹𝑝) respectively only by the 
xor operations with a penalty of approximately 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑚 extra block cipher invocations [CJU]. The 
nonce 𝑁 is communicated as part of a ciphertext. For encryption–tag generation, each block of 
message 𝑀 (𝑀1 … … .𝑀𝑚−1) is computed as 𝐶𝑖 ← 𝐸𝑘1(𝑀 ⊕𝑆𝑖) ⊕𝑆𝑖 for   1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 − 1. The 
XOR-ing of 𝑆𝑖 before and after the block-cipher invocation is a technique called “key-whitening” to 
increase the security of an iterated block cipher. To calculate authentication tag 𝜎, 𝜎 ⟵
𝐸𝑘1(𝑆𝑚 ⊕ {𝑀1 ⊕𝑀2 ⊕𝑀3 … .⊕𝑀𝑚−1}) ⊕  𝑆0. Finally output (𝑁,𝐶1, …𝐶𝑚−1,𝜎 ) as the 
authenticated ciphertext. During the decryption process same offset are generated by using 𝑘0 
and encryption process is simply reversed. After decrypting, authenticated tag is generated to 
ensure it matches with the received tag. If the match is positive then transmission is accepted, and 
if not transmission is considered as an attempt of forgery.   
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Figure 3.2: Integrity Aware Parallelizable Mode scheme. 
 
 
 
3.3.2 XCBC  
 
Soon after IACBC and IAPM, Gligor at el. presented two classes of schemes XCBC and XECB[VGL]. 
As mentioned above, XCBC (Extended Cipher Block Chaining Encryption) is similar to CBC mode 
encryption. XCBC is proposed in three versions: stateless, stateful-sender and stateful both. In this 
section we will be considering only stateful-sender version, because of having the same nonce 
requirement in our proposed system. Initially a set of keys (𝑘1,𝑘2) is used to calculate 𝑅 and 𝑍0 
i.e., 𝑅 ← 𝐸𝑘1(𝐶𝑡𝑟) and 𝑍0 ← 𝐸𝑘2(𝐸𝑘1(𝐶𝑡𝑟)), where 𝑍0  serves as an IV  for CBC-like 
encryption, 𝑅 is used to post-whitening each ciphertext block 𝐶𝑖 by 𝑖 ∗ 𝑅.  To calculate 
authentication tag 𝜎, 𝜎 ⟵ 𝐸𝑘1(𝑍0 ⊕ {𝑀1 ⊕𝑀2 ⊕𝑀3 … .⊕𝑀𝑚}) ⊕ (𝑚 + 1) ∗ 𝑅. However 
XECB, similar to IAPM generates offset to each message block applied before and after a block 
cipher invocation. Offset are generated in a very efficient manner, using arithmetic mod 2𝑛, which 
is very fast on most processors. Both XCBC and XECB is patented and provable secure, AE at a cost 
very close to that of encryption alone.  
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Figure 3.3: Extended Cipher Mode Chaining Encryption mode scheme 
 
 
 
3.3.3 OCB  
 
Offset Codebook mode (OCB) was presented by Rogaway et al [RRO]. This work was based on 
Julta’s IAPM mode with some new improvements. As shown in figure 3.4, in OCB same key is used 
for “offset” calculations and encryption. An authentication tag is verified by using an optional tag 
length 𝜏  (up to n bits), depending on an application needs. For every new message, non-repetitive 
nonce is used. To invoke OCB mode key 𝑘 is used to calculate 𝐿 ←  𝐸𝑘(0𝑛) and for each new 
nonce 𝑁, one block cipher invocation is used to create the intermediate value𝑅 ← 𝐸𝑘(𝑁 ⊕𝐿). 
Using the Gray codes 𝛾, 𝐿 and 𝑅, the “offsets” 𝑧𝑖 are generated 𝑧𝑖  ← 𝛾𝑖. 𝐿 ⊕ 𝑅. For encryption 
each block 𝑀𝑖  1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 − 1 is computed as 𝐶𝑖 ← 𝐸𝑘(𝑀𝑖  ⊕𝑍𝑖) ⊕𝑍𝑖  for   1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 − 1.  To 
calculate authentication tag 𝜎, ⟵ 𝐸𝑘(𝑍𝑚 ⊕ {𝑀1 ⊕𝑀2 ⊕𝑀3 … .⊕𝑀𝑚−1 ⊕ 𝐶𝑚 ⊕ 𝑌𝑚}) 
[𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑇 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠].  
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Figure 3.4: Offset Codebook mode scheme 
 
OCB is patented, fully parallelizable, provable secure and very efficient with small requirements 
with AEAD feature. Performance tests indicate that OCB is about 6.4% slower that CBC mode 
encryption, and this is without exploiting the parallelism that OCB offers up.  
 
3.4 AE Stream Ciphers  
 
Until now, we have looked into the schemes with mode of operation and every mode has used a 
block cipher as its underlying primitive. In this section we will explore authenticated encryptions 
mechanisms in a stream ciphers which provide authentication in addition to privacy. The drawback 
of this approach is that one cannot reduce the security of the scheme to a well-known problem 
such as the indistinguishability of block ciphers from random permutations. However, this 
approach promises better efficiency. Two schemes are discussed in this section: Helix [NFE] and 
SOBER-128[PHA]. Both were designed by experienced cryptographers and close attention was paid 
towards security and efficiency to the ciphers.  
 
3.4.1 Helix  
 
Helix was proposed at FSE’03[NFE] by Ferguson et al. It is an asynchronous stream cipher based on 
a fast keystream generator. The goal was to produce a fast and patent-free stream cipher with 
integrity. Helix guarantees the integrity of the message for very little additional computation and 
without requiring a second pass. Helix is based on an iterated block function applied to an internal 
state of 160 bits. To invoke the function, input consists of a secret key 𝑘 upto 256 bits, a nonce of 
128 bits and a Message 𝑀. Before encryption, the internal state of the 𝑖-th word of Message 𝑀 is 
represented in five 32-bit words. (𝑍0
(𝑖), … …𝑍4
(𝑖)), which are initialized for 𝑖 = 0 using 𝑘 and 𝑁. It 
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uses a block function 𝐹 to update the internal state in function of the Message 𝑀, the key 𝑘 and 
nonce 𝑁. More precisely, the 𝑖 -th state of Helix emits one 32-bit word of key-stream 𝑆𝑖, which 
requires two 32-bit words from the 𝑘 and 𝑁, also requires the 𝑖 -th Message word 𝑀𝑖. Using a 
message stream to generate key-stream is highly-unusual for a stream cipher, but this allows Helix 
to generate key-stream and authentication tag. To produce ciphertext 𝐶𝑖 𝑖 -th key-stream 𝑆𝑖 is 
XORed with Message  𝑀𝑖  . The 5-word state resulting from block 𝑖 is then fed into block 𝑖 + 1 and 
this process is repeated until all words of the Message have been encrypted. Finally a last step can 
generate a tag of 128 bits that constitute the MAC.  
 
In 2004, Muller presented Differential attacks against Helix[MUL]. He showed that the key of Helix 
can be recovered faster than by brute force if the attacker can force the IV’s to be used more than 
once. The attack requires 288 basic operations and processes only 212 words of chosen plaintext in 
order to recover the secret key for length upto 256 bits. Later Paul et al. reduced the number of 
adaptively chosen plaintext words by a factor of at least 3 [SPA].  
 
 
3.4.2 SOBER-128 
 
SOBER-128 was developed from SOBER [PHA], it was proposed by Hawkes and Rose. It is a 
software-oriented stream cipher based on a linear feedback shift-register (LFSR) over GF (232), a 
non-linear filtering function (NLF) consists of additions modulo 232, XORing, circular shift and 8 X 
32 bit substitution box (S-box). A nonlinear plaintext feedback function (PFF) is added when 
authentication and encryption are required.   To invoke the cipher for authenticated encryption, 
initially it generates the key-stream and XORs with the Message 𝑀 then uses a separate API call 
“maconly” to process the associated data.  Like Helix, SOBER-128 also feedback plaintext into the 
key-stream generator.  
 
 
Watanbe and Furnya from Hitachi presented differential cryptanalysis attacks on SOBER-
128[DWA]. Their claim was that the MAC generation function in SOBER-128 is vulnerable against 
differential cryptanalysis and the success probability of this attack is estimated at 2−6.  
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3.5 ASC-1:  An Authenticated Encryption Stream Cipher  
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the goal of a single pass Authenticated Encryption is to 
achieve faster encryption and message authentication by performing both the encryption and 
message authentication in a single pass as opposed to the traditional encrypt-then-mac approach, 
which require two passes. Several single-pass minimal expanding AE schemes have been proposed 
ex., IACBC and IAPM are two block cipher modes of operation for authenticated encryption 
supported by a claim of provable security [CSJ]. Other provably secure AE schemes that use a block 
cipher as a building block were also presented in [VGL] [PRO].  
In this thesis, we propose the single pass authenticated encryption scheme ASC-1[SKG]. The design 
of the scheme has roots in message authentication and encryption scheme that use four rounds of 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as a building block such as the LEX [ABI] stream cipher, the 
ALRED[JDE,JDE1] MAC scheme and the MAC schemes proposed in [GJA,KMI].However, unlike the 
previous constructions, this scheme uses a single cryptographic primitive to achieve both message 
secrecy and authenticity. To argue the security of the scheme, it shows that the scheme is secure if 
one cannot tell apart the case when the scheme uses random round keys from the case when the 
round keys are derived by a key scheduling algorithm.  
For better understanding of ASC-1, we will first look into LEX stream cipher and attacks on LEX 
stream cipher.  
   
3.5.1 LEX Stream Cipher  
 
Alex Biryukov presented a new methodology of stream cipher design, called leak extraction. The 
idea is to extract parts of the internal state at certain rounds and give them as the output key 
stream. The underlying block cipher for LEX is AES block cipher. LEX stream cipher was selected to 
phase 3 of the eSTREAM competition, the ERYPT stream cipher project [ABI].  
LEX is based on AES and it uses AES in a natural way. The key-stream bits are generated by 
extracting 4 bytes from the intermediate state of AES in a 128-bit Output Feedback (OFB) mode. 
As shown in the figure 3.5, in the initialization step, the publicly known 128-bit Initialization Vector 
(IV) is encrypted by AES under a secret key k to get 𝑆 = 𝐴𝐸𝑆𝐾(𝐼𝑉). The 𝑆 and subkeys are the 
output of the initialization process.  
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Figure 3.5: LEX Stream Cipher 
 
S is repeatedly encrypted in the OFB mode under K, where during the execution of each 
encryption, four bytes are leaked from each round. Another IV is chosen after every 500 
encryptions and after 232 IVs, the secret key is replaced.  
 
 
b0,0 b0,1 b0,2 b0,3
b1,0 b1,1 b1,2 b1,3
b2,0 b2,1 b2,2 b2,3
b3,0 b3,1 b3,2 b3,3
b0,0 b0,1 b0,2 b0,3
b1,0 b1,1 b1,2 b1,3
b2,0 b2,1 b2,2 b2,3
b3,0 b3,1 b3,2 b3,3
b0,0 b0,1 b0,2 b0,3
b1,0 b1,1 b1,2 b1,3
b2,0 b2,1 b2,2 b2,3
b3,0 b3,1 b3,2 b3,3
Odd Rounds Even Rounds
 
Figure 3.6: Leak Positions in odd and even rounds 
 
Now the most crucial part is the extraction of bytes from the exact location and frequency of the 
outputs from the intermediate rounds. The designer of the system suggested to extract bytes 
𝑏0,1, 𝑏2,1,𝑏0,3, 𝑏2,3   at every odd round and  𝑏0,0,𝑏2,0, 𝑏0,2,𝑏2,2 at every even round, as shown in 
figure 3.6. LEX encryption round consists of:   
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𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑖) 
{        𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒);  
         𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑤𝑠(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒); 
         𝑀𝑖𝑥𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑠(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒); 
         𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐾𝑒𝑦(𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑒𝑦[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑁𝑟]); 
}  
𝑁𝑟 is the number of rounds and is equal to 10 for 128-bit key AES. The full 𝑇 iterations of LEX 
would then look like:  
𝐿𝐸𝑋 (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑒𝑦) 
{  
       𝐴𝐸𝑆𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝐾𝑒𝑦,𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑒𝑦); 
       𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝐴𝐸𝑆𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡(𝐼𝑉,𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐾𝑒𝑦); 
       𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐾𝑒𝑦 (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒,𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑘𝑒𝑦[0]); 
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑖 = 1; 𝑖 < 𝑇; 𝑖 + +) 
       {  
           𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑖);  
           𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡  [𝑖] =  𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑘𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 (𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 , 𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 2); 
        } 
} 
 
The speed of the cipher is about 2.5 times faster than 128-bit AES. However a key recovery attack 
was presented by Dunkelman et al, where the attack required about 236.3 bytes of key-stream 
produced by the same key, and retrieves the secret key in times of 2112 simple operations 
[OD’08]. The attack was divided into three main steps – identification of a special state, extracting 
information on the special state and finally guess-and-determine attack on the remaining 
unknown bytes, based on the known bytes an attacker can use this attack to retrieve the key. 
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Another attack called “Resynchronization Attack”was presented by Hongjun Wu and Bart Preneel, 
where the resynchronization of LEX is vulnerable to the slide attacks [HWU].  The attack showed 
that if the key is used with about 260.8 random IVs and 20,000 keystream bytes are generated 
from each IV, then the key could easily be recovered.  
In general, slide attacks are not dependent of the properties of the iterated round function and 
the number of rounds as compared to the generic cryptanalytic attacks – differential and linear 
analysis where for each extra round an exponential effort is  required from an attacker. Typically a 
slide attack exploits the self similarity of a block cipher and sees the cipher as a product of 
identical transformations [SKM].  
 
3.5.1 ASC-1 Specification  
 
 
ASC-1 is an authenticated encryption scheme. Its key size can vary depending on the block cipher 
that is used. Block cipher suggestion for ASC-1 is AES with 128-bit key. The encryption and 
decryption algorithms for a message  𝑀 = 𝑚1‖𝑚2‖𝑚3 consisting of three 128-bit blocks depicted 
in figure 3.7.  
The scheme uses a 56-bit representation of a counter that provides a unique initialization vector 
for each encrypted message. The encryption algorithm derives an initial state 𝑋0 and three keys 
𝐾1,0,𝐾2,0and 𝐾3,0 by applying block cipher to 070‖00‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟 070‖01‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟 , 070‖10‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟 and 
𝑙(𝑀)‖00000011‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟 respectively, where 𝑙(𝑀) is a 64-bit representation of the bit length of the 
message M. The message is then processed in a CFB-like mode using the 4R-AES transformation. 
The 4R-AES transformation takes as input a 128-bit input state and outputs a 128-bit “random” 
leak 𝑟𝑖  and a 128-bit output state. The first leak 𝑟1 is used to encrypt the first message block 𝑚1. 
The resulting ciphertext block 𝑐1   is XOR-ed with the output state to give the input state for the 
second 4R-AES transformation. This process is repeated for all message blocks. The leak from the 
last 4R-AES application is ignored, and its output h is encrypted by  𝐾3,0 to give the authentication 
tag. The ciphertext consists of the counter value, the ciphertext blocks and the authentication tag.  
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𝑋0 =  𝐸𝐾(070‖00‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟), 𝐾1,0 =  𝐸𝐾(070‖01‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟), 𝐾2,0 =  𝐸𝐾(070‖10‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟),  
𝐾3,0 =  𝐸𝐾(𝑙(𝑀)‖06‖ 11‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟) 
Figure 3.7: The encryption and decryption algorithms of ASC-1. The message consists of three blocks. The 
ciphertext consists of the counter value, three ciphertext block and an authentication tag. The receiver 
recovers the original message and verifies its validity by checking whether the re-computed authentication 
tag is equal to the received one. 
 
The decryption algorithm uses the same secret key and the received counter value to compute 𝑋0, 
𝐾1,0,𝐾2,0  and 𝐾3,0. The leak 𝑟1 derived by applying 4R-AES to 𝑋0 is used to decrypt 𝑐1 into the 
original message block 𝑚1. The output of the first 4R-AES is XOR-ed with the first ciphertext block 
to give the next input state, and the process is repeated until all message blocks are recovered and 
an authentication tag of the message is computed. If the computed tag is same as the one that 
was received, then the decrypted message is accepted as valid. 
Although, the scheme uses 64-bit and 56-bit representation for the message length and the 
counter, but both the maximum message length and maximum number of messages to be 
encrypted is 248. The message length might not be a multiple of the block length. In this case, the 
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last message block 𝑚𝑛 with length 𝑙𝑛 < 128 is padded with zeros to get a 128-bit block 𝑚΄𝑛. A 
128-bit ciphertext block 𝑐΄𝑛 is derived as 𝑐΄𝑛 = 𝑚΄𝑛 ⊕  𝑟𝑛,  and it is XOR-ed with the n-th output 
state to give the (n+1)-st input state. However, the sender will not transmit  𝑐΄𝑛 but  𝑐𝑛, which 
consists of the first  𝑙𝑛 bits of  𝑐΄𝑛. This will enable the receiver to recover the message length.  
The 4R-AES transformation is depicted in figure 3.8. Four AES rounds are applied to the initial state 
𝑥 = (𝑥1 , … … . . , 𝑥16) to give a 128-bit leak 𝑟 =  𝑙1…4‖𝑙5…8‖𝑙9…12‖𝑙13…16  and an output state   
𝑦 = (𝑦1 , … … . . ,𝑦16). Here, we assume that the key addition is the first operation of the AES 
rounds. Four bytes are leaked after the MixColumns transformation in each round. The leak 
positions are same as in LEX. However, unlike LEX, key whitening is added before each extracted 
byte. This gives additional security to the scheme. 
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Figure 3.8: The 4R-AES transformation 
 
The 4R-AES transformation uses five 128-bit keys: four round keys and one whitening key. These 
keys are derived from the 256-bit key  𝐾1,0�𝐾2,0 as follows.  
71 
 
The AES-256 key scheduling algorithm is applied to   𝐾1,0�𝐾2,0 to derive 14 round keys 
𝐾1,𝐾2, … … 𝐾14. The keys 𝐾2,𝐾3,𝐾4 and 𝐾5 are used as round keys in the first 4R-AES 
transformation. The keys 𝐾7,𝐾8,𝐾9 and 𝐾10are used as round keys in the second 4R-AES 
transformation. The key 𝐾1is used as whitening key in the second 4R-AES transformation and the 
key 𝐾11is used as whitening key in the first 4R-AES transformation. The AES-256 key scheduling 
algorithm is again applied to   𝐾13‖𝐾14 to derive 14 keys that are used by the third and the fourth 
4R-AES transformation, and the process is repeated as long as we need new keys.   
 
 
3.6 Security Considerations  
 
In the previous section we have proposed a single pass authenticated encryption scheme ASC-1, 
with the goal to enable two parties to securely communicate over an insecure channel. The 
security of the ciphers is continuously evaluated by cryptanalysts all over the world in order to 
examine the resistance of the designs towards different kind of attacks. Defining the security of 
the system is quite difficult because an attacker may have different goals and abilities. Before 
trying to prove the security of the system, we will first list approaches to solve most problems 
comprising confidentiality and authenticity, and an overview of typical attack scenarios.   
 
3.6.1 Security Measurements  
 
In modern cryptography, many approaches can be identified to evaluate the security of the 
cryptosystem in the literature. These approaches are based on different assumptions about the 
capabilities of an attacker. However we will consider two different approaches in this section: 
Information theoretic approach and Computational security  
 
Information Theoretic Approach  
 
The approach is based on information theory and it offers unconditional security. A cryptosystem 
is unconditionally secure if it cannot be broken even with infinite computational resources. 
Nevertheless, it should be stated that the unconditional security of the cryptosystem is only 
probabilistic; a system could be secure in one scenario but easy to break in another. In 1950’s a 
classic definition was proposed by Claude Shannon [SH’49] for “perfect secrecy” of an encryption 
scheme.  
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Definition 3.1 (Perfect secrecy) 
A cryptosystem has perfect secrecy if  
 
Pr[𝑃 = 𝑝|𝐶 = 𝑐] = Pr [𝑃 = 𝑝] 
for all 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃 and 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶.   
 
In order words, the plaintext is independent of the ciphertext. Another interesting thing to note 
here is the definitions of unconditional security and perfect secrecy is not equivalent, a 
cryptosystem that is perfectly security is unconditionally secure against a ciphertext only attack 
but not necessarily unconditionally secure against any other attacks. Perfect secrecy is a strong 
condition , Shannon prove that the perfect secrecy  could only be achieved if the length of the 
secret key is same or exceeds the length of the plaintext. This is usually taken as evidence that 
unconditional security can never be practical but achievable. Shannon proved this condition by 
presenting one-time pad cipher.  
 
 
Definition 3.2 (One-time pad)  
Let 𝑛 > 1 be the length of the message, then 𝑃 = 𝐶 = 𝐾 = 𝑍2𝑛 . For 𝑥 = (𝑥1, … … . 𝑥𝑛) ∈ 𝑃, 
 𝑦 = (𝑦1, … … .𝑦𝑛) ∈ 𝐶 and  𝑘 = (𝑘1, … … . 𝑘𝑛) ∈ 𝐾 the encryption 𝐸𝑘(𝑥)  and decryption  
𝐷𝑘(𝑦) is defined as bitwise exclusive-or.  
 
𝐸𝑘(𝑥) = (𝑥1 ⊕  𝑘1, … … 𝑥𝑛 ⊕  𝑘𝑛) 
and 
𝐷𝑘(𝑦) = (𝑦1 ⊕  𝑘1, … … 𝑦𝑛 ⊕  𝑘𝑛) 
 
It is essential for the security of one-time pad that the key 𝑘  is chosen uniformly at random and 
no two messages are encrypted using the same key. In the section we saw that the requirements 
for unconditional security are rather impractical. So, in practice it is safe to assume that an 
attacker does not have infinite computational resources. This leads to our second approach of 
computational security.  
 
 
Computational Security   
 
Computational security is the modern approach and it is based on computational complexity. It 
discards the assumption that an attacker has unlimited computational resources and assumes that 
the attacker’s computational power is limited in some reasonable way. In this approach the main 
question is not if there is plaintext information present on the ciphertext, but rather if the 
information can be efficiently extracted. The security in this approach is based on a gap between 
efficient algorithms guaranteed for the legitimate user verses the computational infeasibility of 
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retrieving information for an attacker [SGM].   
For the sake of an argument, if one has at possibility to verify that the solution is correct, an 
exhaustive search method could be applied. In this method all the possible elements in the space 
are tried until the correct one is found.  
 
Definition 3.3 (Computational Security)  
A cryptosystem provides 𝑛 bits of security if an attack requires a computational effort which is 
equivalent to an exhaustive search over 2𝑛 values.   
 
From the definition we can deduce that a cryptosystem is computationally secure if it provides 𝑛 
bit security where 2𝑛 operations are computationally infeasible with the present resources 
available or that will be in near future. The value of 𝑛 is generally related to the length of the key 
used in the cryptosystem, this is because given the plaintext it is possible to exhaustively search all 
the possible 2𝑛 keys until the correct one is found. Hence the length of the key gives away the 
upper bound for the parameter 𝑛 and in the ideal case also the lower bound, where no other 
attacks are faster than exhaustive key search.  
Shannon identified two basic techniques for obscuring the redundancies in the plaintext messages 
for any cryptographic algorithm – Confusion and Diffusion  
 
Confusion – obscures the relationship between the plaintext and ciphertext. According to 
Shannon “confusion is to make the relation between the simple statistics of ciphertext and the 
simple description of key a very complex and involved one”[SH’49]. This frustrates attempts to 
study the cipher text looking for redundancies and statistical patterns. The easiest to realize this is 
by substitutions such as S-boxes. 
  
Diffusion – dissipates the redundancy of the plaintext by spreading it out over the cipher text. 
According to Shannon “The statistical structure of the plaintext which leads to its redundancy is 
dissipated into long range statistics, i.e., into statistical structure involving long combinations of 
letters in the cryptogram”[SH’49]. This means that a cryptanalyst looking for those redundancies 
will have a harder time finding them. Diffusion can easily be caused through transposition.  
 
For designing an encryption scheme, the main goal of a designer is to maximize the complexity of 
the known attacks and minimize the complexity of the cryptosystem. In our proposed design, we 
have looked into the vulnerabilities and attacks presented on similar cryptosystems like LEX 
stream cipher and tried to overcome those attacks[OD’08][HB’06].  
Looking from attackers prospective, the goal of an attacker is to find an attack with the complexity 
lower than the bound estimated by the designer. But not every successful attack faster than 
exhaustive search makes the cipher useless because it might still be computationally infeasible. On 
the other hand, every attack discloses some unknown vulnerabilities of the system and carries the 
risk of becoming a potential threat in the future.  
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Attack Scenarios  
 
One can view block ciphers as a family of permutations, indexed by a key. The strongest property 
from it is to be indistinguishable from completely random permutations, when the key is selected 
uniformly at random. For the classification of following attack scenarios we assume that the 
attacker have all the details of the cryptosystem except for the secret key. In addition to this we 
also assume that the attacker can access the full communication between the sender and receiver.  
 
Known plaintext attacks (KPA) – The attacker have no control over the plaintexts but have access 
to plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext. A priori, they are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed.  
Ciphertext only attacks (COA) – The attacker possesses certain amount of ciphertext, without the 
corresponding plaintext. For this attack to work, all the messages have to be encrypted with the 
same key.  
Chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) – The attacker chooses a set of plaintexts a priori and receives the 
corresponding ciphertext.  
Adaptive chosen plaintext attacks (ACPA) – The attacker make encryption queries, choosing 
subsequent plaintext depending on the ciphertext he received from previous requests.  
(Adaptive)Chosen ciphertext attacks (A/CCA) – The attacks are similar to chosen plaintext and 
adaptive chosen plaintext attacks. The attacker chooses set of ciphertexts and obtains its 
decryption.  
 
A cryptosystem vulnerable to ciphertext only attacks are certainly considered very weak. But 
attacks like known plaintext are still very realistic, however there are easy strategies to slow down 
these attacks in real world applications. Generally, a symmetric cryptosystem that is secure against 
adaptive chosen plaintext attack might be vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks but secure 
against rest of the above mentioned attacks. In our proposed system, we argue that ASC-1 is 
secure by reducing its (IND-CCA, INT-CTXT) security to the problem of distinguishing the case when 
the round keys are uniformly random from the case when the round keys are generated by a key 
scheduling algorithms.  
 
3.7 Preliminaries  
 
In this section we will draw a notion of an almost universal (AU) and almost XOR universal (AXU) 
hash function from Carter and Wegman [LC’79][MV’81]. 
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Definition 3.4. (AU & AXU) -   A family of hash functions ℋ =  {ℎ ∶ 𝐴 →  {0,1}𝑏} is 𝜀-almost 
universal2 ,written  𝜀-AU2 , if for all distinct 𝑥, 𝑥 ʹ  ∈ 𝐴,  𝑃𝑟ℎ∈ℋ[ℎ(𝑥) = ℎ(𝑥 ʹ)]  ≤ 𝜀. The family of 
hash functions ℋ is 𝜀-almost XOR universal2 ,written  𝜀-AXU2 , if for all distinct 𝑥, 𝑥 ʹ  ∈ 𝐴, and for 
all 𝑐 ∈ {0,1}𝑏 , 𝑃𝑟ℎ∈ℋ[ℎ(𝑥) ⊕ℎ(𝑥 ʹ) = 𝑐]  ≤ 𝜀.  
 
 
The value of 𝜀 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥≠𝑥ʹ{𝑃𝑟ℎ[ℎ(𝑥) =  ℎ(𝑥 ʹ)]} is called collision probability. The important 
measures worth noticing are how small its collision probability is and how fast one can compute its 
functions. Based on this we will introduce the concept of leak-safe almost XOR universal (LAXU) 
hash function. Figure 3.9 shows how these functions can be used as a building block to construct 
an unconditionally secure authenticated encryption scheme.  
  
 
 
 
Definition 3.5. (LAXU) -  A family of hash functions ℋ = {ℎ(𝑚) = (𝑙,ℎ)|𝑚 ∈ 𝑀, 𝑙 ∈ {0,1}𝑘,ℎ ∈
{0,1}𝑛} is leak safe 𝜀- almost XOR universal2, written 𝜀-LAXU2, if for all distinct messages  𝑚,𝑚ʹ ∈ 
M, for all leaks 𝑙 ∈ {0,1}𝑘 and any constant 𝑐 ∈ {0,1}𝑛,  
 
𝑃𝑟ℎ∈ℋ �𝜋ℎ�ℎ(𝑚)�⊕ 𝜋ℎ �ℎ(𝑚ʹ)� = 𝑐� 𝜋𝑙�ℎ(𝑚)� = 𝑙]  ≤ 𝜀.  
 
Where 𝜋ℎ(𝑙,ℎ) = ℎ  and 𝜋𝑙(𝑙,ℎ) = 𝑙 are projection functions.  
 
 Let the message 𝑀 consists of 𝑑 𝑛-bit blocks. The ciphertext is computed as follows – a hash 
function ℎ𝐾1 is randomly drawn from the family of hash functions  ℋ. The function is applied to an 
initial value IV to get a leak 𝑙1and hash value ℎ1. The leak 𝑙1 is XOR-ed with the message block 𝑚1  
and produces the ciphertext 𝑐1 =  𝑚1 ⊕  𝑙1 . To encrypt the second block of message a new hash 
function ℎ𝐾2 is randomly pulled from  ℋ and applied to  𝑖2 =  𝑘1 ⊕ℎ1 ⊕  𝑐1 , where 𝑘1  is a 
random key, to get the a leak 𝑙2 and hash value ℎ2. Similarly the leak 𝑙2 encrypts the message 
block 𝑚2 into ciphertext 𝑐2. This process is repeated until all the 𝑑 𝑛-bit blocks of message 𝑀 are 
encrypted.   To calculate an authentication tag 𝜏 for the message 𝑀 , a random 𝑛-bit key 𝐾𝑇 is 
XOR-ed with the hash value ℎ𝑑+1 i.e., =  𝐾𝑇  ⊕  ℎ𝑑+1 , where ℎ𝑑+1 is obtained by applying a 
randomly drawn hash function to 𝑖𝑑+1 = 𝑘𝑑 ⊕ℎ𝑑 ⊕  𝑐𝑑 . Finally the ciphertext 
𝐶 = 𝐼𝑉‖𝑐1 ‖𝑐2‖… . .   ‖𝑐𝑑‖𝜏    is a concatenation of the initial value, the ciphertext blocks and the 
authentication tag.  
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Encryption. For message 𝑀 =  𝑚1 |𝑚2 | … … |𝑚𝑑 , the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext 
𝐶 =  𝐼𝑉|𝑐1 |𝑐2 |… … |𝑐𝑑 |𝜏  
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Decryption. The algortihm will only output the message 𝑀 =  𝑚1 |𝑚2 | … … |𝑚𝑑  if the computed 
tag 𝜏 and received tag 𝜏𝑟  are equal, else rejects the message. 
 
 
Figure 3.9:  An authenticated encryption scheme construction based on a LAXU hash function family on a 
CFB-like mode.  
 
 
To decrypt and verify the authenticity of the ciphertext we assume that the recipient has 
knowledge of the secret keys that were used by the sender to encrypt the message. Similar to the 
encryption side, ℎ𝐾1 is applied to the IV to get the leak 𝑙1 and hash value ℎ1. The leak 𝑙1 is then 
XOR-ed with the ciphertext block 𝑐1 and produces the message block 𝑚1 =  𝑐1  ⊕ 𝑙1. To decrypt 
the next block of ciphertext hash function ℎ𝐾2 is applied to 𝑖2 =  𝑘1 ⊕ℎ1 ⊕  𝑐1 , to get the leak 
𝑙2  and hash value ℎ2. The leak 𝑙2 decrypts the ciphertext block 𝑐2 into plaintext message 𝑚2 =
 𝑐2 ⊕  𝑙2  . This process is repeated until all the 𝑑 𝑛-bit ciphertext blocks are decrypted.  To order 
to verify the authenticity of the received ciphertext, the recipient re-computes the authentication 
tag 𝜏 = 𝐾𝑇  ⊕  ℎ𝑑+1. If the recomputed tag 𝜏 is equal to the received tag 𝜏𝑟 , then the decryption 
algorithm returns the plaintext 𝑀 =  𝑚1‖𝑚2 ‖… … . ‖𝑚𝑑  . Otherwise the decryption algorithm 
rejects the ciphertext considering it not authentic. Following theorem establishes the security of 
the previous theorem.  
 
 
Theorem 1. Suppose that  ℋ = {ℎ(𝑚) = (𝑙,ℎ)|𝑚 ∈ {0,1}𝑛, 𝑙 ∈ {0,1}𝑛,ℎ ∈ {0,1}𝑛} is an 𝜀-LAXU2 
family of hash functions such that (𝑖) 𝜋ℎ(ℎ(𝑚)) is a bijection, and (𝑖𝑖) 
𝑃𝑟ℎ∈ℋ  � 𝜋𝑙�ℎ(𝑚)� = 𝑙�𝑚� =  2−𝑛 for any message 𝑚 and leak  𝑙. Then, the authenticated 
encryption scheme depicted in figure 3.9 achieves:  
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1. Perfect secrecy. The a posteriori probability that the message is M given a ciphertext C is 
equal to the a priori probability that the message is M. 
2. Unconditionally secure ciphertext integrity. The probability that a computationally 
unbounded adversary will successfully forge a ciphertext is at most 𝑞𝑣 𝜀, where 𝑞𝑣 is the 
number of the verification queries that the adversary makes.  
 
  Proof. From 1, the scheme has perfect secrecy if the initial value 𝐼𝑉 is independent of the 
message and all the leaks 𝑙𝑖 and the key 𝐾𝑇  have uniform probability distribution for any possible 
message, as in the analysis given below:  
 
Pr[ 𝑀 = 𝑚1 ‖… … … . ‖  𝑚𝑑| 𝐶 = 𝐼𝑉 ‖𝑐1‖… … … . . ‖𝑐𝑑‖ 𝜏 =  
=
Pr[ 𝑀 = 𝑚1 ‖… … . ‖  𝑚𝑑]  ×  Pr [𝐶 = 𝐼𝑉 ‖𝑐1‖… . . ‖𝑐𝑑‖ 𝜏|𝑀 = Pr[ 𝑀 = 𝑚1 ‖… … . ‖  𝑚𝑑]
∑ Pr [𝑀ʹ =𝑀ʹ 𝑚1ʹ ‖… … . ‖  𝑚𝑑ʹ ]  ×  Pr [𝐶 = 𝐼𝑉 ‖𝑐1‖… . . ‖𝑐𝑑‖ 𝜏|𝑀ʹ = 𝑚1ʹ ‖… … . ‖  𝑚𝑑ʹ ]
 
  
=
Pr[ 𝑀 = 𝑚1 ‖… … . ‖  𝑚𝑑]  × 2−(𝑑+1)𝑛   × Pr [𝐼𝑉]
∑ Pr [𝑀ʹ =𝑀ʹ 𝑚1ʹ ‖… … . ‖  𝑚𝑑ʹ ]  × 2−(𝑑+1)𝑛   × Pr [𝐼𝑉]
 
= Pr[ 𝑀 = 𝑚1 ‖… … . ‖  𝑚𝑑] 
For any message 𝑀ʹ:  
Pr�𝐶 = 𝐼𝑉 ‖𝑐1‖… . . ‖𝑐𝑑‖ 𝜏�𝑀ʹ = 𝑚1ʹ ‖… … . ‖  𝑚𝑑ʹ � =  
= Pr[𝑐1‖… … . ‖  𝑐𝑑 ‖𝜏 | 𝐼𝑉,𝑀ʹ]  × Pr[𝐼𝑉 |𝑀ʹ] 
= Pr[1 =  𝑚1⨁ 𝑐1‖… … . ‖𝑚𝑑⨁ 𝑐𝑑,𝐾𝑇 =  ℎ𝑑+1⨁ 𝜏�𝐼𝑉,𝑀ʹ] × Pr [𝐼𝑉] 
=  2−(𝑑+1)𝑛  × Pr[𝐼𝑉]. 
 
3.7.1 Classical attacks of cheating   
 
The idea of authenticating a message is to assure receiver that the message is sent by a specified 
legitimate sender, even in the presence of an attacker who can intercept message and send a fake 
message to the receiver. When considering the authenticity of the message two classical attacks of 
cheating are – impersonation and substitution attack.   
 
Impersonation attack – The adversary constructs and sends a ciphertext 𝐶 ʹ to the receiver before 
he sees the encryption of the message 𝑀. From the definition above the fact that the key 𝐾𝑇 is 
uniformly random, the probability of success of an impersonation attack is at most 2−𝑛. If the 
adversary makes 𝑞𝐼 impersonation attempts, then the probability that at least one of these 
attempts will be successful is 1 − (1 − 2−𝑛)𝑞𝐼  ≤  𝑞𝐼 ×  2−𝑛.  
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Substitution attack – In case of substitution attack, the adversary intercepts the ciphertext 𝐶 of a 
given message 𝑀 and tried to replace it with a replace with a different ciphertext 𝐶 ʹ which he 
hopes to be accepted by the receiver. Following shows that the probability of success for this 
attack is at most  𝑞𝑠 ×  𝜖 , where 𝑞𝑠  is the number of substitution attempts made by the 
adversary. 
  
Let us assume that 𝐶 = 𝐼𝑉‖𝑐1 ‖𝑐2‖… . .   ‖𝑐𝑑‖𝜏   is the encrypted text for message 𝑀 and let 
𝐶 ʹ = 𝐼𝑉ʹ�𝑐 ʹ1 �𝑐 ʹ2‖… . .   �𝑐 ʹ𝑑‖𝜏  ʹ be the forged message constructed by the attacker to substitute the 
original ciphertext. In a case where both the ciphertexts 𝐶 and 𝐶 ʹ differ only in their authentication 
tags i.e., 𝜏 ʹ ≠ 𝜏, 𝐼𝑉 ʹ = 𝐼𝑉  and 𝑐𝑗 =  𝑐 ?́? , 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑑, then the probability of successful substitution is 
zero. Now let us consider an interesting case where the forged ciphertext 𝐶 ʹ is different from the 
original ciphertext 𝐶 in at least one block that is different from the tag block.  
 
Let  0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑑 be the index of the first block where 𝐶 and 𝐶 ʹ differ, and let ∆𝑖𝑗+1 =  𝑐 ?́?  ⨁𝑐𝑗 be the 
difference at the input of ℎ𝐾𝑗+1, with 𝑐0 = 𝐼𝑉 and 𝑐ʹ0 = 𝐼𝑉ʹ. Based on leaf-safe almost XOR 
universal (LAXU) hash function and invertibility properties of ℋ, Pr[∆ℎ𝑗+1 =  0� 𝑀,𝐶,𝐶 ʹ] =
0 𝑎𝑛𝑑  ∀∆∈{0,1}𝑛,∆≠0 Pr�∆ℎ𝑗+1 =  ∆�𝑀,𝐶,𝐶 ʹ� ≤ 𝜖. The probability Pr[∆ℎ𝑗+2 =  0� 𝑀,𝐶,𝐶 ʹ] is equal 
to the probability that Pr[∆𝑖𝑗+2 =  0� 𝑀,𝐶,𝐶 ʹ], and is a most 𝜖. When the input different ∆𝑖𝑗+2 is 
nonzero, we get that ∀∆∈{0,1}𝑛,∆≠0 Pr�∆ℎ𝑗+2 =  ∆�𝑀,𝐶,𝐶 ʹ� ≤ 𝜖 and if continue in the similar 
fashion,  we get that  ∀∆∈{0,1}𝑛 Pr[∆ℎ𝑑+1 =  ∆�𝑀,𝐶,𝐶 ʹ] ≤ 𝜖.  The forged ciphertext will only be 
accepted as valid if ℎʹ𝑑+1⨁ 𝐾𝑇 = 𝜏ʹ, i.e., only if ∆ℎ𝑑+1 = ∆𝜏, where ∆𝜏 =  𝜏 ⨁ 𝜏ʹ. From the 
previous analysis, this will happen with the probability no larger than 𝜖.   
The probability that an adversary will be able to succeed with at least one substitution query is at 
most 𝑞𝑆𝜖 and the probability of success with verification queries i.e., 𝑞𝑉 =  𝑞𝐼 +  𝑞𝑆 is at most  𝑞𝑉𝜖 
due to the fast that 𝜖 ≤ 2−𝑛.  
 
3.8 Security of ASC-1  
 
 
The security in encryption designs can be classified according to the assumed computational 
resources of an adversary. Security that holds when one assumes a suitable restriction on an 
attacker’s computing power is called computational security whereas the security that holds even 
with the unbounded computational capabilities of an attacker is called information-theoretic 
security. In this section, we will cover both the cases and show if the underlying block cipher in 
ASC-1 is secure. Additionally, we will also show where one cannot tell apart the case when ASC-1 
uses random round keys from the case when it used round keys derived by a key scheduling 
algorithm, then ASC-1 is secure authenticated encryption scheme.  
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3.8.1 The information-theoretic case  
 
In order to establish the unconditional security of ASC-1, let us consider the case where scheme 
uses random keys. Figure 3.10, shows the two round Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) 
structure. The input 𝑥 =  𝑥1‖… … . ‖𝑥𝑛 is an 𝑛 × 𝑚-bit string. The key addition operator is the 
bitwise XOR operator. The non-linear substitution layer consists of 𝑛 S-boxes and each S-box is a 
non-linear permutation that transforms an 𝑚-bit string into an 𝑚-bit string. The liner mixing layer 
is defined by a 𝑛 × 𝑛 matrix. As shown in figure 3.10, the mixing layer is not included in the 
second round since it does not affect our analysis. The leak Ι consists of 𝑠 values 𝑣1, … . . 𝑣𝑠 .  
 
 
Linear mixing layer
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x1
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k1,2
x2
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v2
y2
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S
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k2,n
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𝒍 =  𝒗𝟏‖𝒗𝟐‖ … . ‖𝒗𝒔 
 
 
Figure 3.10: A two round SPN structure with a leak  
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Each possible key 𝑘1,1, … … ,𝑘1,𝑛,𝑘2,1, … … ,𝑘2,𝑛,𝑘3,1, … … ,𝑘3,𝑠  defines a function that maps the 
input 𝑥 into an output 𝑦 and a leak l. The collection of such functions ℋ2𝑅 forms a LAXU hash 
function family.  
 
 
 
 
 
Lemma 1. Suppose that the keys in the transformation depicted in figure 4 are chosen uniformly at 
random. Then, we have that  
 
𝑃𝑟[∆𝑦 = ∆y |𝑥 =  x, 𝑥 ʹ =  x’, Ι = 𝑙] = Pr  [∆𝑦 = ∆y |  ∆𝑥 =  x ⨁ x’ ]. 
 
Proof. Let a function ℎ is randomly drawn from the pool of functions ℋ2𝑅 , where ℎ is the key 
𝑘1,1, … … , 𝑘1,𝑛,𝑘2,1, … … , 𝑘2,𝑛,𝑘3,1, … … , 𝑘3,𝑠  and let Ι be the leak that is acquired by applying ℎ to 
𝑛-bit input string 𝑥 and let 𝑥ʹ be an input bit string distinct from 𝑥. The probability 𝑃𝑟[∆𝑦 = ∆ 
y|𝑥 = x, 𝑥 ʹ =  x’, Ι = 𝑙] is the probability that the output difference 𝑦 ⨁𝑦ʹ is ∆y given 𝑥 =  x, 
𝑥 ʹ =  x’ and  Ι = 𝑙. Due to the initial key addition, this probability is equal to the probability Pr  
[∆𝑦 = ∆y |  ∆𝑥 =  x ⨁ x’, Ι = 𝑙 ] that the output difference is ∆y given the input difference 
∆x =  x ⨁ x’ and the leak 𝑙. To prove this lemma, we use the following observations:  
 
1. Pr [∆𝑢|∆𝑥, 𝑙] =Pr [ ∆𝑢|∆𝑥], where ∆𝑢 = (∆𝑢1, … . .∆𝑢𝑛), ∆𝑢𝑖 =  𝑢𝑖 ⨁ 𝑢ʹ𝑖. This observation 
shows that, given the input difference ∆𝑥 the output different ∆𝑢 is independent of the 
leak 𝑙 and this is because of the second key addition which makes the leak uniformly 
distributed for any possible value ∆𝑢.  
 
2. Pr [∆𝑦|∆𝑢, 𝑙] = ∏ Pr [𝑠𝑖=1 ∆𝑦𝑖|∆𝑢𝑖, 𝑣𝑖] ×   ∏ Pr [𝑛𝑖=𝑠+1 ∆𝑦𝑖|∆𝑢𝑖] . Given the difference ∆𝑢, 
the probability of having a difference ∆𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖⨁ 𝑦ʹ𝑖 at the output of 𝑖-th S-box of the 
second round is independent of the probability of having a difference ∆𝑦𝑗 , 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 at the 
output of some other S-box in the second round.  
 
3. Pr[∆𝑦𝑖|∆𝑢𝑖, 𝑣𝑖] = Pr[∆𝑦𝑖|∆𝑢𝑖] , 𝑖 = 1, . . . . , 𝑠. After the leak 𝑙 = 𝑣1, … . . 𝑣𝑠. The intermediate 
values are bit wise XOR-ed with a third key, this makes the input to the S-boxes uniformly 
distributed and independent of the  𝑣𝑖  values.  
 
 Based on the observations, following shows the proof of the theorem.  
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Pr[∆𝑦|∆𝑢, 𝑙] =  �Pr[∆𝑦|∆𝑢,∆𝑥, 𝑙] Pr[∆𝑢|∆𝑥, 𝑙] 
∆𝑢
 
=  �Pr[∆𝑦|∆𝑢, 𝑙] Pr[∆𝑢|∆𝑥] 
∆𝑢
 
=  �Pr[∆𝑢|∆𝑥]  ×  �Pr[∆𝑦𝑖|∆𝑢𝑖, 𝑣𝑖]
𝑠
𝑖=1
 × � Pr[∆𝑦𝑖|∆𝑢𝑖]
𝑛
𝑖=𝑠+1∆𝑢
 
=  �Pr[∆𝑢|∆𝑥]  ×  �Pr[∆𝑦𝑖|∆𝑢𝑖]
𝑠
𝑖=1
 × � Pr[∆𝑦𝑖|∆𝑢𝑖]
𝑛
𝑖=𝑠+1∆𝑢
 
=  �Pr[∆𝑢|∆𝑥]  ×  �Pr[∆𝑦𝑖|∆𝑢𝑖]
𝑠
𝑖=1
 
∆𝑢
 
=  �Pr[∆𝑢|∆𝑥]  ×  Pr[∆𝑢|∆𝑥] 
∆𝑢
 
=  Pr [∆𝑦|∆𝑥] 
 
 
Corollary 1. The family of functions ℋ2𝑅 defined by the 2-round transformation depicted in figure X 
is 𝜀 −LAXU2  with  𝜀 =DP2R , where DP2R  is the maximum differential probability of the 2-round SPN 
structure when there is no leak.  
 
Proof. Based on previous lemma, we get that  𝑃𝑟[∆𝑦 = ∆y |𝑥 =  x, 𝑥 ʹ =  x’, Ι = 𝑙] = Pr  [∆𝑦 = ∆y 
|  ∆𝑥 =  x ⨁ x’ ] ≤ DP2R  
 
The results shown till now are based on two round SPN structure. To show that one can use four 
AES rounds to construct a LAXU hash function, we will first consider the composition of 
transformations shown in figure 3.11. In the next lemma we will show the independence of the 
differential probability of 𝐹1 from the leak value  𝑙2  and vice versa. This could be achieved because 
of the key addition operation between  𝐹1  and 𝐹2 . 
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Figure 3.11: A composition of a transformation 𝐹1, key addition and transformation 𝐹2. 
 
 
Lemma 2.   The following holds for the differential probabilities of the transformations 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 
shown in figure 3.11:  
 
Pr [∆𝑦1 =  ∆ y1 | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2]  =  Pr [∆𝑦1 =  ∆ y1 | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1]  
 
and  
 
Pr [∆𝑦2 =  ∆ y2 | ∆𝑦1 =  ∆ y1,𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2]  =  Pr [∆𝑦2 =  ∆  y1| ∆𝑦1 =  ∆ y1 ,𝛪2 = 𝑙2]   
 
Proof.  
 
Pr [∆𝑦1 =  ∆  y1| ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2]   
=  ∑ Pr [∆𝑦1 =  ∆y1  y1 ,𝑦1 =  y1 | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2]   
=  ∑ (Pr [∆𝑦1 =  ∆y1  y1|,𝑦1 =  y1  , | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2]  × 
× Pr [,𝑦1 =  y1 , | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2]  )  
=  ∑ (Pr [∆𝑦1 =  ∆y1  y1 |,𝑦1 =  y1 , | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1]  × 
× Pr [,𝑦1 =  y1, | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1]  )  
 = Pr [∆𝑦1 =  ∆ y1 | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1]. 
 
Here we used the fact that  
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Pr [∆𝑦1 =  ∆ y1 |𝑦1 = y1 ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2]   
=  
Pr[∆𝑦1 =  ∆y1  ,𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2] 
Pr[𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2]
 
=
Pr[𝛪2 =  𝑙2  |∆𝑦1 =  ∆y1 , 𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1] 
Pr[𝛪2 =  𝑙2  |𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1]
× 
×  
Pr[∆𝑦1 =  ∆y1  ,𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1] 
Pr[𝑦1 =  y1 ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1]
 
=  
Pr[𝛪2 =  𝑙2 ] ×  Pr [∆𝑦1 =  ∆y1 , 𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1] 
Pr[𝛪2 =  𝑙2  ]  × Pr [𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1]
 
= Pr[∆𝑦1 =  ∆y1 | 𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 = ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1 ]   
 
 
The equalities Pr[𝛪2 =  𝑙2  |𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1] =  Pr[𝛪2 =  𝑙2 ] and Pr[𝛪2 =
 𝑙2  |∆𝑦1 =  ∆y1, 𝑦1 =  y1  ,∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1] =  Pr[𝛪2 =  𝑙2 ] shows that the leak 𝑙2 is 
independent of ∆x1,y1,∆y1 and leak 𝑙1 , this is because the input x2 is uniformly distributed and 
independent of these values. Similarly we can shown that  
 
Pr [𝑦1 =  y1 | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2]  =  Pr [𝑦1 =  y1 | ∆𝑥1 =  ∆x1,  𝛪1 = 𝑙1] 
 
This proves the first part of the proof. The second part of the lemma can be proved in a similar 
fashion.   
Let us now look into the situation shown in figure 3.12, where we say that the knowledge of the 
leak values 𝛪ʹ = (𝑙1………….𝑙𝑠) does not change the output differential probabilities of the function 𝐹 
. A keyed non-linear function 𝐹 is applied to an input 𝑥 = (𝑥1 … … … . 𝑥𝑛) to produce the output 𝑦 = 
(𝑦1 … … … . 𝑦𝑛) of n output values. Without loss of generality, we assume that the first 𝑠 output 
values are leaked after a uniformly random key is XOR-ed with them.  
 
 
 
x1 xs xs+1 xn
....... ............
F
y1
k2,1
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k2,s
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ys+1
............
yn
k l
 
Figure 3.12: The first s output of a non-linear function F are “leaked” after a uniformly random key is added 
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to them 
 
 
Lemma 3. Let 𝒐 = (𝑙1, … … . , 𝑙𝑠,𝑦𝑠+1, … … . , 𝑦𝑛) denote the output of the transformation shown in 
figure XX. The following holds for the output differential probability ∆𝒐.   
 
Pr [∆𝒐 (≡ ∆𝑦) = ∆𝑜 | ∆𝑥 =  ∆x, 𝛪 = 𝑙, 𝛪ʹ = 𝑙’ ]  
= ∑ Pr [𝑦 ∆𝒐 = ∆𝑜,𝑦 = y|∆𝑥 =  ∆x, 𝛪 = 𝑙, 𝛪ʹ = 𝑙’ ]  
= ∑ Pr [𝑦 ∆𝒐 = ∆𝑜,𝑦 = y|∆𝑥 =  ∆x, 𝛪 = 𝑙, 𝛪ʹ = 𝑙’ ] × Pr [𝑦 = y|∆𝑥 =  ∆x, 𝛪 = 𝑙, 𝛪ʹ = 𝑙’ ]  
= ∑ Pr [𝑦 ∆𝒐 = ∆𝑜,𝑦 = y|∆𝑥 =  ∆x, 𝛪 = 𝑙 ] × Pr [𝑦 = y|∆𝑥 =  ∆x, 𝛪 = 𝑙 ]  
= Pr [∆𝒐 = ∆𝑜|∆𝑥 =  ∆x, 𝛪 = 𝑙 ] 
 
 
Theorem 2.  Suppose that the initial state and all the keys in ASC-1 are uniformly random, then the 
scheme provides: 
 
- Perfect secrecy and  
- Unconditional ciphertext integrity, where the probability of success of any adversary 
making 𝑞𝑉 verifying queries is at most 𝑞𝑉  × 2−113. 
 
Proof. In this theorem, we show that if the round keys are selected uniformly at random then the 
family of functions defined by four rounds of AES with leak extraction is an 𝜀-LAXU2  hash function 
family with 𝜀 = 2−113. The keys used in the first round of 4R-AES transformation play the same role 
as key 𝑘𝑖  of the construction shown in figure 3.9. The transformation defined by four rounds of 
AES is a bijection, and due to the uniform distribution of keys the leaks are uniformly random and 
independent of the input. Hence we can say that sufficient conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied 
and the scheme provides perfect secrecy and unconditional ciphertext integrity.  
As mentioned before, in our specification we assume that AddRound key i.e., key addition is the 
first operation in the round instead of last one as in AES specification. Additionally, all the keys are 
independent with uniform probability distribution. We use following notation:  
 
- 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 = 0, … . . ,3  is the input to the 𝑖-th round and consists of 16 bytes x𝑖,0, … . . , x𝑖,15; 
 
- 𝑦𝑖, 𝑖 = 0, … . . . ,3 is the output of the MixColumns transformation of the 𝑖-th round and 
consists of 16 bytes y𝑖,0, … . . , y𝑖,15;  
 
 
- 𝒛𝑖, 𝑖 = 0, … … ,3 is the state after the leak extraction layer of the 𝑖-th round and consists of 
16 bytes z𝑖,0, … … . , z𝑖,15; 
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- 𝛪𝑖, 𝑖 = 0, … . . . ,3 is the leak extracted in the 𝑖-th round and consists of 4 bytes  𝑙𝑖,0 
, … … . , 𝑙𝑖,15;  
 
Let x´0 and x´´0 are two distinct input values, and let us consider the output difference ∆𝒛𝟑 given 
the input difference ∆x 0 =  x´0 ⨁ x´´0. By applying previous lemmas, we get:  
 
Pr [∆𝒛𝟑 = ∆𝑧3| 𝑥´0 =  x´0 , 𝑥´´0 =  x´´0, 𝛪0 = 𝑙0, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2, 𝛪3 = 𝑙3] 
= 𝑃𝑟 [∆𝒛𝟑 = ∆𝑧3| ∆𝑥0 =  x´0⨁ x´´0 , 𝛪0 = 𝑙0, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2, 𝛪3 = 𝑙3] 
=  ∑ (Pr [∆𝑧1 ∆𝒛𝟏 = ∆𝑧1| ∆𝑥0 =  x´0⨁ x´´0 , 𝛪0 = 𝑙0, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2, 𝛪3 = 𝑙3]  ×                    (1)  
× Pr  [∆𝒛𝟑 = ∆𝑧3| ∆𝒛𝟏 = ∆𝑧1 ,∆𝑥0 =  x´0⨁ x´´0 , 𝛪0 = 𝑙0, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2, 𝛪3 = 𝑙3] 
= ∑ (Pr [∆𝑧1 ∆𝒛𝟏 = ∆𝑧1| ∆𝑥0 =  x´0⨁ x´´0 , 𝛪0 = 𝑙0, 𝛪1 = 𝑙1]  ×                                                  (2) 
Pr   [∆𝒛𝟑 = ∆𝑧3| ∆𝒛𝟏 = ∆𝑧1, 𝛪2 = 𝑙2, 𝛪3 = 𝑙3]) 
= ∑ (Pr [∆𝑧1 ∆𝒛𝟏 = ∆𝑧1| ∆𝑥0 =  x´0⨁ x´´0 , 𝛪0 = 𝑙0]  ×                                                                (3)  
× Pr  [∆𝒛𝟑 = ∆𝑧3| ∆𝒛𝟏 = ∆𝑧1 , 𝛪2 = 𝑙2] 
= ∑ (Pr [∆𝑧1 ∆𝒛𝟏 = ∆𝑧1| ∆𝑥0 =  x´0⨁ x´´0 ]  ×                                                                              (4) 
Pr   [∆𝒛𝟑 = ∆𝑧3| ∆𝒛𝟏 = ∆𝑧1]) 
= Pr   [∆𝒛𝟑 = ∆𝑧3| ∆𝑥0 =  x´0⨁ x´´0] 
≤ DP4rAES, 
 
Where DP4rAES is the differential probability of four rounds of AES with no leak extraction and the 
rounds keys used in the transformation are random. The equation (2) follows from Lemma 2, the 
equation (3) follows from Lemma 3, and the equation (4) follows from Lemma 1. 
 
Based on the previous inequality in mind, we get that the family of function defined by four 
rounds of AES with leak extraction is an 𝜀-LAXU2 hash function family with 𝜀 =  DP4rAES  ≤ 2−113 
[LKJ].  
 
 
 
3.8.2 Computational security analysis of ASC-1  
 
Based on our previous proofs, we are able to show that ASC-1 is unconditionally secure 
authenticated encryption scheme provided that all the keys and the initial state are random. 
However, the key and the initial state of ASC-1 are derived using an underlying block cipher (AES) 
and a key scheduling algorithm. The security of the scheme in this case is based on two 
assumptions: 
  
- The block cipher (e.g., AES) is indistinguishable from a random permutation,  and  
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-  One cannot tell apart the case when the initial state and the keys are random from the 
case when the initial state 𝑋0 and the tag key 𝐾3,0 are random, and the round keys are 
derived by applying a key scheduling algorithm to the random initial key 𝐾1,0�𝐾2,0.    
 
The first assumption is a standard assumption and it is used in many security proofs such as modes 
of operations of the block cipher. On the other side, the second assumption is a novel one and 
should be studied in detail. The second assumption claims that an attacker cannot win the game of 
distinguishing if the initial state and the keys are random or not. The attacker is given two oracles, 
an encryption oracle and a decryption oracle. A random coin 𝑏 is flipped. If the outcome is zero, 
then a large table is generated with random strings, the number of strings in the table is equal to 
the maximum number of messages that can be encrypted. Now when the attacker submits an 
encryption query, the encryption oracle get the next random string from the table, extracts the 
initial value and all the rounds keys from the random string and encrypts the message. Similarly, 
when the attacker submits the decryption query, the decryption oracle gets the random string 
corresponding to the counter value given in the ciphertext, and uses it to decrypt the ciphertext. 
On the other hand, if the outcome of coin flipping is one, then the random string in the table 
consists of four 128-bit random values: an initial start 𝑋0 and three keys 𝐾1,0 ,𝐾2,0 and 𝐾3,0. When 
the attacker submits the encryption query, the encryption oracle uses the next available initial 
state and keys to encrypt the message following the ASC-1 algorithm. When decryption query is 
made then the decryption oracle uses the initial state and keys corresponding to the counter value 
given in the ciphertext to decrypt the ciphertext. The goal of the adversary is to guess the outcome 
of the coin flipping. The attacker wins if it can guess the value of b with probability significantly 
greater than 1/2. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section the design of ASC-1 was inspired by the LEX stream cipher, 
we are going to address the known attacks on LEX: 
  
- The attack presented by Orr Dunkelman et al. [OD’08] showed that there are special 
difference patterns that can be observed in the output key stream and these patterns can 
be used to retrieve the secret key. This attack works under the assumption that single key 
is used to generate the key stream of at least 𝟐𝟑𝟔.𝟑 bytes (number of bytes used for 
successful attack).  However, unlike LEX, we do not use the same round keys repeatedly. 
So, in order for a differential cryptanalysis to work, one has to be able to guess the round 
key differences. Since these round keys are far apart in the key scheduling process, the 
above mentioned attack cannot be applied to our scheme.  
 
- The attack presented in [HWU] showed that the LEX stream cipher is vulnerable to slide 
attack. This attack looked for the repetitions of the state, which can easily be detected 
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because same states will generate the same pseudo-random key. The round keys in LEX are 
reused and the state of LEX is 128-bits, it is quite possible to find collisions. Whereas in our 
scheme, the state is a 384-bit string and it will be very hard to find any collisions. After 
analyzing, we can carefully deduce that ASC-1 is safe against slide attack.    
 
3.9 Conclusions  
 
 
In this chapter we have introduced the concept of Authenticated Encryption (AE) scheme – a 
scheme designed for protecting both message´s privacy and its authenticity. In this scheme, the 
encryption algorithm takes a key and a plaintext and returns a ciphertext. Given the ciphertext and 
the secret key, the decryption algorithm returns plaintext when the ciphertext is authentic; and 
invalid when the ciphertext is not authentic. Many solutions have existed for decades for the 
privacy and authentication problems, and the traditional approach for solving this problem is by 
combining them in a straightforward manner using so-called “generic composition”. However this 
is not a very efficient way of achieving both the security goals, the time it takes to encrypt and 
authenticate make twice as slow as either encryption or authentication.  For past few years, there 
have been number of constructions that can achieve both privacy and authenticity, often almost 
twice as fast as any solution which uses generic composition.   
To analyze the security of the AE schemes three generic composition methods are considered 
namely Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-Encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC. We gave a brief overview of 
these is section 3.1.1, and show the security comparison in different composition.  
With the popularity of highly-efficient one-pass AE schemes, several patents cover the usage of 
fast single-pass schemes. To avoid this two pass combined mode were developed, where one pass 
is used for encryption and another one for authentication.  In section 3.2, we discussed two pass 
combined mode followed with the analysis of such schemes ex., CCM (CBC MAC with Counter 
Mode) and EAX mode.  
Section 3.3 gives an overview of one-pass combined mode with few single-pass schemes proposed 
in the past. As opposed to two pass the goal of single pass authenticated encryption is to achieve 
faster encryption and message authentication in a single pass. When used for large messages 
these schemes are as fast as conventional encryption and twice as fast as the generic approach, 
such schemes were first proposed by jutla in 2000 and immediately after that Gligor, also 
proposed two such schemes. AE stream ciphers are discussed in section 3.4. Instead of block 
ciphers, stream ciphers are used to provide privacy and authentication. Disadvantage of such 
approach is that one cannot reduce the security of the scheme to a well-known problem such as 
the indistinguishability of block cipher from random permutation. 
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In section 3.5, we proposed a single pass AE scheme. The design of the scheme has its roots in 
message authentication and encryption scheme that uses four rounds of AES as a building block. 
The scheme is inspired from LEX stream cipher, the ALRED MAC scheme and the MAC schemes 
proposed in [GJA,KMI]. Section 3.8 discusses the security of the scheme. Many approaches can be 
identified to evaluate the security of the cryptosystem. In our case we have discussed Information 
theoretic approach and Computational security of the scheme. We have argued the security of 
ASC-1 by showing that it is secure if one cannot distinguish the case when the round keys are 
uniformly random from the case when the round keys are derived by the key scheduling algorithm 
of ASC-1. Since our proposed design is inspired by the LEX stream cipher, we have also addressed 
known attacks on LEX and showed that our system is secure against those attacks.  
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4 
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) 
 
 
With the development of advanced field-programmable devices the process of designing digital 
hardware has changed significantly over the past few years. Unlike prior to the discovery of these 
programmable logic, designers had to use specialized integrated circuits, each of which contained 
just a few gates known as discrete logic. Even to design a reasonably complex device, designers 
had to mount few tens of these chips on one board. This led to performance issues and more 
complex board. The first type of user-programmable chip that could implement logic circuits was 
the Programmable Read-Only Memory (PROM) [SBJ]. However PROMs were considered an 
inefficient architecture because logic functions rarely need more than a few product terms and a 
PROM contains a full decoder for its address inputs. So, PROMs were rarely used in practice for 
that purpose. The first device developed in 1970s by Philips, specifically for implementing logic 
circuit was the Programmable logic array (PLA). PLAs were one-time programmable chips 
consisting of two levels of logic gates: a programmable “wired” AND-plane followed by a 
programmable “wired” OR-plane. Figure 4.1 shows the structure of PLA, its inputs and 
complements are AND-ed together and connected to OR-plane output.  
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Figure 4.1: Programmable-Logic-Arrays  
 
 
 
As a contribution to PLA architecture, Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD) chips include 
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PLD-like (Programmable Logic Device, usually a PLA) blocks also known as macrocells, at the 
borders of the chip, and a connection matrix located at the central part. CPLD is a more complex 
PLD that consists of multiple PLDs on a single chip with programmable interconnects. CPLDs are 
usually Flash-based, that is, the configuration of marcocells and the interconnection matrix is 
defined by contents of the on-chip flash memory. It means that CPLD need not to be configured 
after each power-up, unlike the SRAM-based FPGAs [BZE].  
 
4.1 FPGA Architecture 
 
Field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) are classified into three categories: SRAM – based on 
static memory, Antifuse – one-time programmable and EPROM / EEPROM / Flash based – Erasable 
Programmable Read-only memory. Here we will be mainly focusing on SRAM-based FPGAs. SRAM-
based FPGA is a semiconductor device comprises of an array of programmable logic blocks, 
surrounded by programmable I/O and connected by a programmable routing matrix. These are 
programmed by loading appropriate value into SRAM on the chip.   
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Figure 4.2: Field Programmable Gate Array 
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As shown in figure 4.2, these programmable logic blocks can perform the function of basic logic 
gates such as AND or XOR, or more complex combinational functions such as decoders or simple 
mathematical functions. Logic functions are implemented in small lookup tables called LUT. A logic 
block consists of a LUT and some flip-flops, connections between LUT and flip-flops are quite fast 
as the wires within the logic block are quite short.  There are also short distance fast connections 
to and from neighboring logic blocks. These are normally used for regular structures such as 
adders and counters. Whenever a function larger than LUT need to be implemented, neighboring 
LUTs can be borrowed, but with the cost of significant overhead in terms of propagation delay 
(lower speed performance).  
 
A hardware description language (HDL) provided for the user defines the behavior of the FPGA. 
Common HDLs are VHDL and Verilog. The unit of HLD text is processed by the design tools ex., 
Xilinx-ISE, a technology-mapped netlist is generated. The netlists are designed according to the 
specification of the FPGA architecture and fitted to that specific FPGA using a process called place-
and-route. Before validating the map, place and route results, user also have the possibility to run 
different verification methods and simulations of the design. Once the design and validation 
process is complete, the binary file is generated to (re)configure the FPGA [XLX]. 
 
4.1.1 FPGA Implementation Flow  
 
Before validating the design for implementation, an FGPA application developer first simulate the 
design at multiple stages. All simulators come with IEEE precompiled libraries. For a new design a 
new library is created and designated as the working library before Register transfer level (RTL) 
and testbench code can be compiled into it. RTL describes how data is transformed as it is passed 
from register to register and testbench help the developer to verify that the design is correct. 
After simulating, the design is synthesized, where the VHDL code is compiled and mapped to a 
netlist. The netlist is further transformed into gate level description where simulation is repeated 
to check for warnings and error reports. Before downloading the design to the FPGA, the 
implementation tool needs to know the exact FPGA part to target. As shown in the figure 4.3, 
performance objectives are communicated to the implementation tools through timing 
constraints, this tells the tool how fast the design must operate and which parts of the design 
should have the first allocation of logic and routing resources.  Next the mapper takes the 
elements from the netlist and packs them into the logic components of the chosen FPGA, then the 
packed components are placed onto the array of components sites across the FPGA fabric. Finally 
a bit stream is generated and ready for downloading to the FPGA. In this thesis, Xilinx-Spartan 3AN 
is used as a test bed for implementation of our authenticated encryption stream cipher.  
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Figure 4.3: Xilinx implementation Flow   
 
 
4.1.2 Xilinx Spartan 3AN FPGA  
 
Spartan 3AN FPGA is a highly integrated device targeted for the cost-conscious and high volume 
market. This platform combines the best attributes of SRAM-based technology with reliable non-
volatile flash technology in a single-chip solution. Spartan 3AN platform also provides advanced 
security features that safeguard against reverse-engineering, cloning and unauthorized 
overbuilding along with one of the industry’s largest user flash [XLXS]. 
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Figure 4.4: Xilinx Spartan 3AN 
 
 
The Spartan 3AN family is available in five non-volatile device options, with system gates ranging 
from 50K to 1.4M gates, up to 576Kb block RAM, 16 Mb of total embedded flash, and I/O ranging 
from 108 to 502[XLXS]. The Spartan family builds on the success of the earlier Spartan-IIE family by 
increasing the amount of logic resources, the capacity of internal RAM, the total number of I/Os,  
and the overall level of performance as well as by improving clock management functions. Lots of 
enhancements are driven from the Virtex-II platform technology [XLX3]. Because of its low cost 
Spartan 3- FPGAs are perfectly match for wide range of consumer electronics applications, 
including broadband access, home networking and digital television equipment. The Spartan-3 
family is a superior alternative to mask programmed ASICs; it also avoids the initial high cost and 
the lengthy development cycles. FPGAs in general, permits design upgrades in the field with no 
hardware replacement as compared to ASICs. Xilinx security division has designed a variety of 
security solutions for FPGAs as mentioned above. Variety of security solution as designed and 
implemented for high performance FPGA like Virtex-5 and above, which includes single chip 
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security solutions in collaboration with National Security Agency (NSA) [XLXN]. Also volume design 
security solution for Spartan – 3A family which is called Device DNA [XLXD], but the security 
threats addressed by Xilinx are limed and very specific to the applications [XLXA].   
 
4.2 Role of FPGAs in SDR 
 
 
The term “Software Defined Radio” was first proposed by Joseph Mitola [JMI]. Software Defined 
Radio (SDR) is a promising and rapidly evolving technology, generating widespread interest in the 
field of wireless communication. SDR technology offers flexible methods to implement radio 
functionality, such as signal generation, coding, modulation/demodulation and link-layer protocols 
in software. In other words, SDR is flexible and reconfigurable. The radio or behavior of a wireless 
device is able to be changed, upgraded and enhanced simply by changing the software. This gives 
the possibility of adapting the radios to the user preferences with different operating 
environments and allows supporting multiple standards without requiring separate hardware for 
each standard.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Software Defined Radio – a) Receiver, b) Transmitter 
 
  
Figure 4.5, shows basic elements of Software radio system. The front end consists of analog RF 
tuner, which converts the high frequency RF signals down to a frequency that an A2D (Analog-to-
Digital) converter can handle. The A2D output feeds the digital intermediate frequency (IF) 
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samples to the Digital Down-convertors (DDC), which consists normally of filtering and down-
sampling at the high speed. Processing of IF is suitable application for FPGAs since its 
computational requirements are relatively simple and its speed requirement is high [ERJ, CUM]. 
Finally, baseband demodulation and decoding need a computation-intensive algorithm often 
implemented in a DSP. FPGAs with DSP blocks allow implementing these tasks and join all digital 
processing in a single chip. For past few years FPGAs have become an increasingly important 
resource for software defined radio. Implementing software functions like  DDC in FPGAs gives 
significant advantages. These functions related to DDC have seen a shift from being delivered in 
Application-Specific ICs to FPGAs, the reason being that FPGA realizes lower power consumption 
and faster signal processing when compared to common micro processors.   
 
 
Software Defined radio are capable of supporting military, public safety, satellite and general 
communication applications. Unfortunately, these devices are exposed to security threats – two 
approaches are considered for the secure communications systems for SDR [HKR].  Firstly, 
replacing the currently available cryptosystem with a stronger and more efficient cryptosystem 
and secondly, the development of security using SDR technologies.  The main issue in these 
communication systems is security, whereby an adversary can take control of a radio system to 
their advantage. As a result, data and traditional application of a device can be changed. Thus, 
various security functions such as authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, etc, need to be supported 
in SDR receivers [CNA]. In this thesis, a security solution is proposed by designing and 
implementing an Authenticated Encryption cryptographic solution at physical layer ex., FPGA 
instead of higher layers, which will considerably maximize the speed and security of the receiver 
and also make the system more suitable for low-cost portable devices. 
  
 
4.2.1 Cross Layer Architecture of Software Defined Radio  
 
In terms of the traditional OSI model of a communication system, the software defined radio 
mainly concerns the two lowest layers of the OSI-model. Physical Layer is the most basic layer, 
gives us the resources for the transmission of bits. Next layer is the Data link layer, provides data 
transfer across the physical layer. Stream of data is packed into smaller units called frames, the 
transmission of these frames are controlled by Media Access layer (Sub-layer of data link layer). 
These two layers provide basic functions for data transfer.  
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Figure 4.6: SDR Layers in OSI 
 
As shown in figure 4.6, we can say that SDR is a software reconfigurable radio technology, but it is 
not the applications that are implemented on the radio. Since multiple applications and functions 
are the main features of future wireless systems, the OSI inspired definition is somewhat 
debatable.   
 
 
Levels of Software Defined Radio – Sometimes it is not practical to develop radios that have all the 
features of fully software defined radio. Some radios support only few features while others are 
fully software controlled. Looking into this Wireless Innovation forum has divided the radios into 
five levels depending on what is configurable.  
 
1. All the radios that cannot be changed by software fall into level 0 category also known as 
Hardware Radios.  
2. In level 1, limited functions can be changed by software ex., power levels, frequency etc; 
these kinds of radios are called Software-Controlled Radios.  
3. Level 2 kinds of radios are the one where reality falls. For most applications, state-of-the-
art SDR currently falls into level 2 kind of radios also known as “Software Defined Radios”. 
Significant portion of the radio is software controlled, parameters like frequency, 
modulation waveform generation / detection, security etc are controlled by the software. 
The RF front end still remains hardware based and non-configurable. 
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4. The radio where the distinction between configurable and non-configurable elements 
exists very close to the antenna and the “front end” is configurable falls under level 3. 
These radios are also known as Ideal software radios.   
5. Finally the Ultimate software radio is a step forward from the idea software radio. In 
addition to the full programmability, it is also able to support a broad range of functions 
and frequencies at the same time.  
 
In this thesis, security solution is based on level 2 radios, where a SDR consists of hardware 
frontend and software based base-band platform. The hardware front-end includes an antenna, 
an amplifier/filter, a down/up converter and AD/DA converter and the base-band part is built up 
by reconfigurable FPGA. For better understanding, let us look into a well known open source GNU 
Radio Framework and Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) device.  
 
 
4.2.2 GNU Radio and USRP  
 
GNU Radio is defined as an open source software toolkit which when combined with minimal 
hardware allows constructing radios, and thus turns usual hardware into software problems 
[GNUR].  GNU Radio provides a library of signal processing blocks and the glue to tie these blocks. 
It also provides blocks for communication with USRP device and new blocks can be added as 
needed. The main goal is to combine the signal and data processing blocks and this can be 
achieved by creating a graph where the vertices are signal processing blocks and the edges 
represent the data flow between them. Programming in GNU Radio is usually the combination of 
C++ and python. Signal processing blocks are implemented in C++ while the graph and applications 
are developed in Python as shown in figure 4.7. SWIG is used as an interface compiler which 
allows easy integration of C++ into scripting language.  
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Figure 4.7: Block diagram of GNU Radio Components 
 
 
In most of the cases, a signal processing block processes on a continuous stream of data passing 
from its input ports to its output ports. A special kind of signal blocks, called sources and sinks, 
have only output ports or input ports. Sources are the blocks that read from ADCs, a file and sinks 
write to DACs, a file or graphical display. Each of these blocks has input or output signature that 
defines the minimum and maximum number of I/O streams it can have.  
 
Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP)- In addition to GNU Radio software toolkit additional 
hardware is needed to receive and send radio waves. The USRP is a basic SDR platform, which 
allows the creation of a Software Defined Radio using any computer with an USB 2.0 port. USRP 
was developed by Matt Ettus as a low-cost and flexible platform for Software Defined Radio[ETT]. 
It consists of a main board and up to four daughter boards as shown in figure 4.8. The main/ 
mother board holds upto four 12-bit, 64 M sample/sec ADCs, four 14-bit 128M sample/sec DACs, 
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and a programmable USB 2.0 controller. The four daughter 
boards serve as RF front ends, two for receiving and two for transmitting and can be used 
simultaneously.  In the USRP, high sampling rate processing takes place in the FPGA. It performs 
high bandwidth math and reduce the data rate to something that can be easily transferred over a 
USB 2.0 interface. The standard FPGA configuration includes digital down converters (DDC) 
implemented with the cascaded integrator-comp (CIC) filters. CIC filters are very high-performance 
filters using only adds and delays. The DDC converts the digitized frequency range, which the 
receiver daughter boards passed to the ADC, down to the base frequency, also called base band. 
Then the signals are decimated so that the data rate can be adapted by the USB interface. In case 
of transmission, the only transmit signal processing blocks in the FPGA are the interpolators. Then 
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the signal passes through a digital up converter (DUC) which exists as a special chip on the main 
board, not in the FPGA. DUCs convert the signal to a higher frequency range and finally sent to the 
DAC.  
 
 
FPGA
ADC
ADC ADC
ADC
DAC
DACDAC
DAC
Receive
DaughterBoard
Transmit
DaughterBoard
Receive
DaughterBoard
Transmit
DaughterBoard
USB
Controller
 
Figure 4.8: Block Diagram of the USRP [GNUR] 
 
 
 
Recently several different models have been developed USRP 2, USRP N (Networked series) with 
increased FPGA resources and USRP E (Embedded series), a standalone SDR device. All the devices 
on the hardware feature a firmware which enables basic capabilities like Up/down sampling of RF 
signal, filtering, management of data timestamp and UDP packets on the Giga-bit Ethernet 
connection to the PC. However considerable amount of resources on the USRP FPGAs are left 
unused and implementation of additional features may be the valuable improvement to SDRs.   
 
USRP N series includes a Xilinx Spartan 3A-DSP 3400 FPGAs where custom application can be 
implemented in the FPGA fabric. The FPGA also offers the potential to process up to 100 MHz of 
RF bandwidth in both transmit and receive directions [ETT]. In N series FPGA firmware are 
transferred manually over Gigabit Ethernet interface. The USRP E series is for deployable radio 
application where radio runs as a standalone SDR device. E series employ a unicore TI OMAP 
processor featuring an ARM Cortex A8 running at 720 Mhz and a TI C64 DSP processor [ETT]. 
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4.3 Generic SDR Structure 
In the past, computers from different manufactures were completely incompatible. Peripheral 
equipment from one source did not work with disk and files from a second source or with other 
system components from a third [WCS].In addition to high costs and restricted choices, today’s 
communication systems suffer from similar incompatibility issues and these restrictions are driving 
the integration of SDR technology into commercial, military, emergency response agencies – law 
enforcement, fire and emergency medical services. Developing a truly international handset is 
nearly impossible. Multi-mode handset provides some relief but it comes with increased cost, 
higher power consumption and limited flexibility.  Industry has seen parallel evolution of 
incompatible radio standards all over world for the commercial market. For  tactical side, older 
warfare models simply does not work in today’s network-centric warfare model, where forces are 
tightly integrated and closely coordinated , which requires the ability to quickly and freely 
communicate across organizational boundaries. A similar situation exists for emergency response 
agencies across the globe.  
 
SDR technology provides us a foundation for seamless interoperation between communication 
systems. A typical SDR radio architecture consists of radio hardware (RF front-end) and re-
configurable hardware and software.     
 
RF front-end – The basis of selecting RF front-end architectures depend on the complexity, cost, 
power distribution and number of external components. There are three popular RF front-end 
architectures in use today – Heterodyne (or superheterodyne), Homodyne (direct conversion) and 
Low-IF (digital - IF) architecture. In heterodyne receiver design, RF signal is converted into IF 
(intermediate frequency). The incoming signal mixes with the local oscillator to easily step it down 
to more manageable frequency. The design shifts two signals to the IF signal – the original RF 
signal and another frequency called the image frequency. However it requires an image rejection 
filter to remove the image frequency. The major disadvantage of this design is the number of 
components required. Another design is called homodyne or direct conversion receiver, the RF 
signal is directly converted to baseband by mixing it with local oscillator signal whose frequency is 
same as the carrier frequency. However for frequency and phase modulated signals, quadrature 
downconversion (In-phase ‘I’ and Quadrature ‘Q’) is necessary to avoid loss of information.  Finally 
a Low-IF architecture, most commonly used architecture in SDRs. The design is the hybrid of 
heterodyne and homodyne architecture and comprises the advantages of both the architectures. 
The RF signal is converted into a low-IF frequency which is then downconverted to baseband signal 
in domain.  
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Figure 4.9: Practical SDR receiver 
 
 
In the first SDR radio architecture proposed by Mitola, all the RF and baseband receive signal 
processing is digital, enabled by an A/D convertor (ADC) at the antenna. However to fulfill this 
requirement ADC in the SDR receiver must accomplish extraordinary specifications [AAA]. The 
present speed of ADCs limits the performance of digital front-end; therefore most radios require 
an RF to IF conversion. Figure 4.9, shows the practical SDR receiver. The ADCs are placed after IQ 
demodulator. This configuration requires more components and two ADC channels at the low-
frequency IF. With the increase of speed in ADC, the convertors could be placed before IQ 
demodulator closer to the antenna. This will remove much of extra analog components and 
architecture begins to move towards an ideal architecture as the transition point to digital occurs 
much closer to the antenna.  
 
 
 
 
Re-configurable hardware and software – In typical SDR the baseband processing – the physical 
layer is implemented in re-configurable hardware and software. The physical layer consists of RF 
hardware which includes mixers, filters, modulators/demodulators and amplifiers, as well as field 
programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).  
After converting IF or baseband from analog to digital, the digitized waveforms enter in digital 
signal processing (DSP) domain. The complex I and Q baseband representation are then digitally 
filtered to pass the desired channel and last step involves symbol demodulation into bits, de-
interleaving and decoding. If Analog to digital converter is placed before the IQ demodulation, 
then demodulator, local oscillator, filter and mixers are fully digital. The software that emulates 
these devices runs on DSP or general-purpose processor (GPP) or on a FPGA design.  
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4.3.1 SoC in Software Defined Radio  
 
 
For defining an effective and efficient SDR design a standard programmable hardware platform is 
required. However there is limited technical information regarding hardware architectures for 
realizing SDR system-on-Chips (SoC). It is likely that large scale design integration is necessary to 
achieve lower form factors and reduced costs in order to target SDRs for wireless segment[PKG]. 
Recent developments in the reconfigurable platform such as Zynq from Xilinx present a new 
approach to SDR development[XLX]. Zynq- 7000 EPP from Xilinx is able to integrate / cut parts of 
standard tactical SDR into one single device, while providing the flexibility to support future 
waveforms [ASC].   
 
General SDR SoC hardware requirements are mentioned [PKG] but end application requires 
certain SoC and system level architecture e.x., Software Communications Architecture (SCA) 
frameworks have additional requirements on SoC, such as partitioning into red and black 
side[SCAS]. The Red side, is the plaintext portion of the radio which contains a general purpose 
processor and a FPGA.  The red part manages the confidential data which is generated by the data 
source. The black side of the radio consists of a black FPGA, a GPP and a modem FPGA for 
waveform processing. The black part manages encrypted data sent to or received from the 
unsecured physical communication channel. For data security assurance between encrypted and 
unencrypted portions of the radio in SoC, the design isolates Red and black parts to prevent 
information leaks of sensitive data out of the system in plaintext. This isolation is provided by the 
cryptographic boundary which is named Crypto Sub System (CSS). Data streams between red and 
black radio areas are encrypted and authenticated by the CSS [MLG].   
 
 
109 
 
Figure 4.10: SCA Structure, showing the Red and Black FPGAs 
 
As shown in figure 4.10, the required amount of devices (FPGAs and GPPs), the amount of I/O 
signaling and the high logic density of the devices makes this a non-optimal solution in terms of 
size, weight, power and cost. However with today´s technology it is possible to have single-device 
platform with high-performance processing system and large programmable logic unit ex., Xilinx 
Zynq -7000 Extensible processing platform, the modern FPGA, black FPGA, red FPGA, red GPP and 
black GPP can all be combined into one device[ASC]. 
 
 
4.3.2 Secure Communication  
 
 
Similar to SCA, a secure crypto module i.e., ASC-1 is placed in SoC. ASC-1 is responsible for the 
confidentiality and integrity of the data flow passing through it from both the sides.  Messages 
encapsulated in data frames, consists of preamble, Frame Alignment Signal (FAS), headers and 
payload, as shown in figure 4.11 [SKK]. When the message passes through crypto core, only 
payload have to be encrypted, headers must remain in plaintext.  
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resControl resHeader CRC
16 Bytes Up to 1500 Bytes
L M
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Figure 4.11: Frame structure - Preamble is used at the start of each frame, as a sequence of 8-bit words to inform 
the receiving station that a new packet is arriving. FAS is a distinctive sequence of bits used to accomplish frame 
alignment, the signal consists of additional bits for status, control and error detection. 𝐿𝑀 , 64-bit representation for 
the length of the message.    
 
In order to encrypt the payload, frame preprocessing is necessary where, the message is unpacked 
and the FAS and payload are extracted. The FAS and headers are then validated according to the 
policies. Once headers are validated, payload is encrypted and authenticated. Finally, the frame is 
packed and sent to the final destination.    
 
To initiate the encryption core, we assume that the master key 𝐾𝑀, is exchanged by key exchange 
algorithms e.x., Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and a 56- bit representation of Nonce / Counter 
is exchanged during the process.  
 
  
4.4 Implementation of ASC-1: An authenticated Encryption Stream Cipher  
 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the goal of Authenticated Encryption is to achieve faster 
encryption and message authentication by performing both in the single pass as compared to the 
traditional encrypt-then-mac approach, which requires 2-passes. ASC-1 gives us the possibility to 
encrypt and authenticate in 1-pass. Its key size can vary depending on the underlying block cipher, 
but our block cipher suggestion is Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with 128-bit key. ASC-1 is 
divided into two steps – Initial phase generation, Encryption in CFB-like mode and authentication 
of the data. At the decryption side, same steps are repeated and the computed tag is matched 
with the received tag for verification.  
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4.4.1 Initial phase generation  
 
As shown in figure 4.12, Initial phase consists of an initialization vector 𝑋0 and three keys 
𝐾1,0 ,𝐾2,0 ,𝐾3,0 .  To calculate these values ASC-1 uses 56-bit of the counter and applies 128-bit 
AES block cipher to 070‖00‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟 , 070‖01‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟, 070‖10‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟, 𝑙(𝑀)‖00000011‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟, using 
Master key 𝐾𝑀. Where 𝑙(𝑀) , is the 64-bit representation of the bit length of the Message M. In 
this scheme, we assume that the maximum number of messages and maximum length to be 
encrypted is 248.  
 
AES
( 070 II 00 II Cntr )     
KM
X0
AES
( 070 II 01 II Cntr )     
KM
K1,0
AES
( 070 II 10 II Cntr )     
KM
K2,0
AES
( 070 II 00000011 II l(M))     
KM
K3,0  
Figure 4.12: Initialization vector and Key Generation 
 
 
 
To obtain the initial values, standard AES-128 bit implementation is used in ECB (Electronic Code 
book) mode. 128-bit input block is passed through four basic operations, SubBytes, ShiftRows, 
MixColumns and AddRoundKey. (Details are mentioned in Chapter 2). Key  𝐾𝑀 is used to calculate 
all the initial values.   
 
 
 
4.4.2 Encryption Process  
 
Before initializing encryption process, Key  𝐾1,0 and  𝐾2,0 are concatenated together and AES-256 
key scheduling algorithm is applied to derive 14 round keys.  Keys 𝐾2 ,𝐾3 ,𝐾4 and 𝐾5 are used as 
round keys in the first round and Keys 𝐾7 ,𝐾8 ,𝐾9 and 𝐾10 are used in the second round. Keys 𝐾11 
and 𝐾1 are used as a whitening keys in the first and second rounds of 4R-AES transformation 
respectively. In AES key scheduling round keys can either be generated on-the-fly or it can be 
 
 
112 
 
stored in the internal memory. Whereas in ASC-1, because of using 𝐾1 and 𝐾11 for key whitening it 
is only possible to store the keys in the memory during the key setup phase, and then read them 
from this memory whenever they are required by the encryption/decryption unit. Dedicated 
embedded memory block are ideal for storing keys. A special feature of Xilinx Spartan-3 
FPGA[XLX3] is used in ASC-1, which offers multiple block RAMs, organized in columns. Each block 
RAM contains 18 kb of fast static RAM[XLXS]. The Xilinx Spartan-3 xc3s700an has 20 block RAMs 
and it can be used as single or dual port RAM.  
 
ASC-1 Encryption Block consists of 4 Round AES. To initialize the encryption module, 128 bit 
Initialization vector is provided as an input to the ASC-1 encryption algorithm. ASC-1 performs 
number of transformations to the input data to give a 128-bit leak 𝑙1, 𝑙2 … . . 𝑙16 and output 
state 𝑦1,𝑦2 … . .𝑦16. ASC-1 stream cipher performs 4 discrete transformations – AddRoundKey, 
SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns – in that specific order, as shown in figure 4.13. Four bytes 
are leaked at the end of every round and positions of the leaks depend on the number of the 
round (even or odd). Finally whitening key byte is added before each extracted byte.   
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Figure 4.13: ASC-1 Flowchart 
 
 
4.4.3 Proposed ASC-1 Architecture  
 
The high-level architectural organization of the ASC-1 encryption core is presented in figure 4.14. 
The system is divided into five logical blocks. The Initial input interface is responsible for feeding 
data to the key logic and the processing core. Key logic handles all the key scheduling operations 
and processing core block performs all the main encryption process. SBox block is a ROM that is 
used for the SubBytes transformation by key logic and core block. Finally the Control unit is used 
for the synchronization and communication with the external logic. Let us further look into the 
functionality of each logic block in detail.   
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Initial input interface – For initial phase generation i.e., initialization vector 𝑋0 and three keys 
𝐾1,0 ,𝐾2,0 ,𝐾3,0 ,  a new counter/nonce is loaded. The Initial input interface concatenates the 
values of the counter with the pre-defined values stored in the local registers. The processing core 
unit is then notified that an initial state is available for processing.   
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Figure 4.14: Block diagram of ASC-1 
 
Key Logic – As shown before, the scheme requires a new round key for every encryption round. 
When a new key (128-bits for AES and 256-bits for ASC-1 encryption algorithm) is loaded, the 
block starts generating round keys based on a single external key. Three different approaches can 
be used to calculate the keys. In the online approach, a new round key is calculated at every 
encryption round using the previous round key. Another approach is known as “offline” or 
“stored-key”, all the round keys are calculated upon the reception of the initial cipher key before 
the start of encryption core and stores them in a local memory. The memory is accessed at every 
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encryption round in order to provide the necessary round key. The third method for the 
generation is to use an external source for example a key generator or an external processor. The 
external source calculates the keys and seeds them sequentially to the AES processing core.  
 
This implementation is based on the second approach for both the schemes i.e., AES-128 and ASC-
1. In this approach all the round keys are stored in the memory for a number of reasons. For initial 
phase generation same key (𝐾𝑀) is used to encrypt initialization vector (IV), two initial keys 
(𝐾1,0 ,𝐾2,0) for key scheduling for ASC-1 encryption and key (𝐾3,0) for authentication of data.  The 
round keys derived from the Master key is stored in the memory and during the encryption 
process right round key is accessed from the memory to perform encryption operation. In case of 
encryption of stream data using ASC-1, 256-bit key ( 𝐾1,0�𝐾2,0) is loaded to the key logic for key 
expansion. Fourteen round keys (𝐾1,𝐾2, … … … … .𝐾14,) are derived and stored in the memory. The 
key logic block performs two main functions. The key expansion process and read/write round 
keys to the memory block. The first one is performed whenever a new cipher key is inserted to the 
block and second one is to fetch round keys from the local memory for encryption process. All the 
operations in the key logic are controlled by the system control unit.   
 
Figure 4.15 a, b demonstrates the generation of new round keys from the previous round. In order 
to generate new round key, two operations are performed, RWord (Rot Word) and SWord (Sub 
Word usually called as SubBytes). The first one cyclically shifts the bytes of last 32-bit word of the 
previous round key by one position to the left and SWord operation simply takes the output of the 
RWord and applies SubBytes transformation independently on each byte of a state using a 
substitution table (S-BOX). As shown below, key expansion routine for 256-bit key is slightly 
different than 128-bit. SubWord () operation is applied to 𝑅𝑘𝑒𝑦 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑4 prior to XOR.  
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Figure 4.15 a, b: Fully parallel pipelined structure - a) key expansion round for 128-bit AES, b) key expansion 
round using 256-bit AES for ASC-1. 
AES and ASC-1 Processing Core - Figure 4.16 shows the process core block performing AES-128 and 
ASC-1 encryption process. AES encryption core is used only for the generation of Initialization 
vectors and the keys used in ASC-1. This could be before initializing ASC-1 encryption core or 
whenever new IV or keys are needed. In order to complete the encryption process in AES of the 
data block, 10 encryption rounds are needed. Each round performs SubBytes, ShiftRows, 
MixColumns and AddRoundkey transformations. The SubBytes transformation is applied on each 
byte of input block, altering its value by a non-linear manner.  The S-Box byte substitution can be 
implemented either by using combinational logic or a ROM containing all 256 possible pre-
calculated outcomes. In this implementation S-Box is implemented as a ROM, because the cost of 
implementing combinational logic for the S-Box in resource usage is significantly larger with no or 
very little extra performance is gained. Xilinx Spartan -3AN / Virtex V FPGAs provide fast on-chip 
memories, called BlockRAMs, which are ideal for implementation of ROM. After byte substitution 
in SubBytes, ShiftRow transformation is applied to each row of the state and changes the position 
of each byte in that row. Next MixColumns transformation is applied to the state in a column by 
column fashion. This transformation is quite simple and can be implemented by a network of XOR 
gates. Finally AddRoundkey transformation is applied, where 128-bit state is XORed with a 128-bit 
round key.   
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Figure 4.16: AES-128 & ASC-1 encryption core block 
 
 
Once the Initialization Vector and keys are encrypted using AES-128, keys are fed into key logic 
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block for the calculation of round keys and IV is used to initialize ASC-1 scheme. From figure 4.16, 
the underlying block used in ASC-1 is AES, so same transformations are applied to the block but in 
different order. In ASC-1 unlike AES, Addroundkey transformation is the first block and after 
MixColumns,  KeyWhitenting is applied to the specific bytes before extracting from intermediate 
rounds.  Four Round AES ASC-1, operates in a Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode which means that the 
processing of each plaintext block has to be completed before the processing of the next one 
starts. Therefore, implementation presented here is sequential. However from figure 4.15, parts of 
implementation are implemented in parallel pipeline mode.  
 
Systems control unit is implemented as a finite state machine to supervise the core between AES 
and ASC-1, generate address for accessing the round keys from the block and handle 
communication between blocks. The unit generates the signal to notify the external source that a 
new plaintext may be loaded as soon as core is ready.  Finally Authentication tag is calculated once 
𝑛 numbers of blocks are encrypted (maximum number of messages and maximum length to be 
encrypted is 248).  
 
 
 
4.5 Conclusions  
 
Software Defined Radio is a promising and rapidly evolving technology, generating widespread 
interest in the field of wireless communication. The main feature of SDR is its ability to dynamically 
adapt according to the radio environment through the re-configurability of its components. This 
feature gives SDR systems the ability to support a variety of mobile radio standards. Instead of 
implementing radio functional blocks on inflexible ASICs in the past, the technologies like FPGAs, 
DSPs and GPPs are used to build software radio blocks. These components have reconfigurable 
capability and deliver flexibility of programmable architecture with power efficient and 
performance. 
We have discussed the architecture and design implementation flow of the FPGA in section 4.1. 
The basic design flow of FPGA consists of writing a code in hardware description language and a 
text bench, followed by simulating the model together with its text environment. The design is 
synthesized to a particular FPGA (in our case – Xilinx Spartan 3AN), then placed and routed on the 
chip. Finally the hardware was created and the bitstream (Image) is downloaded to the chip to 
program it. We discussed the role of FPGAs in SDR in section 4.2 and for better understanding we 
have also discussed a well known open source GNU radio framework and USRP device. 
In Section 4.3 we presented a generic SDR structure – a typical SDR radio architecture with RF 
front-end and re-configurable hardware and software. We have also discussed SDR system-on-
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chips (SoC) with an example of recent development presented by Xilinx to integrate standard 
tactical SDR into one single device. Based on our proposed AE scheme, section 4.4 presents the 
design and implementation of ASC-1 on FPGA. The target device used for this implementation is 
Xilinx Spartan- 3 sxc3s700an FPGA. The proposed architecture is divided into five functional blocks 
including a key logic and AES & ASC-1 encryption core. Whole architecture is controlled by a 
systems control unit implemented as a finite state machine to supervise the core between AES and 
ASC-1, generate addresses for accessing the round keys from the block and handle communication 
between blocks. 
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5 
Hardware Implementation Results 
 
 
The results for hardware implementation of “ASC-1: An Authenticated Encryption Stream Cipher” 
are tabulated in this chapter. Area utilization, throughput and latency are provided for FPGA 
implementation. ASC-1 is implemented in VHDL and the hardware used is Xilinx Spartan -3AN. The 
software used for this design is Xilinx ISE -12.4. This is used for writing, debugging and optimizing, 
and all the simulations are done in ISim simulator. The system is tested and verified against test 
vectors (See Appendix I).  
 
This chapter also covers different hardware architecture and explores area / delay tradeoffs in the 
implementation. The results also show the optimal payload lengths for maximum throughput 
corresponding to the Bit Error Rate (BER) on different data rates. 
 
 
5.1 Parameters of Hardware Implementation  
 
Hardware implementation of Encryption schemes depends on several performance parameters 
like implementation area (number of slices used in FPGA), throughput and latency. However, for 
authenticated encryption schemes, the throughput is not a static value, but is dependent on the 
length of the message.    
ASC-1 uses Cipher feedback mode of operation, which means same forward function, is used for 
encryption as well as decryption of plaintext. The throughput of encryption/decryption is defined 
as the number of bits encrypted (decrypted) in a unit time. The unit of throughput is Mbit/s or 
Gbits/s. Latency is defined as a time necessary to encrypt/decrypt a single block of data (Plaintext 
/ciphertext). The unit of latency is ns (nanosecond).  
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The general formula for throughput and Latency computation is as follows [GAJ] :  
 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 =  
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 (𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠) ∗ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑙𝑦
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
 
   
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∗ 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
 
5.2 Block cipher modes of operation  
 
As presented in chapter 4, ASC-1 is divided into two steps – Initial phase key generation, 
Encryption in CFB-like mode and authentication of data. The first part is calculated by using non-
feedback mode, such as Electronic Code Book mode (ECB) and Encryption is done in feedback 
mode, such as Cipher feedback mode. In non-feedback modes of operation, encryption of each 
block is performed independently from other blocks and all the blocks can be encrypted in 
parallel. Whereas in feedback mode of operation, encryption of next block of data cannot be 
started until encryption of previous block is completed, which means all block must be processed 
sequentially. Normally this limitation in feedback modes does not concern decryption process and 
several blocks of ciphertext can be processed in parallel. However ASC-1 can only be processed 
sequentially at encryption and decryption because of the calculation of authentication tag, which 
is based on all the previous blocks.  
 
 
5.2.1 Hardware Architecture for Feedback cipher modes  
 
Basic Iterative Architecture:  Iterative architecture is the most basic hardware architecture, where 
only single round of the block cipher is implemented as a combinational logic. As shown in the 
figure 5.1, input data block is fed to the circuit and stored in the register. For every clock cycle, 
intermediate round data after the completion of one round is fed back to the circuit.  
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Figure 5.1: Iterative Architecture of Block cipher 
 
In Iterative architecture only one block of data is processed at a time. So the number of clock 
cycles needed to encrypt one block is equal to number of rounds in a cryptosystem. The 
throughput and latency in case of basic iterative architecture is [GAJ] 
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 (𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠)
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑒
 
     
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑒 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 ∗ 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
 
Partial and full loop unrolling: Figure 5.2-a&b, shows architecture with partial loop and full loop 
unrolling. The main difference between partial loop and basic iterative architecture is that the 
combinational logic in partial loop implements N rounds instead of one round.  Even though the 
number of clock cycles to encrypt a single blocks of data decreases by a factor of N, the minimum 
clock period increase by a factor slightly smaller than N. This leads to a small increase in 
throughput and decrease in latency at the cost of large area penalty [JOZ]. The multiplexer and 
feedback loop is omitted in full loop unrolling. This leads to small increase in throughput and 
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decrease in area as compared to partial loop unrolling. Both the loop unrolling architectures 
provide increase in circuit speed for both feedback and non-feedback modes. But this increase is 
minimal at the cost of circuit space used by the architecture.  
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Figure 5.2: Hardware Architecture - a) Partial loop unrolling, b) with full loop unrolling 
 
5.2.2 Hardware Architecture in non-feedback cipher mode  
 
Pipelining:  The Pipelined architecture can increase the speed of encryption/decryption by 
processing blocks of data simultaneously. In the cases where the available circuit area is not large 
enough to fit all the rounds of block cipher, partial outer-round pipelining architecture could be a 
solution, as shown in figure 5.3-a. It is realized by inserting rows of registers among combinational 
logic on the boundaries between two subsequent cipher rounds. With this, N blocks of data can be 
processed at the same time, with each of these block stored in a different register at the end of 
clock cycle. The area of the circuit and throughput in case of partial outer-round pipelining is 
proportional to N, but the latency remains same as in the basic iterative architecture[GAJ]. Similar 
to full loop unrolling architecture, full outer-round pipelining architecture can be applied where 
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feedback loop is not required, shown in figure 5.3-b. This can only be realized if circuit area is not a 
constraint. 
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Figure 5.3: Hardware architecture for non-feedback cipher modes – a) partial outer round pipelining, b) full 
outer round pipelining, c) one pipelining stage. 
For optimal pipeline architectures, the registers can also be inserted inside of a cipher round 
known as inner round pipelining, as in figure 5.4-a.   By combining the outer and inner loop 
pipeline architecture and inserting right amount of registers inside each cipher round will increase 
the throughput with minimal increase in the circuit area. Adding more registers after optimal 
amount of registers, may still increase the throughput, but the throughput to area radio will get 
worse.  The throughput for the partial and full inner- and outer- round pipelining is [GAJ]: 
  
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟_𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒(𝑁,𝑛)
=  
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘  (𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠) ∗ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑙𝑦(𝑁)
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 ∗ 𝐶𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑛)
 
 
Where 𝑛 is the number of inner-round registers, 𝑁 is the number of outer-round registers, and 
𝐶𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑛) is the clock period for inner-round pipelining.  
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𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙_𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒(𝑁,𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑡) =  
𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘 (𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠)
𝐶𝑙𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑡)
 
Where 𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑡 us the maximum number of inner-round registers optimal for the throughput to area 
ratio.     
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Figure 5.4: Optimal Hardware Architecture for non-feedback cipher modes – a) Inner-round pipelining, b) 
Partial inner and outer – round pipelining, c) full inner and outer – round pipelining, d) one round n-stage 
pipeline. 
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5.3 Performance of ASC-1 Crypto core  
 
In Authenticated Encryption stream cipher (ASC-1) scheme, the underlying block cipher (AES) is 
used only in the forward “encrpytion” direction for both ASC-1 encryption and decryption. This 
characteristic make ASC-1 an attractive candidate for hardware where area is limited.  
Before looking into the overall performance of the core, let us look at the implementation and 
results of basic operations of AES in FPGAs.  
SubBytes – The SubByte transformation is applied to each byte of the state matrix, where byte is 
replaced with another byte from S-Box. The S-Box byte substitution function can be implemented 
either by using combinational logic [ABR] or using a 256 X 8 bit look up table, using ROM (Read 
Only Memory). Use of ROM is the most optimal implementation in terms of area/performance – in 
an FPGA. To access ROM, inputs used as addresses and output is acquired at the data out bus.  A 
state matrix consists of 16 bytes and for each byte substitution 16 ROMs have to be used. FPGA 
used in this implementation Xilinx Spartan-3AN provides fast on-chip memories, called BlockRAMs. 
BlockRAMs can be configured as dual port ROMs, as shown in figure 5.5. This reduces the amount 
of ROMs in half i.e., 8. This whole process requires only one clock cycle.  
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Figure 5.5:  S-Box organized as 8 banks of 256 x 8 dual port ROMs. 
 
The working of other basic operations like ShiftRows, MixColumns and Addroundkey performed in 
AES is already mentioned in the previous chapters. Following Table 5.1 Shows the performance of 
these transformations, the system is set to maximum clock frequency of 250 MHz and clock period 
of 4 ns. All these transformations take only a fraction of space on FPGA as shown in Table 5.1. 
Basic Operation Clock Cycle Number of Slices 
ShiftRows  1 74 (1 %) 
MixColumns 1 197(3 %) 
AddRoundKey 1 147(2 %) 
 
Table 5.1: Performance of Basic Operations in AES block cipher   
129 
 
Key Expansion - Key scheduling in ASC-1 encryption core caters round keys for initial phase 
generation (AES-128, 10 round keys) and for encryption core (AES-256, 14 round keys). There are 
different possible ways to generate round keys (mentioned in previous chapter). But for ASC-1 the 
optimal approach is “offline” or “stored key approach”[MGR, ABR]. In this approach all the round 
keys are calculated upon the reception of the initial cipher key and store them in an internal 
memory. Keys are then read from the memory whenever they are required by the core, as shown 
in figure 5.6.  Even though this approach requires a key setup phase, for round keys processing and 
storing in the local memory, the calculations can be performed in parallel with the encryption core 
using previous key. This results in no performance penalty because of key scheduling. 
Local /Internal 
Memory
Key Logic 
Key Ready
Cipher Key
Mode
Round Key
S-Box ROM
 
Figure 5.6: Key Logic Unit – 10 round keys are calculated for AES-128 bits for initial phase generation and 14 
rounds keys for Encryption and decryption of data block. Mode controls the key size and makes sure right 
round key is read from local memory. 
 
Same as the size of an encryption block in AES, the size of each round key is 128 bits. For the sake 
of performance (area/delay) comparison, 128-bit & 256-bit key expansion is implemented in 
parallel and in basic iterative architecture. The performance and area consumption of both the 
architectures are shown in Table 5.2 based on behavioral simulation. The system is set to 
maximum clock frequency i.e., 250 Mhz and clock cycle of 4 ns. Performances of both the key 
expansion are shown for parallel and Iterative architectures. Based on the observation from table, 
number of clock cycles used to compute key expansion for AES-256 in parallel architecture is less 
than the clock cycles used for AES-128. This is due to the fact that the AES-128 works on single 
 
 
130 
 
state matrix for the key expansion of the cipher key whereas AES-256 works on two matrices for 
key expansion.   
 
Performance AES-128 Key Expansion AES-256 Key Expansion 
 Parallel Iterative Parallel Iterative 
Number of Clock Cycles 15 22 12 23 
     
Number of Slices  5000 3447 5916 5818 
 
Table 5.2: Performance of AES-128 & AES-256 Key Expansion in Parallel and Iterative Architecture 
 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES): AES – 128 bits encryption cipher is used in initial phase for 
the calculation of Initialization Vector (IV) and keys used for encryption and authentication of data. 
Same Key (𝐾𝑀) is used to encrypt all the initial values in ECB non-feedback mode. With encryption 
in non-feedback mode, processing of data blocks can be performed independently from other 
blocks and all the blocks can be encrypted in parallel. The key expansion is performed only once 
and stored in the internal logic. Table 5.3 shows the throughput, latency and area used for parallel 
and iterative hardware architectures. The system is set to 250 Mhz and clock cycle of 4ns.  
 
AES-128 Encryption 
Performance 
 
Iterative Parallel 
Number of Slices 1736 15550 
   
Number of Clock Cycles 62 30 
   
Latency (ns) 248 120 
   
Throughput (Gbps) 0.516 up to 32 
 
Table 5.3: Performance of AES-128 Encryption in Parallel and Iterative Architecture  
From table 5.3, a huge trade-off between area and performance of the system can be clearly seen. 
Number of slices used in parallel architecture is almost 9 times than iterative architecture. But on 
the other side, the throughput of the Iterative architecture is much lower than parallel 
architecture. 
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Figure 5.7 shows proposed architectures. The iterative architecture consists of one AES functional 
unit for 𝑛 − 1 rounds and final round functional unit for 𝑛𝑡ℎ round. Three registers are added in 
the circuit, the input and intermediate register is used as buffers for inter-round transformations.  
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Figure 5.7: Proposed AES-128 Hardware Architectures – a) Iterative. b) Parallel Pipelined. 
In figure 5.7-b, parallel pipelined AES architecture is proposed. It consists of 10 AES functional 
blocks and registers are placed between each AES round computation.    
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ASC-1 Encryption Core:  Encryption block in ASC-1 consists of 4-Round AES and operates in Cipher 
feedback mode fashion to compute an authentication tag over the encrypted message. As 
mentioned, in feedback modes it is not possible to encrypt next block of data until encryption of 
previous block is completed. This left us with the choice of only encrypting the data block 
sequentially. The performance of ASC-1 is shown in table 5.4.  
 
ASC-1 Encryption Core 
Performance  
 
Iterative 
Number of Slices 1796 
  
Number of Clock cycles 41 
  
Latency (ns) 164 
  
Throughput (Gbps) ~0.780 
 
Table 5.4: Performance of ASC-1 Encryption core Iterative Architecture 
 
 
As compared to AES iterative architecture, data is processed only 4 times instead of 10 times and 
Initial, and final rounds are not included.   As shown in figure 5.8, the order of bits transformations 
inside each round is also different as compared to AES; AddRound key transformation is 
performed at the start of each round unlike AES. 
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Figure 5.8: Proposed ASC-1 Iterative Hardware Architectures 
 
 
5.4 Frame Delay   
 
Data frame consists of preamble, Frame Alignment signal (FAS), headers and payload. As shown in 
figure 5.9, when the frames passes through the core, only payload have to be encrypted and rest 
remains in the plaintext. However to initiate the encryption of the payload requires Initial phase 
generation i.e. calculating initialization vector and keys for the encryption based on Counter 
(𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟) and Master Key (𝐾𝑀). The process is repeated for every frame, where Counter values are 
varied but Master Key remains same for the session. Two different approaches are proposed – Key 
setup during transmission or parallel key setup with the encryption core.   
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Figure 5.9: Crypto Architecture   
 
 
In first approach, the key setup is triggered at the start of the transmission. The unencrypted 
prefix of the frame i.e., preamble, FAS, header etc is validated and passed though the bypass unit 
and waits for the encrypted and authenticated payload. Once the encryption is done, the whole 
frame is packed and sent to the transmitter. During the transmission of the frame, key setup for 
next frame is performed and stored in the logic.   Based on previous sections two hardware 
architectures are suggested - Basic iterative and parallel architecture. Depending on the area 
constraints and acceptable delay for the specific applications, either of the architecture for initial 
phase can be chosen. Iterative architecture has a latency of 248 ns, whereas parallel architecture 
takes about half the time but three times in area.  However in either of the architectures this 
approach may cause some minor end-to-end delays.  
To overcome these delays, keys can also be computed in parallel with the encryption core. In this 
approach, initial phase is generated before the start of the transmission and keys are stored in the 
internal logic. For subsequent frames new keys are generated in parallel with the encryption core 
processing last block of the previous frame. This approach may not cause any delays but it comes 
with the cost of high area consumption.   
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5.5 Payload Length on effective throughput  
 
This section shows throughput optimization by varying the payload length. Throughput in this 
analysis is defined as number of payload bits per second received correctly. Key assumption in the 
analysis is - no losses due to collision i.e., packet losses are caused only by bit errors. Figure 5.10 & 
5.11, based on calculation, shows the variation of throughput with payload length at a bit error 
rate of 10−4 and 10−5 in a channel.  From the figures, higher bit error rates are not shown. Due to 
the higher packet error rate the effective throughput leads to zero. The payload size is varied from 
as low as 20 bytes to 2500 bytes and extra 20 Bytes for frame prefix is added.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Throughput vs. Payload length at a bit error rate of 10−4 in a channel 
           
4,72101 3,170803 
 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 in
 M
bp
s 
Payload Length in Bytes 
4   Mbps 
8   Mbps 
12 Mbps 
24 Mbps 
 
 
136 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Throughput vs. Payload length at a bit error rate of 10−5 in a channel. 
 
The graphs identify maximum throughputs with optimal payload lengths for data rates with 
specified bit error rate in the channel. As shown in figure 5.10, with a bit error rate of 10−4 
corresponding to data rates at 4 , 8 and 12 Mbps, maximum channel efficiency is around the 
payload length of 200 bytes corresponding to an effective throughput of 3.04, 6.09 and 9.14 Mbps 
respectively. However reducing or increasing the payload length does not increase throughput, for 
example, with data rate of 8 Mbps and payload length of 20 bytes will give the effective 
throughput of 3.87 Mbps and with 2500 bytes the effective throughput is 1.05 Mbps. Similar 
results can be concluded from figure 5.11, where the maximum channel efficiency for 8 Mbps data 
rate is around 600 bytes corresponding to a throughput of 7.36 Mbps.  
Based on the performance results of ASC-1, iterative architecture of initial key setup phase has a 
latency of 248 ns and the core design gives us the throughput of approximately 800 Mbps. Keeping 
these results in mind, in figure 5.12 we have shown the throughput vs. payload length for both the 
cases, i.e., with no latency and latency of 248 ns per frame. This is achieved by adding extra bits 
per frame representing bit length spaces i.e., 52 bits and 208 bits to the data rates at 200 and 800 
Mbps respectively. Similar to our previous analysis the maximum channel efficiency is around the 
payload length of 200 bytes with the effective throughput of 147.33 Mbps and 534.20 Mbps. It is 
also interesting to notice that for higher data rate and smaller payloads the latency of 248 ns 
significantly affects the throughput. However, a larger payload for higher data rate or smaller data 
rate, the throughput is not much affected.   
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Figure 5.12: Throughput vs. Payload length at a bit error rate of 10−4 in a  
channel with no latency and with latency of 248ns per frame. 
 
 
5.6 LTE and WiMAX  
 
Newest cellular standards like 3GPP LTE and WiMAX represent low latency, high data rate, 
incorporating OFDMA/MIMO, adaptive modulation and coding techniques. Deploying dedicated 
base terminals even for small areas is costly and time consuming process. One of the major 
disadvantages of implementing new base stations configured to support LTE is that existing 
hardware equipment will either have to be upgraded or replaced. This will boost the resources of 
the network that will need ongoing management and maintenance. Recently SDR approach has 
been adopted where it is possible to accommodate future developments and improvements in 
network functionality without having to replace older equipment. This is realized by remotely 
changing the radio standard that network components operate on by simply installing new 
software. Both LTE and WiMAX use OFDM as a modulation technique in their physical layer 
procedure. Before getting to LTE and WiMAX let us look briefly into OFDM.  
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Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is a multicarrier technique. As compared to 
single carrier technique high-rate data stream is transmitted on a signal channel whereas in 
OFDM, channel is divided into more than one channel using multiple orthogonal subcarriers for 
improved spectral efficiency. Similar to other modulation systems OFDM modulation system is 
made up of transmitter and receiver. This system is divided into four main stages [SSI]:  
 
• Splitting data stream into many parallel data streams; 
• Symbol generation;  
• Converting data into time domain; 
• Converting the parallel data streams back again in to serial domain digital signal;  
 
 
5.6.1 OFDM in LTE and WiMAX  
 
In both the technologies, the available bandwidth resource is divided in time and frequency to 
form smaller blocks to support many users simultaneously. These blocks are used for modulation 
using Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA). The available spectrum in OFDMA 
is divided into number of orthogonal subcarriers with the spacing of ∆𝑓 between them, where 
∆𝑓 = 15 𝐾𝐻𝑧  for LTE and ∆𝑓 = 10.94 𝐾𝐻𝑧  for WiMAX and these subcarriers are grouped 
together to form a Resource block[IXP][IDA]. Fixed numbers of subcarriers are used in both the 
technologies i.e., 12 in LTE and 18 in WiMAX. Depending on the system configuration, the resource 
block is then defined in time for number of OFDM symbols ie., 5-14 symbols. These blocks are then 
grouped in a frame of 10 ms for LTE and 5 ms for WiMAX. Base station decides for the allocation of 
resource blocks to a user for data transmission.  
OFDMA have many advantages as compared to other techniques ex., best spectral efficiency, Inter 
symbol interference (ISI) can be minimized adjusting cyclic prefix, flat fading due to smaller 
spacing etc. These capabilities make OFDM ideal choice for broadband technologies. However, 
one of the major disadvantages of OFDM is Peak to Average Power Ratio (PAPR), which results 
into a need of high linear RF power amplifier. This is because when all the subcarriers are 
modulated and added together, the amplitude may shoot very high as compared to the average 
amplitude value. In order to overcome this issue, modulation technique called Single Carrier 
OFDMA (SC-FDMA) is used. Similar to OFDM, SC-FDMA divides the spectrum bandwidth into 
multiple subcarriers and maintains orthogonality between subcarriers in frequency selective 
channel. However unlike OFDM, SC-FDMA signal modulated onto a given subcarrier is a linear 
combination of all data symbols transmitted at the same time. This helps reducing the peak 
amplitude at the output. LTE uses SC-FDMA in the uplink to save battery power on the user 
equipment. Table 5.5 summarizes the main physical layer parameters for LTE and WiMAX.  
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Feature  3GPP LTE-Advanced IEEE 802.16m Mobile WiMAX 
Multiple Access Scheme Downlink : OFDMA 
Uplink : SC-FDMA 
Downlink : OFDMA 
Uplink : OFDMA 
Physical Resource Block Size 12 sub-carriers x 14 OFDM/SCFDMA 
 
Symbols = 168 Resource elements 
18 sub-carriers  x 6 OFDM 
 
Symbols = 108 Resource elements 
Usable Bandwidth at 10 Mhz 600 sub-carriers x 15 kHz  
(Subcarrier spacing ) = 9 MHz 
Spectrum Occupancy = 90% 
864 sub-carriers x 10.9375 kHz  
(Subcarrier spacing ) = 9.45 MHz 
Spectrum Occupancy = 94.5% 
Usable Resource Elements per 
5 ms 
42000 Resource Elements 44064 Resource Elements  
Modulation and Coding 
Scheme Levels 
27 Levels  32 Levels 
Theoretical peak bit rate in 
ideal case (2 x 2 MIMO) 
Uplink : ~ 85 Mbps 
Downlink : ~ 25 Mbps  
Uplink : ~ 40 Mbps 
Downlink : ~ 8 Mbps 
 
Table 5.5 : Physical Layer Parameter for LTE and WiMAX [SAH] 
 
Modulation schemes like BPSk, QPSK, 16QAM or 64 QAM are used with various forward error 
correcting codes with varying coding rate from 1/16 to 3/4.    
 
 
5.6.2 Confidentiality and Integrity in LTE and WiMAX   
 
A primary security concern of a device using a radio channel, which is an open channel, is to 
protect the traffic confidentiality and integrity. In this section we will look into the security 
standards for LTE and WiMAX.  
LTE uses two standardized algorithms to provide confidentiality and integrity i.e., 𝑓8,𝑓9 
respectively [3GPP]. The underlying block cipher for both the algorithms is KASUMI.  The block 
cipher is based on MISTY 1 [MIM]. However, in order to increase the level of security and to meet 
demanding hardware implementation requirements ex., low power and low area consumption in 
hardware, several improvements were made in order to evolve to KASUMI. The block cipher is an 
eight round Feistel block cipher, inputs 64-bit data block and 128-bit key and produces 64-bit 
output.  
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Confidentiality Algorithm 𝑓8 – The 𝑓8 cryptographic algorithm is a stream cipher that is used to 
encrypt/decrypt the data between the length of 1 and 20,000 bits under a master key 𝐶𝐾. 𝑓8 
stream cipher uses the underlying block cipher in a Output Feedback Mode (OFB) as a keystream 
generator. Figure 5.13 shows the structure of confidentiality algorithm 𝑓8.  
 
 
KASUMI
A
KASUMICK
KS[0]......KS[63]
KASUMICK
KS[64]......KS[127]
KASUMICK
KS[128]......KS[191]
KASUMICK
BLKCNT = 0 BLKCNT = 1 BLKCNT = 2 BLKCNT = BLOCKS -1
CK‘ = CK XOR KM
COUNT ll BEARER ll DIRECTION ll 0...0
 
 
Figure 5.13: Confidentiality Algorithm 𝑓8. BLKCNT is a 64-bit counter. COUNT, BEARER and DIRECTION are 
padded to become a full length datablock. Master Key 𝐶𝐾 is XOR-ed with fixed mask 𝐾𝑀 and derived key 
𝐶𝐾′is used to in initial KASUMI block cipher.   
 
Integrity Algorithm 𝑓9 – For the authenticity of the data, the integrity algorithm computes 32-bit 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) on the data block under the integrity key 𝐼𝐾. The integrity 
algorithm uses a variant of CBC MAC and same block used in confidentiality algorithm. Figure 5.14 
shows the structure of integrity algorithm 𝑓9.  
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KASUMIIK KASUMIIKKASUMIIK KASUMIIK
PS0 PS1 PS2 PSblocks-1
KASUMIIK XOR KM
MAC-I (left 32-bits)
COUNT  ll  FRESH  ll    MESSAGE    ll   DIRECTION    ll    1    ll      0...0
 
Figure 5.14: Integrity Algorithm 𝑓9. The outputs of all the XOR-ed block computations are XOR-ed to the 
input of the final block computation. The leftmost 32-bits of the final output is taken as the output value 
MAC-I.    
 
 
Unlike many other technologies, the security has been included in WiMAX system at the very start. 
In IEEE 802.16-2004, 802.16e and 802.16m standards, MAC layer contains a security sub-layer 
[LCU][KSC]. The key aspects of WiMAX security are traffic confidentiality, data authentication, key 
management and data integrity. The current IEEE standard supports three modes of operation for 
the encryption of data: CBC, Counter (CTR) and CTR with CBC message authentication code 
(CCM).The underlying block cipher used in WiMAX is AES[PRA]. However CTR mode is preferred 
over CBC as it is considered stronger and less complex to implement, it also offers encryption 
block preprocessing and can be implemented in parallel, which increases the throughput of the 
system. Combining CBC with CTR i.e., CCM adds the extra feature of verifying the authenticity of 
encrypted messages. CCM is considered the most secure and preferred suite for these standards 
because it provides integrity and confidentiality to the data.  
 
After analyzing security design and various implementations, we can conclude that in both the 
cases data encryption and authentication is applied using 2-pass approach, where one pass is used 
for the confidentiality and other for the integrity of the data. Looking into the hardware 
implementations of LTE confidentiality (𝑓8) and integrity (𝑓9) algorithms, both the functions uses 
a number of cascaded KASUMI blocks in order to achieve data confidentiality and integrity. From 
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[AHV], maximum throughput of 𝑓8 and 𝑓9 on Xilinx vertex-E series, i.e., XCV300E-6BG432 is 
240.96 Mbps with maximum clock frequency of 30.12 MHz. Whereas the proposed Authenticated 
Encryption scheme in this thesis, i.e., ASC-1 can achieve a throughput of approximately 800 Mbps 
by performing both encryption and message authentication in a single pass as opposed to above 
mentioned approaches.   
 
5.7 Conclusions  
 
 
FPGAs have become a popular target for implementing cryptographic block cipher. As well-
designed FPGA solution is capable of designing some of the algorithmic flexibility equivalent to 
software implementation with throughputs that are comparable to custom ASIC designs.  
In this chapter we have summarized the results for hardware implementation of ASC-1. Hardware 
implementation of such encryption schemes depends on several performance parameters like 
implementation area, power consumption, maximum throughput and maximum throughput to 
area ratio. However, in case of authenticated encryption schemes, the throughput is not a static 
value, but is dependent on the length of the message. Section 5.1 gives the general formula for 
throughput and latency. In section 5.2 we have discussed hardware architectures verses the block 
cipher modes of operation such as feedback and non-feedback modes.  The motivation for this 
discussion is due to the fact that the first part of ASC-1 is calculated by using non-feedback mode 
and encryption part is done in feedback mode.  Section 5.2.1 explained the hardware architectures 
for feedback modes such as basic iterative and partial/full loop unrolling architecture. In basic 
iterative architecture only single block cipher is implemented as a combinational logic where as in 
partial loop N rounds are implemented as a combinational logic. The later gives a small increase in 
throughput at the cost of large area penalty. In section 5.2.2, we have defined pipeline hardware 
architecture for non-feedback cipher modes, where the throughput of the architecture could be 
increased by processing blocks of data simultaneously.  
In section 5.3 we have presented the overall performance of the core by discussing the functional 
block of the scheme. Parts of the scheme are implemented in iterative and parallel pipeline 
hardware architecture for the sake of comparison between the performance parameters such as 
area utilization and throughput. This section also shows a huge trade-off between area and 
performance of the system in case of encryption of Initialization vector and keys in initial phase 
generation. Number of slices used in parallel architecture is almost 9 times than iterative 
architecture, but the throughput of the iterative architecture (~0.5 Gbps) is much lower than 
parallel architecture (~32 Gbps). In our proposed sequential ASC-1 design, with maximum 
operational frequency we have achieved a throughput of approximately 0.8 Gbps and this can be 
suitably used for SDR applications.  
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Additionally, we have also explored any possible fame delay due to the initial key setup with every 
frame in section 5.4. Based on the available resources two different approaches are proposed – 
key setup during transmission and parallel key setup with the encryption core. Based on our 
results we assume that our proposed scheme is suitable for SDR application with negligible or no 
delays. In section 5.5, we showed the maximum throughput with optimal payload lengths for data 
rates with specified BERs in the channel. 
 
Finally in section 5.6 we looked into newer cellular standards, LTE and WiMAX and the use of 
OFDM as a modulation technique in their physical layer procedure.  We have also briefly discussed 
advantages and disadvantages of OFDM and concluded that OFDM is an ideal choice for 
broadband services. In the end, we have discussed security standards in LTE and WiMAX, where in 
both the cases encryption and authentication of data is applied using two different algorithms. 
Whereas our proposed scheme achieves both the security features in a one single algorithm.   
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6 
Summary and Future Scope 
 
 
In this chapter, we will summarize the contributions of this thesis and present open problems of 
varying generality.  
 
6.1 Contributions of This Thesis  
 
Due to variety of wireless communication standards (LTE, WiFi, WiMax etc), we need highly 
flexible and interoperable communication systems. SDRs are used to meet the flexibility 
constraint. In order to avail this enabling technology that is applicable across a wide range of areas 
within the wireless infrastructure, these radios have to propose cryptographic services such as 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication. Therefore, integration of cryptographic services into 
SDR devices is essential. Following are the highlights of our contribution: 
• A design of an authenticated encryption scheme, “ASC-1: An Authenticated Encryption 
Stream Cipher”. With it’s outside the box construction we aimed to explore new design 
approaches without scarifying the security and the performance.  
• Security analysis of ASC-1, by showing that it is secure if one cannot distinguish the case 
when the round keys are uniformly random from the case when the round keys are 
derived by the key scheduling algorithm of ASC-1. 
• Careful design and optimal implementation of ASC-1 for reconfigurable chips by analyzing 
optimum choice of hardware architecture for cryptosystems. 
• Analysis of results based on performance parameters which are implementation area, 
maximum throughput and maximum throughput to area ratio.  
 
The objective of this thesis was to design an authenticated encryption scheme with the focus to 
achieve high throughput and low overhead for SDRs. We worked into two very different research 
topics. One topic was the design of an authenticated encryption scheme that can accomplish both 
massage secrecy and authenticity in a single cryptographic primitive. The other topic was the 
implementation of this design on re-configurable hardware in SDRs by closely observing the trade-
off between area/throughput performance parameters.   
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We accomplished our first part of objective by proposing an authenticated encryption stream 
cipher (ASC-1) scheme that is designed using a stream cipher approach instead of a block cipher 
mode approach [SKG]. The goal here was to achieve faster encryption and messages 
authentication by performing both the encryption and message authentication in a single pass as 
opposed to the traditional encrypt-then-mac approach, which requires two passes. The design of 
the scheme uses four round AES block cipher as a building block. ASC-1 is inspired by the LEX 
stream cipher and similar to LEX, ASC-1 uses leak extraction from different AES rounds to compute 
the key material that is XOR-ed with the message and transform it into ciphertext. Block ciphers 
are usually built from a round function in an iterative way. Using just a single round of block and 
repeated use of the round function leaves patterns, which could be used to break the cipher [JBO]. 
Adding extra rounds certainly gives additional security to the cipher but it also increases the 
complexity of the encryption. Thus, the designers have to find the right trade-off between the 
security and performance of the cipher. In case of ASC-1, we show that the scheme is secure if one 
cannot distinguish the case when the round keys are uniformly random from the case when the 
round keys are derived by the key scheduling algorithm of ASC-1. It is not uncommon to make this 
assumption that the round keys are random when analyzing the security of cryptographic 
primitive. For instance, this assumption is always made when proving the resistance of a block 
cipher to linear and differential cryptanalysis.  ASC-1 is divided into two parts – Initial phase 
generation and encryption in CFB-like mode together with the authentication of data. For initial 
phase 56-bit representation of a counter is used that provides a unique initialization vector and 
authentication key is generated using 64-bit representation of the bit-length of the message, if 
one substitutes a ciphertext with a different-length ciphertext, then the probability of success of 
this attack will be 2−𝑛. Even though ASC-1 is inspired from LEX stream cipher and the leak 
positions are same as in LEX. However, unlike LEX, we add a whitening key byte before each 
extracted byte; this gives additional security to the scheme. Round keys for ASC-1 encryption 
scheme are derived from AES-256 key scheduling algorithm and keys used in each round are far 
apart in the key scheduling algorithm. In order for an attack to work one has to be able to guess 
the round key differences as well.  
 
The second direction of the research in this thesis was inspired from the fact that the information 
security is one of the key relevant aspects of SDR, whether it is for data transmission or 
downloading of radio parameters or upgrades [RFL, LMI, ABR]. We have tried to accomplish this by 
designing and implementing ASC-1 authenticated encryption scheme on FPGAs. The target device 
used for this implementation is Xilinx Spartan -3 xc3s700an FPGA. The crypto module i.e., ASC-1 is 
placed on the re-configurable chip is responsible for the confidentiality and integrity of the data 
flow passing through it from both the sides.  
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The proposed ASC-1 architecture is divided into five functional blocks including a key logic and AES 
& ASC-1 encryption core. The round keys in a key logic functional block are calculated using an 
“offline” or “stored key” approach, where all the round keys are calculated upon the reception of 
the initial cipher key before the start of encryption core and stores them in a local memory. This is 
done because for initial phase generation, round keys are derived using the same master key to 
encrypt initialization vector, two initial keys for key scheduling for ASC-1 encryption and key used 
for the authentication tag. Also this approach works well for the encryption of data because of the 
key whitening operation.   The encryption core block is used for performing AES-128 and ASC-1 
encryption process. AES encryption core is only used for the generation of initialization vector and 
keys used in ASC-1. 
In this thesis we have analyzed several performance parameters like Implementation area 
(number of slices used in FPGA), throughput and latency based on different hardware 
architectures for feedback and non-feedback cipher modes. The first part of ASC-1, i.e., the initial 
phase is calculated by using non-feedback mode, such as Electronic code book mode (ECB). Where 
the encryption of each block is performed independently for other blocks and all the blocks can be 
encrypted in parallel. The second part i.e., encryption of data is done in cipher feedback mode 
(CFB), where encryption of next block of data cannot be started until encryption of previous block 
is completed, which means all blocks must be processed sequentially. For the sake of comparison 
between the performance parameters such as area utilization and throughput, parts of the system 
are implemented in both iterative and parallel architecture.  Additionally, we have also looked into 
any possible fame delay due to the initial key setup with every frame. Based on the available 
resources two different approaches are proposed – key setup during transmission and parallel key 
setup with the encryption core.  
 
In conclusion, this thesis has proposed a new efficient single pass authenticated encryption stream 
cipher (ASC-1) for SDRs, with a goal to provide secrecy and authenticity to data transmission for 
reconfigurable chips.  
 
 
6.2 Open Problems  
 
The subject of security for SDR systems is quite broad and covers many issues. According to the 
wireless innovation forum, definition of a secure SDR in a broad sense is a device that maintains 
the integrity and privacy of the system and the information distributed across it. It includes 
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mechanisms to ensure accurate contact delivery to intended recipients, denial of interception by 
intruders, rejection of attempts to gain unauthorized access, mechanisms for configuration 
management of software download, and record-keeping with non-repudiation of actions taken by 
all participants[WIF].  
Based on this definition possible direction could be to combine the proposed cryptographic 
scheme with other secure algorithms which provide countermeasures against unauthorized FPGA 
bitstream/image modification, key management issues etc. Other requirements that need to be 
explored for the security of the underlying hardware are integrity of the platform, downloading 
upgrade and secure storage of the keys. Additional issues are the challenges in dynamic spectrum 
access environment, security problems like spectrum misusage and selfish misbehaviors, licensed 
user emulation attacks, common control channel jamming etc are still prominent security 
threats[AEI].   
In recent years, the study of block ciphers and hash functions has matured significantly. Certainly 
combining these two together and to find a mode of operation which can achieve both privacy 
and authentication using only a single pass is still quite new, many open problems still remain.     
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I 
Appendix – Test Vectors 
 
The appendix contains the example vectors for ASC-1. The vectors presented here are only for the 
encryption side. ASC-1 encryption phase is divided in to two parts – Initial phase generation and 
encryption and authentication of data. All the vectors are presented in hexadecimal notation.  
 
A.1 ASC-1 Preprocessing / Initial Phase 
 
 
Master Key (𝐊) – C6 56 82 7F C9 A7 99 17 6f 29 4C EC 6C D5 59 8B  
 
Counter (𝑪𝒏𝒕𝒓) – 11 22 33 44 55 66 77   (56 bit representation) 
 
Initialization Vector - 𝑋0 =  𝐸𝐾(070‖00‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟)   
                                                                         = 1D 1C CF 6D 85 DF 31 57 51 62 11 0B D8 CF 9B C0 
 
Initial Key - 𝐾1 =  𝐸𝐾(070‖01‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟)  
                                                                         = BA AE 5B A2 5E 66 60 5E B6 30 5D 0C D2 0C 47 8B   
 
Initial Key - 𝐾2 =  𝐸𝐾(070‖10‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟)  
                                                                         = B3 BE A6 AE 65 C5 35 B2 70 CA 1D 98 32 56 FF 8D 
 
Length of the message - 𝑙(𝑀)  
                                                                         = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 80 (64 bit representation) 
 
Authentication key - 𝐾3 =  𝐸𝐾(𝑙(𝑀)‖06‖ 11‖𝐶𝑛𝑡𝑟)  
                                                                         = 7F 05 94 5E 3D 73 26 FF 98 05 FD 7E FD F3 AF 7F  
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A.2 Key Expansion  
 
1. Key Expansion 256 bit -  𝑲𝟏‖ 𝑲𝟐  
 
= BA AE 5B A2   5E 66 60 5E   B6 30 5D 0C   D2 0C 47 8B 
   B3 BE A6 AE    65 C5 35 B2  70 CA 1D 98   32 56 FF 8D 
 
Key Whitening Round key 2 -        𝐾1 = baae5ba2  5e66605e  b6305d0c  d20c478b  
 
AES Round key 1 -                            𝐾2 = b3bea6ae  65c535b2  70ca1d98  3256ff8d  
 
AES Round key 1 -                            𝐾3 = 0ab80681  54de66df  e2ee3bd3  30e27c58 
 
AES Round key 1 -                            𝐾4 = b726b6c4  d2e38376  a2299eee  907f6163  
 
AES Round key 1 -                            𝐾5 = da57fde1   8e899b3e  6c67a0ed  5c85dcb5  
 
Discarded key -                                 𝐾6 = fdb13011   2f52b367   8d7b2d89 1d044cea 
   
AES Round key 2 -                            𝐾7 = 2c7e7a45   a2f7e17b   ce904196  92159d23 
  
AES Round key 2 -                            𝐾8 = b2e86e37   9dbadd50 10c1f0d9   0dc5bc33 
  
AES Round key 2 -                            𝐾9 = 821bb992   20ec58e9  ee7c197f  7c69845c 
  
AES Round key 2 -                            𝐾10 = a211317d 3fabec2d   2f6a1cf4   22afa0c7 
  
Key Whitening Round key 1 -        𝐾11 = ebfb7f01   cb1727e8  256b3e97 5902bacb 
  
Discarded key -                                 𝐾12 = 6966c562  56cd294f  79a735bb  5b08957c 
  
Round keys for key expansion -    𝐾13 = fbd16f38   30c648d0 15ad7647  4cafcc8c 
  
Round keys for key expansion -    𝐾14 = 401f8e06  16d2a749  6f7592f2   347d078e 
  
Discarded key -                                 𝐾15 = 44147620  74d23ef0  617f48b7  2dd0843b 
 
 
2. Key Expansion 256 bit -  𝑲𝟏𝟑‖ 𝑲𝟏𝟒  
 
=  fb d1 6f 38 30 c6 48 d0 15 ad 76 47 4c af cc 8c  
     40 1f 8e 06 16 d2 a7 49 6f 75 92 f2 34 7d 07 8e 
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Discarded key in case of final Round -   𝐾1 = fbd16f38   30c648d0   15ad7647     4cafcc8c 
 
AES Round key 3 -                                      𝐾2 = 401f8e06   16d2a749   6f7592f23    47d078e   
 
AES Round key 3 -                                      𝐾3 = 05147620   35d23ef0   207f48b76    cd0843b  
 
AES Round key 3 -                                      𝐾4 = 106fd1e4    06bd76ad  69c8e45f      5db5e3d1   
 
AES Round key 3 -                                      𝐾5 = d205486c    e7d7769c  c7a83e2b     ab78ba10  
 
Discarded key -                                          𝐾6 = 72d3252e     746e5383  1da6b7dc     4013540d  
 
AES Round key 4 -                                     𝐾7 = ab259f65      4cf2e9f9     8b5ad7d2    20226dc2  
 
AES Round key 4 -                                     𝐾8 = c540190b      b12e4a88   ac88fd54     ec9ba959  
 
AES Round key 4 -                                     𝐾9 =   b7f654ab     fb04bd52  705e6a80      507c0742 
  
AES Round key 4 -                                     𝐾10 = 9650dc27      277e96af  8bf66bfb      676dc2a2 
  
Key Whitening Round key 3 -                 𝐾11 = 9bd36e2e      60d7d37c  1089b9fc     40f5bebe 
  
Discarded key -                                          𝐾12 = 9fb67289       b8c8e4263 33e8fdd     54534d7f 
   
Discarded key in case of final Round    𝐾13 = 5630bc0e       36e76f722  66ed68e   669b6830 
  
Discarded key in case of final Round    𝐾14 = aca2378d        146ad3ab   27545c76 73071109 
   
Discarded key -                                          𝐾15 = d3b2bd81       e555d2f3    c33b047d a5a06c4d 
 
A.3 ASC-1 Encryption  
 
𝑴𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝑴 = 𝑚1,𝑚2,𝑚3   
 
𝑚1 = 00112233 44556677 8899aabb ccddeeff   
 
𝑚2 = 11112222 44447777 9999aaaa ccccffff 
   
𝑚3 = 00002222 33336666 8888bbbb eeeeffff   
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Round 𝟏𝟏   
 
Initialization vector (𝑋0)                    = 1D1CCF6D 85DF3157 5162110B D8CF9BC0 
 
Round 1: AddRoundKey (𝑋0  ⨁𝐾2)  = AEA269C3E01A04E521A80C93EA99644D  
 
Round 1: SubBytes                               = E43AF92E E1A2F2D9 FDC2FEDC 87EE43E3  
Round 1: ShiftRows                              = E4A2FEE3 E1C2432E FDEEF9D9 873AF2DC  
 
Round 1: MixColumns                         = 33419FB6 E995D7E5 E8F38AA2 75223DF9  
 
Round 1: KeyWhitening 𝐾11 (Odd Round) = D8 41 64 b6    e9 95 d7 e5   97 f3 39 a2   75 22 3d f9  
 
Round 1 : LeakKey (𝑙1…4)  = D8649739 
 
Round 𝟏𝟐   
 
Input Round 2 = D8 41 64 b6    e9 95 d7 e5   97 f3 39 a2   75 22 3d f9 
 
Round 2 : AddRoundKey (Input Round 2  ⨁𝐾3)   
                          = D2 F9 62 37 BD 4B B1 3A 75 1D 02 71 45 C0 41 A1 
  
Round 2 : SubBytes          = B5 99 AA 9A 7A B3 C8 80 9D A4 77 A3 6E BA 83 32 
  
Round 2 : ShiftRows         = B5 B3 77 32 7A A4 83 9A 9D BA AA 80 6E 99 C8 A3 
  
Round 2 : MixColumns     = FA 63 BE 64 1A 2D 76 86 DE 97 F3 B7 07 A7 82 BE  
 
Round 2 : KeyWhitenting 𝐾11 (Even Round)  
=  FA 63 BE 64 D1 2D 61 86 DE 97 F3 B7 20 A7 6A BE  
 
Round 2 : LeakKey (𝑙5…8) =  D161206A 
 
Round 𝟏𝟑   
 
Input Round 3 = FA 63 BE 64 D1 2D 61 86 DE 97 F3 B7 20 A7 6A BE 
  
Round 3 : AddRoundKey (Input Round 3  ⨁𝐾4)  
= 4D 45 08 A0 03 C3 E2 F0 7C BE 6D 59 B0 D8 0B D0  
 
Round 3 : SubBytes       = E3 6E 30 E0 7B 8B 98 8C 10 AE 3C CB E7 61 2B 70 
  
Round 3 : ShiftRows      = E3 8B 3C 70 7B AE 2B E0 10 61 30 8C E7 6E 98 CB 
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Round 3 : MixColumns  = 17 DA 80 69 D4 A1 B8 D3 3F 0E 9E 62 34 43 E4 49 
  
Round 3 : KeyWhitenting 𝐾11 (Odd Round)  
                   = 32  DA EB  69 D4 A1 B8 D3 01 0E 09 62 34 43 E4 49  
 
Round 3 : LeakKey (𝑙9…12) =  32EB0109                                                                           
 
Round 𝟏𝟒   
 
Input Round 4 = 32  DA EB  69 D4 A1 B8 D3 01 0E 09 62 34 43 E4 49 
 
Round 4 : AddRoundKey (Input Round 4  ⨁𝐾5) = e8 8d 16 88 5a 28 23 ed 6d 69 a9 8f 68 c6 38 fc  
 
Round 4 : SubBytes = 9b 5d 47 c4 be 34 26 55 3c f9 d3 73 45 b4 07 b0  
 
Round 4 : ShiftRows = 9b 34 d3 b0 be f9 07 c4 3c b4 47 55 45 5d 26 73  
 
Round 4 : MixColumns = 12 2d d9 2a b4 9a 1e b4 ad d3 f9 1d 38 e6 c1 52  
 
Round 4 : keyWhitenting  𝐾11 (Even Round) = 12 2d d9 2a ED 9a 1C b4 ad d3 f9 1d 82 e6 0A 52 
 
Round 4 : LeakKey (𝑙13…16)::  ED1C820A 
 
Leak  𝒓𝟏 =  𝑙1…4‖𝑙5…8‖𝑙9…12‖𝑙13…16  = D8649739 D161206A 32EB0109 ED1C820A  
 
Message 𝒎𝟏 = 00112233 44556677 8899aabb ccddeeff   
 
Ciphertext 𝒄𝟏 = D8 75 B5 0A 95 34 46 1D BA 72 AB B2 21 C1 6C F5 
 
 
Round 𝟐𝟏  
𝒎𝟐 = 11112222 44447777 9999aaaa ccccffff 
 
Input round 1 :: (Round 𝟏𝟒 output ⨁𝑐1) = CA 58 6C 20 78 AE 5A A9 17 A1 52 AF A3 27 66 A7 
 
Round 1: AddRoundKey (Input round 1 ⨁𝐾7) = E6 26 16 65 DA 59 BB D2 D9 31 13 39 31 32 FB 84 
 
Round 1: SubBytes = 8e f7 47 4d 57 cb ea b5 35 c7 7d 12 c7 23 0f 5f  
 
Round 1: ShiftRows = 8E CB 7D 5F 57 C7 0f 4d 35 23 47 b5 c7 f7 ea 12 
 
Round 1: MixColumns = 63 db 5e 81 b3 9e 59 ab fd 0f 5c 4a 6f 05 c9 6b  
 
Round 1: KeyWhitening 𝐾1 (Odd Round) = D9  db F0  81 b3 9e 59 ab A6 0f FE 4a 6f 05 c9 6b  
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Round 1 : LeakKey (𝑙1…4) =  D9 F0 A6 FE  
 
 
 
Round 𝟐𝟐  
 
Input round 2 = D9  db F0  81 b3 9e 59 ab A6 0f FE 4a 6f 05 c9 6b  
 
Round 2 :: AddRoundKey (Input round 2 ⨁𝐾8) = 6B 33 9E B6 2E 24 84 FB B6 CE 0E 93 62 C0 75 58 
 
Round 2: SubBytes =  7f c3 0b 4e 31 36 5f 0f 4e 8b ab dc aa ba 9d 6a  
Round 2: ShiftRows = 7f 36 ab 6a 31 8b 9d 4e 4e ba 0b 0f aa c3 5f dc  
 
Round 2: MixColumns = 65 9f ba c8 37 ce 49 d9 4d 33 f3 7d 92 0a a8 da  
 
Round 2: KeyWhitening 𝐾1 (Even Round)  = 65 9f ba c8 69 ce 2F  d9 4d 33 f3 7d F2  0a F6  da  
 
Round 2 : LeakKey (𝑙5…8) = 69 2F F2 F6 
   
Round 𝟐𝟑  
 
Input round 3 = 65 9f ba c8 69 ce 2F  d9 4d 33 f3 7d F2  0a F6  da  
 
Round 3 :: AddRoundKey (Input round 3 ⨁𝐾9) = E7 84 03 5A 49 22 77 30 A3 4F EA 02 8E 63 72 86 
 
Round 3: SubBytes =  94 5f 7b b3 3b 93 f5 04 0a 84 87 77 19 fb 40 44  
 
Round 3: ShiftRows = 94 93 87 44 3b 84 40 be 0a fb 7b 04 19 5f f5 77  
 
Round 3: MixColumns = 5e 7f de 3b 1f 56 e6 ee 7d 6e 0b 96 51 d4 2e 6f  
 
Round 3: KeyWhitening 𝐾1 (odd Round)  = E8 7f EE 3b 1f 56 e6 ee 20 6e 07 96 51 d4 2e 6f  
 
Round 3 : LeakKey (𝑙9…12) = E8 EE 20 07  
  
Round 𝟐𝟒  
 
Input round 4 =  E8 7f EE 3b 1f 56 e6 ee 20 6e 07 96 51 d4 2e 6f 
  
Round 4 :: AddRoundKey (Input round 4 ⨁𝐾10) = 4A 6E DF 46 20 FD 0A C3 0F 04 1B 62 73 7B 8E A8 
 
Round 4: SubBytes =  d6 9f 93 5a b7 54 67 23 76 f2 af aa 8f 21 19 c2 
 
Round 4: ShiftRows = d6 54 af c2 b7 f2 19 5a 76 21 9e 2e 8f 9f 67 aa 
Round 4: MixColumns = 26 56 9a 05 3b 39 99 9d 3f a3 02 79 72 a9 3b 3d  
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Round 4: KeyWhitening 𝐾1 (Even Round) = 26 56 9a 05 E9 39 95 9d 3f a3 02 79 35 a9 B0 3d                                                                                        
 
Round 4 : LeakKey (𝑙13…16) = E9 95 35 B0 
________________________________________________________________________________  
Leak  𝒓𝟐 =  𝑙1…4‖𝑙5…8‖𝑙9…12‖𝑙13…16  = D9 F0 A6 FE 69 2F F2 F6 E8 EE 20 07 E9 95 35 B0  
 
Message 𝒎𝟐 = 11 11 22 22 44 44 77 77 99 99 aa aa cc cc ff ff  
 
Ciphertext 𝒄𝟐 = C8 E1 84 DC 2D 6B 85 81 71 77 8A AD 25 59 CA 4F 
 
Round 𝟑𝟏   
 
𝑚3 = 00002222 33336666 8888bbbb eeeeffff    
 
Input round 1 :: (Round 𝟐𝟒 output ⨁𝑐2) = EE B7 1E D9 C4 52 10 1C 4E D4 88 D4 10 F0 7A 72  
 
Round 1: AddRoundKey (Input round 1 ⨁𝐾2) = AE A8 90 DF D2 80 B7 55 21 A1 1A 26 24 8D 7D FC 
 
Round 1: SubBytes = E4 C2 60 9E B5 CD A9 FC FD 32 A2 F7 36 5D FF B0  
 
Round 1: ShiftRows = E4 CD A2 B0 B5 32 FF 9E FD 5D 60 FC 36 C2 A9 F7  
 
Round 1: MixColumns = 8D 28 BD 23 46 55 DB 2E 9A 1B 7F C2 6F B3 BF C4 
 
Round 1: KeyWhitening 𝐾11 (Odd Round) = 16 28 6E 23 46 55 DB 2E F4 1B 51 C2 6F B3 BF C4 
 
Round 1 : LeakKey (𝑙1…4) =  16 6E F4 51 
 
Round 𝟑𝟐  
 
Input round 2 =   16 28 6E 23 46 55 DB 2E F4 1B 51 C2 6F B3 BF C4 
  
Round 2 : AddRoundKey (Input round 2 ⨁𝐾3 ) = 13 3C 18 03 73 87 E5 DE D4 64 19 75 03 63 3B FF 
 
Round 2 : SubBytes = 7D EB AD 7B 8F 17 D9 1D 48 43 D4 9D 7B FB E2 16 
 
Round 2 : ShiftRows = 7D 17 D4 16 8F 43 E2 7B 48 FB AD 1D 7B EB D9 9D  
 
Round 2 : MixColumns = 01 22 E3 68 59 4F 9E DD 36 54 D5 B4 94 5B 85 9E  
 
Round 2 : KeyWhitening 𝐾11 (Even Round) = 01 22 E3 68 39 4F 49 DD 36 54 D5 B4 47  5B F9  9E  
 
Round 2 : LeakKey (𝑙5…8) = 39 49 47 F9  
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Round 𝟑𝟑  
 
Input round 3 = 01 22 E3 68 39 4F 49 DD 36 54 D5 B4 47  5B F9  9E 
  
Round 3 : AddRoundKey (Input round 3 ⨁𝐾4 ) = 11 4D 32 8C 3F F2 3F 70 5F 9C 31 EB 1A EE 1A 4F  
 
Round 3 : SubBytes = 82 E3 23 64 75 89 75 51 CF DE C7 E9 A2 28 A2 84 
 
Round 3 : ShiftRows = 82 89 C7 84 75 D3 A2 64 CF 28 23 51 A2 E3 75 E9 
 
Round 3 : MixColumns = DC 5D 09 C0 55 4B 58 2B 8F AB 52 E3 FD 09 8B A2  
 
Round 3 : KeyWhitening 𝐾11 (odd Round) = CC 5D 80 C0 55 4B 58 2B 36 AB AE E3 FD 09 8B A2  
 
Round 3 : LeakKey (𝑙9…12)= CC 80 36 AE  
 
Round 𝟑𝟒  
 
Input round 4 = CC 5D 80 C0 55 4B 58 2B 36 AB AE E3 FD 09 8B A2  
 
Round 4 : AddRoundKey (Input round 4 ⨁𝐾5) = 1E 58 C8 AC B2 9C 2E B7 F1 03 90 C8 56 71 31 B2  
 
Round 4 : SubBytes = 72 6A E8 91 37 DE 31 A9 A1 7B 60 E8 B1 A3 C7 37 
 
Round 4 : ShiftRows = 72 DE 60 37 37 7B C7 91 A1 A3 E8 A9 B1 6A 31 E8  
 
Round 4 : MixColumns = CA 42 35 46 B5 02 71 DC E6 76 29 FA 1E DE 9A 58  
 
Round 4 : KeyWhitening 𝐾11 (Even Round) = CA 42 35 46 F5 02 84 DC E6 76 29 FA A0 DE 24 58  
 
Round 4 : LeakKey (𝑙13…16) = F5 84 A0 24  
 
Leak  𝒓𝟑 =  𝑙1…4‖𝑙5…8‖𝑙9…12‖𝑙13…16  = 16 6E F4 51 39 49 47 F9 CC 80 36 AE F5 84 A0 24 
 
Message  𝒎𝟑 = 00002222 33336666 8888bbbb eeeeffff    
 
Ciphertext 𝒄𝟑 = 16 6E D6 73 0A 7A 21 9F 44 08 8D 15 1B 6A 5F DB 
 
Round 𝟒𝟏  (Authentication Round) 
 
Input round 1 :: (Round 𝟑𝟒 output ⨁𝑐3) =  DC 2C E3 35 FF 78 A5 43 A2 7E A4 EF BB B4 7B 83   
 
Round 1: AddRoundKey (Input round 1 ⨁𝐾7) = 77 09 7C 50 B3 8A 4C BA 29 24 73 3D 9B 96 16 41 
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Round 1: SubBytes = F5 01 10 53 6D 7E 29 F4 A5 A5 8F 27 14 90 47 83  
 
Round 1: ShiftRows = F5 7E 8F 83 6D A5 47 53 A5 90 10 F4 12 01 29 27 
 
Round 1: MixColumns = 7F 00 10 E8 3A A6 B3 F3 1E 5A 12 87 25 4A 2E 5A  
 
Round 𝟒𝟐 
 
Input Round 2 :  7F 00 10 E8 3A A6 B3 F3 1E 5A 12 87 25 4A 2E 5A  
 
Round 2 : Addroundkey (Input round 2 ⨁𝐾8) = BA 40 09 E3 8B 88 F9 7B B2 D2 EF D3 C9 D1 87 03  
 
Round 2 : SubBytes = F4 09 01 11 3D C4 99 21 37 B5 DF 66 DD 3E 17 7B  
 
Round 2 : ShiftRows = F4 C4 DF 7B 3D B5 17 11 37 3E 01 21 DD 09 99 66 
 
Round 2 : MixColumns = 00 66 18 EA B8 64 95 C7 0C 69 68 24 45 19 57 20  
 
Round 𝟒𝟑 
 
Input Round 3 = 00 66 18 EA B8 64 95 C7 0C 69 68 24 45 19 57 20 
 
Round 3 : AddRoundKey (Input round 3 ⨁𝐾9) = B7 90 4C 41 43 60 28 95 7C 37 02 A4 15 65 50 62  
 
Round 3 : SubBytes = A9 60 29 83 1A D0 34 2A 10 9A 77 49 59 4D 53 AA 
 
Round 3 : ShiftRows = a9 d0 77 aa 1a 9a 53 83 10 4d 29 2a 59 60 34 49  
 
Round 3 : MixColumns = FF 21 72 08 51 43 B8 FA F4 DB 71 00 6F 8C 8A 2D  
 
Round 𝟒𝟒 
 
Input Round 4 = FF 21 72 08 51 43 B8 FA F4 DB 71 00 6F 8C 8A 2D 
 
Round 4 : AddRoundKey (Input round 4 ⨁𝐾10) = 69 71 AE 2F 76 3D 2E 55 7F 2D 1A FB 08 E1 48 8F  
 
Round 4 : SubBytes = F9 A3 E4 15 38 27 31 FC D2 D8 A2 0F 30 F8 52 73 
 
Round 4 : ShiftRows = F9 27 A2 73 38 D8 52 15 D2 F8 E4 FC 30 A3 31 0F  
 
Round 4 : MixColumns = 51 39 14 73 44 70 7B E8 B4 F2 E6 92 A0 31 E0 DC  
 
Authentication Tag 𝜏 (Output round 44 ⊕ Authentication Key 𝐾3) 
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= 2E 3C 80 2D 79 03 5D 17 2C F7 1B EC 5D C2 4F A3 
 
Ciphertext 𝑪 =  𝑰𝑽/𝑪𝒏𝒕𝒓‖ 𝑪𝟏‖ 𝑪𝟐‖ 𝑪𝟑‖ 𝜏 
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II 
Appendix – Xilinx Sample Code  
and Waveforms 
 
The appendix contains parts of the VHDL code implemented in parallel and iterative hardware 
architecture. Additionally simulation waveforms are all shown for ASE-128, Key expansion and 
ASC-1 encryption core.  
 
  
 
Language VHDL (VHSIC hardware description 
language) 
VHDL Source Analysis Standard VHDL-93 
Product Category 
• Family 
• Device 
• Package 
• Speed 
 
 
Spartan 3AN 
XC3700AN 
FGG484 
-4 
Synthesis Tool XST – VHDL/Verilog 
Simulator ISim 
Software Version Xilinx ISE – 12.4 
 
 
B.1 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) – 128  
 
The block cipher is used in initial phase for the calculation of Initialization Vector (IV) and keys 
used for encryption and authentication of data. For performance comparison AES-128 encryption 
is implemented in parallel and in basic iterative architectures. 
 Top Module for AES- Encryption basic iterative architecture is implemented using the case 
statements. Each statement is executed when one specific case of an expression equal to a choice. 
Following shows the sample code for the case statements used in AES encryption module.  
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case algState is                                                                                   
      
IDLE State:    
when IDLE =>          
                 ctValidDly  <= '0'; 
       if cnt < RND1KEYDELAY then 
            cnt <= cnt + 1; 
       else 
            cnt      <= 0; 
           sInNxt   <= sInNR(1); 
           algState <= rnd1;    
       end if; 
Round 1:     
when rnd1 => 
          W0nxt <= W(4); 
          W1nxt <= W(5); 
          W2nxt <= W(6); 
          W3nxt <= W(7); 
 
         if cnt < RNDDELAY then 
              cnt <= cnt + 1; 
         else 
              cnt      <= 0; 
              algState <= rnd2; 
              sInNxt   <= sOutNxt; 
         end if; 
 
        Round 2:    
  
        when rnd2 => 
           W0nxt <= W(8); 
           W1nxt <= W(9); 
           W2nxt <= W(10); 
           W3nxt <= W(11); 
 
        if cnt < RNDDELAY then 
              cnt <= cnt + 1; 
        else 
            cnt      <= 0; 
            algState <= rnd3; 
            sInNxt   <= sOutNxt; 
        end if; 
. 
. 
. 
. 
    Round 9:   
  when rnd9 => 
          W0nxt <= W(36); 
          W1nxt <= W(37); 
          W2nxt <= W(38); 
          W3nxt <= W(39); 
 
      if cnt < RNDDELAY then 
            cnt <= cnt + 1; 
      else 
            cnt       <= 0; 
            sInNR(10) <= sOutNxt; 
      end if;  
Round 10 (Final Round):  
finalRoundSelect : process (W, sInNR) is            
begin  
        WFinal0  <= W(40); 
        WFinal1  <= W(41); 
        WFinal2  <= W(42); 
        WFinal3  <= W(43); 
        sInFinal <= sInNR(10);  
 end process;  
  
 finalround_1 : finalround 
    port map ( 
          clk      => clk,               
          rstn     => rstn,                 
The case is IDLE when the top 
module is waiting for the Key 
Schedule to be completed. Once all 
the round keys are calculated using 
the key scheduling the state moves 
to next case, i.e., rnd1 
From round 1 to round 9, round 
keys and output of previous state is 
fed into the intermediate states. 
Except the final round same 
operation is performed in each 
round, i.e., SubBytes, ShiftRows, 
MixColumns and AddRoundKey.   
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          W0       => WFinal0,               
          W1       => WFinal1,               
          W2       => WFinal2,               
          W3       => WFinal3,               
          stateIn  => sInFinal,              
          stateOut => final);   
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Sample code for AES-128 parallel Architecture:   
 
 
  addroundkey_1: addroundkey 
    port map ( 
          clk      => clk,                   
          rstn     => rstn,                  
          W0       => W(0),                  
          W1       => W(1),                  
          W2       => W(2),                  
          W3       => W(3),                  
          stateIn  => sIn,                   
          stateOut => sInNR(1));       
 
Generating Rounds 1 to 9       
genRounds: for Nr in 1 to 9 generate                                      
round_NR: round 
   port map ( 
        clk      => clk,                 
        rstn     => rstn,                
        W0       => W(4+((Nr-1)*4)),       
        W1       => W(5+((Nr-1)*4)),       
        W2       => W(6+((Nr-1)*4)),       
        W3       => W(7+((Nr-1)*4)),       
        stateIn  => sInNR(Nr),           
        stateOut => sOutNR(Nr));         
 
      sInNR(Nr+1) <= sOutNR(Nr);           
 end generate genRounds; 
 
Round 10 (Final Round) : 
 finalRoundSelect: process (W, sInNR) is 
  begin   
        WFinal0  <= W(40); 
        WFinal1  <= W(41); 
        WFinal2  <= W(42); 
        WFinal3  <= W(43); 
        sInFinal <= sInNR(10); 
 end process finalRoundSelect; 
 
finalround_1: finalround 
    port map ( 
       clk      => clk,                   
       rstn     => rstn,                  
       W0       => WFinal0,               
       W1       => WFinal1,               
       W2       => WFinal2,               
       W3       => WFinal3,              
       stateIn  => sInFinal,              
       stateOut => sOut);   
At Round 0, key is Xor-ed with the 
initial state i.e., Plaintext  
All 9 rounds are generated using 
parallel pipeline architecture  
Finally, round 10 is transformed 
separately   
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B.2 Key Expansion  
 
Two sets of key scheduling is performed for ASC-1 encryption core, one for the initial phase 
generation where 10 rounds keys are derived from the key scheduling algorithm for AES-128 and 
14 round keys are derived for ASC-1 encryption/decryption. Similar to AES implementation, for 
performance analysis both the key scheduling are implemented in Parallel and iterative 
architectures. However, results are shown only for AES-128 key expansion.  
 
Sample code for AES-128 key expansion iterative architecture.  
 
  w(0) <= keyInReg(31 downto 0); 
  w(1) <= keyInReg(63 downto 32); 
  w(2) <= keyInReg(95 downto 64); 
  w(3) <= keyInReg(127 downto 96); 
        
  j  <= 0; 
  r  <= 1; 
  i <= 3; 
             
 if  cnt < RND1KEYLOAD + 3 then             
         cnt <= cnt + 1;  
 else 
            cnt      <= 0; 
            keyState <= itr1; 
 end if;           
 
   
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   when itr1 => 
         w(j + 4) <= Wout; 
         w(j + 5) <= Wout xor w1; 
         w(j + 6) <= Wout xor w1 xor w2; 
         w(j + 7) <= Wout xor w1 xor w2 xor w3; 
 
        i <= i + 4; 
        j <= j + 4; 
        r <= r + 1; 
 
       if cnt < 9 then 
           cnt <= cnt + 1; 
       else 
            cnt      <= 0; 
            keyState <= DONE; 
        end if; 
  
 
 
 
128 bit cipher keys is loaded into 
the registers w(0) … w(4) 
One single round of block is 
implemented as a combinational 
logic and is repeated 9 times.  
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Sample code for AES-128 Parallel Architecture  
 
          w(0) <= keyInReg(31  downto 0); 
          w(1) <= keyInReg(63  downto 32); 
          w(2) <= keyInReg(95  downto 64); 
          w(3) <= keyInReg(127 downto 96); 
           
Cycle 1  
 
          vW(4) := (subWord(rotWord(w(3))) xor Rcon(1)) xor w(0); 
          w(4)  <= vW(4); 
          w(5)  <= vW(4) xor w(1); 
          w(6)  <= (vW(4) xor w(1)) xor w(2); 
          w(7)  <= ((vW(4) xor w(1)) xor w(2)) xor w(3); 
Cycle 2  
 
          vW(4+4) := (subWord(rotWord(w(3+4))) xor Rcon(2)) xor w(0+4); 
          w(4+4)  <= vW(4+4); 
          w(5+4)  <= vW(4+4) xor w(1+4); 
          w(6+4)  <= (vW(4+4) xor w(1+4)) xor w(2+4); 
          w(7+4)  <= ((vW(4+4) xor w(1+4)) xor w(2+4)) xor w(3+4); 
Cycle 9 
 
          vW(4+32) := (subWord(rotWord(w(3+32))) xor Rcon(9)) xor w(0+32); 
          w(4+32)  <= vW(4+32); 
          w(5+32)  <= vW(4+32) xor w(1+32); 
          w(6+32)  <= (vW(4+32) xor w(1+32)) xor w(2+32); 
         w(7+32)  <= ((vW(4+32) xor w(1+32)) xor w(2+32)) xor w(3+32); 
Cycle 10 
 
          vW(4+36) := (subWord(rotWord(w(3+36))) xor Rcon(10)) xor w(0+36); 
          w(4+36)  <= vW(4+36); 
          w(5+36)  <= vW(4+36) xor w(1+36); 
          w(6+36)  <= (vW(4+36) xor w(1+36)) xor w(2+36); 
          w(7+36)  <= ((vW(4+36) xor w(1+36)) xor w(2+36)) xor w(3+36); 
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B.3 ASC-1 Encryption  
 
Encryption in ASC-1 consists of 4 rounds of AES and operates in a variant of Cipher Feedback Mode 
(CFB). The encryption of next data block depends on the previous block in feedback mode, which 
the all block must be processed sequentially. Following shows the sample code for ASC-1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
case algState is 
      when IDLE =>                                
               ctValidDly  <= '0'; 
         if cnt < RND1KEYDELAY then 
               cnt <= cnt + 1; 
         else 
            cnt      <= 0; 
            sInNxt1   <= sIn; 
          algState <= rnd1;    
          end if; 
Round 1  
 
when rnd1 => 
          W0nxt <= W(4); 
          W1nxt <= W(5); 
          W2nxt <= W(6); 
          W3nxt <= W(7); 
          W_key <= W(40); 
 
 
 
    if cnt < RNDDELAY then 
 
            cnt <= cnt + 1; 
    else 
            cnt      <= 0; 
            
        
 Leak  <= sOutNxt1 (0)(0) & sOutNxt1(2)(0) & sOutNxt1(0)(2) & sOutNxt1(2)(2); 
        sInNxt   <= sOutNxt1; 
        algState <= rnd2; 
     end if; 
     
when rnd2 => 
          W0nxt <= W(8); 
          W1nxt <= W(9); 
          W2nxt <= W(10); 
          W3nxt <= W(11); 
          W_key <= W(41); 
 
   if cnt < RNDDELAY then 
            cnt <= cnt + 1; 
    else 
            cnt      <= 0; 
            Leak1  <= sOutNxt (0)(1) & sOutNxt(2)(1) & sOutNxt(0)(3) & sOutNxt(2)(3); 
            sInNxt1   <= sOutNxt; 
            algState <= rnd3; 
     end if; 
     
 
when rnd3 => 
          W0nxt <= W(12); 
          W1nxt <= W(13); 
          W2nxt <= W(14); 
          W3nxt <= W(15); 
          W_key <= W(42); 
 
   if cnt < RNDDELAY then 
            cnt <= cnt + 1; 
The case is IDLE when the top 
module is waiting for the Key 
Schedule to be completed. Once all 
the round keys are calculated using 
the key scheduling the state moves 
to next case, i.e., rnd1 
 
From round 1 to round 4, round 
keys and output of previous state is 
fed into the intermediate states. 
Leak of bytes depends on odd or 
even rounds. AES round output 
certain four bytes from the 
intermediate variable.    
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   else 
            cnt      <= 0; 
            Leak2  <= sOutNxt1 (0)(0) & sOutNxt1(2)(0) & sOutNxt1(0)(2) & sOutNxt1(2)(2); 
            sInNxt   <= sOutNxt1; 
            algState <= rnd4; 
  end if; 
     
when rnd4 => 
          W0nxt <= W(16); 
          W1nxt <= W(17); 
          W2nxt <= W(18); 
          W3nxt <= W(19); 
          W_key <= W(43); 
 
  if cnt < RNDDELAY then 
        cnt <= cnt + 1; 
  else 
         cnt      <= 0; 
         ctValidDly  <= '1'; 
          Leak3  <= sOutNxt (0)(1) & sOutNxt(2)(1) & sOutNxt(0)(3) & sOutNxt(2)(3); 
            final   <= sOutNxt;  
end if; 
when others => null; 
 end case;  
 
 
 
Finally, the output of the 4th round 
is XOR-ed with Authentication key 
to calculate the Tag (𝜏).  
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